To some, the promise of a settled peace is also reminiscent of the two wars Russia waged in the autonomous, majority-Islamic republic of Chechnya, which sought independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Fearing that other semi-independent regions would seek to cleave from Russia, President Boris Yeltsin sent the Russian army into what would become its first post-Soviet conflict.
Much like Putin in Ukraine, Yeltsin expected an easy conquest. Again like Putin, he would be proven wrong. The already savage war culminated with an especially savage 1996 battle in the Chechen capital, Grozny. Russia’s inexperienced soldiers, led by corrupt officers, found themselves ambushed by thousands of Chechen fighters who had long been preparing for a definitive battle.
“We had to make them understand that we will never give our country away,” a Chechen commander said at the time, sounding very much like the defenders of Ukraine who say they refuse to accept less than complete independence.
Three weeks after the defeat at Grozny, Russia signed a peace agreement that looked like victory for Chechnya. A brutal conflict was over. A badly wounded superpower withdrew. A much smaller nation yearning for freedom saw that freedom finally within grasp.
“It’s the end of the war,” Russia’s security chief declared.
But only for a little while.
Just five years after that ostensible peace was signed, a second Chechen war began, one that saw a Russian military determined not to make the same mistakes. Just months later, Grozny was flattened. The war would ebb and flow after that but would never descend into the chaos of the Yeltsin years; Russia declared final victory over Chechnya in 2009, just 13 years after promising Chechnya peace.
“The Russian government lies as a matter of policy and principle,” says Russia expert Michael Weiss, who like others sees the Kremlin as a fundamentally untrustworthy negotiator. U.S. officials share that view.