
Originally Posted by
bsnub
The Minsk accords are nonbinding, as Troy has stated.
Some have differing views to Troy and yourself:
The organisation:
European Journal of International Law.
"EJIL already has a homepage www.ejil.org, the autonomous website of the European Journal of International Law. Our website was a pioneer long before publishers such as our current publisher, OUP, moved into digital journal publishing, and it is distinct from all other mainline journals of which we are aware. Not only is a sizeable portion of current content made free to the reader, but all content becomes free one year after publication – the scholarly world’s Napster! I say all this to indicate that we are not parvenus to the notion of digital internet publishing."
About – EJIL: Talk!
One example of the organisations opinion:
Legal Bindingness of Security Council Resolutions Generally, and Resolution 2334 on the Israeli Settlements in Particular
Written by Dan Joyner
January 9, 2017
"As I have read commentary on the recently adopted resolution by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 2334) addressing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, I’ve noticed a number of commentators who appear to assume that, since this resolution was not explicitly adopted in exercise of the Council’s Chapter VII powers, therefore all of its operative provisions are per se legally non-binding. Orde Kittrie, writing over at Lawfare, seems to make this assumption clear when he writes:
“Resolution 2334 was not adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and is not legally binding. The resolution does not create additional legal requirements on Israel, nor does the resolution require (or even explicitly encourage) U.N. member states to impose sanctions on Israel in response to Israeli settlement activity.”
I thought this would be a good opportunity to write briefly to clarify that the legal obligation for U.N. Charter states parties to comply with the decisions of the Security Council, contained in Article 24 and 25 of the Charter, is not contingent upon the Council’s acting in exercise of its Chapter VII powers. Any decision of the Security Council is legally binding upon all U.N. member states, whether or not the text of the resolution explicitly references Chapter VII.
Rather, the key question for determining whether a particular provision of a Security Council resolution is legally binding on member states (i.e. whether the provision is a “decision” of the Security Council), including the specific addressee of the resolution, is whether the Council has chosen to use words within the provision indicating its intent to create a legally binding obligation.
The International Court of Justice made these points clear in its 1971 Namibia advisory opinion, in Paragraphs 108-114. There, the Court was considering the juridical implications of provisions of Security Council Resolution 276, which had similarly been adopted with no textual indication that the Council was acting in exercise of its Chapter VII powers. The Court held that:
“It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. It is not possible to find in the Charter any support for this view. . . It has also be contended that the relevant Security Council resolutions are couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory language and that, therefore, they do not purport to impose any legal duty on any State nor to affect any right of any State. The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council. (Para 113-114)”
Applying this test for determining bindingness, the Court determined that the provisions in operative paragraphs 2 and 5 of Resolution 276 were legally binding on all U.N. member states. This included the determination by the Council in operative paragraph 2 that the presence of South African forces on the territory of Namibia was unlawful, and the Council’s call in operative paragraph 5 for all states to refrain from any dealings with South Africa that were inconsistent with this determination.
The question of which words will indicate the Council’s intent to create binding obligation is one that has been discussed in scholarly literature, though honestly not as much as the topic deserves. I recently engaged in an analysis of this subject in Chapter 6 (Pgs. 195-198) of my book on Iran’s nuclear program.
It is interesting to note in this context that in the Namibia advisory opinion, the Court found to be legally binding a provision (operative paragraph 5) which began with the words “Calls upon all States . . . ” Most scholarly commentary over the succeeding decades (including mine) has, however, categorized “calls upon” language as legally non-binding.
So there would appear to be some room for disagreement over which words fall into which category.
Continues at:
https://www.ejiltalk.org/legal-bindi...in-particular/
One presumes you and Troy have some legal knowledge to support your opinion, or a statement from an organisation confirming the legal reasoning in the Minsk Agreement, being or not, "Legally Binding".