Thread: The View, from China

Originally Posted by sabang

I just had to laugh-

25 years Investment Banker. Family OfficeMar 7






https://chinaworldleader.quora.com/Yeah-Americans-still-no-1?ch=8&oid=63047561&share=74410500&srid=u6VOf&targ et_type=post

Quality source that one, Sabang.

China - World Leader.

Share all facts about China and discuss how China leads in key areas globally.

Quality photo mate- whatever bulletin board it was posted on. Aren't you proud of them?

Originally Posted by harrybarracuda

I think it's quite brave of you to admit it.

what.

Getting it wrong, being a journalist, or a piano player in a brothel?

Maybe he’s just a plagiarist. lol ��

China faces consequences if it helps Russia evade sanctions over Ukraine - Sullivan

Author of the article:



Reuters


Andrea Shalal and Michael Martina
"WASHINGTON — U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, who is due to meet with China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi in Rome on Monday, warned Beijing that it would “absolutely” face consequences if it helped Moscow evade sweeping sanctions over the war in Ukraine.

Sullivan told CNN the United States believed China was aware that Russia was planning some action in Ukraine before the invasion took place, although Beijing may not have understood the full extent of what was planned.

Now, he said, Washington was watching closely to see to what extent Beijing provided economic or material support to Russia, and would impose consequences if that occurred.

“We are communicating directly, privately to Beijing, that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions, evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them,” Sullivan said. “We will not allow that to go forward and allow there to be a lifeline to Russia from these economic sanctions from any country, anywhere in the world.”

A senior administration official said the war in Ukraine would be a “significant topic” during Sullivan’s meeting with Yang, which is part of a broader effort by Washington and Beijing to maintain open channels of communication and manage competition between the world’s two largest economies.

“This meeting is taking place in the context of Russia’s unjustified and brutal war against Ukraine, and as China has aligned itself with Russia to advance their own vision of the world order, and so I expect … the two of them will discuss the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on regional and global security,” the source said.

No specific outcomes were expected from the meeting, the source added, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The United States on Saturday said it would rush up to $200 million worth of additional weapons to Ukrainian forces as they try to defend against Russian shelling in the largest war in Europe since World War Two.

The Russian assault, which Moscow calls a “special military operation,” has trapped thousands of civilians in besieged cities and sent 2.5 million Ukrainians fleeing to neighboring countries.
The United States and its allies have imposed sweeping, unprecedented sanctions against Russia and banned its energy imports, while providing billions of dollars of military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.

Individually and together they have appealed to China, Gulf nations and others that have failed to condemn the Russian invasion to join in isolating Russia from the global economy.
Beijing, a key trading partner of Russia, has refused to call Russia’s actions an invasion, although Chinese President Xi Jinping last week did call for “maximum restraint” in Ukraine after a virtual meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron.

Xi also expressed concern about the impact of sanctions on global finance, energy supplies, transportation and supply chains, amid growing signs that Western sanctions are limiting China’s ability to buy Russian oil.

Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the state-backed Chinese Global Times newspaper, said on Twitter: “If Sullivan thinks he can persuade China to participate in sanctions against Russia, he will be disappointed.”
The International Monetary Fund last week said the crisis could also see China miss its 5.5% growth target this year, and its chief said she had spoken with China’s top central banker and expected mounting pressure on Russia to end the war.
While in Rome, Sullivan will also meet with Luigi Mattiolo, diplomatic adviser to Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi to continue coordinating the strong global response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “war of choice,” the source said.

The United States and the Group of Seven advanced economies on Friday ratcheted up pressure on Russia by calling for revoking its “most favored nation” trade status, which would allow them to jack up tariffs on Russian goods.

Trade made up about 46% of Russia’s economy in 2020, much of that with China, its biggest export destination"

China faces consequences if it helps Russia evade sanctions over Ukraine - Sullivan | National Post




No mention if it will be televised.

China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi

" is the secretary-general, later renamed director of the general office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, the highest diplomatic position under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. He is generally regarded as one of the foremost contemporary architects of China's foreign policy"

Popcorn ready.

Cool, people are starting to realise what a fucking scam Belt & Owed actually is.

I expect the average chinky won't be able to read this article.

China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), a network of enhanced overland and maritime trade routes better linking China with Asia, Europe and Africa began in 2013 with much fanfare and hope. Upwards of a trillion dollars were being put on the table to boost economic development in globalization’s final frontiers, Asia and Africa’s infrastructure gap was to be lessened, and the world’s second largest economy was taking more of an active role in international affairs with the prospect of creating a true multi-polar global power structure. With catchphrases like “a rising tide lifts all ships,” China stepped beyond its borders to an extent that hasn’t been seen for centuries—perhaps ever—and was welcomed by many emerging markets with open arms.

But today, nearly seven years since the Belt and Road began, the story is much different, as in some markets Chinese investment has nearly become a euphemism for wasteful spending, environmental destruction and untenable debt. Many major projects are currently strewn around the world in half-finished disrepair and the opportunities that were sold to local populations rarely materialized. All up and down the Belt and Road, projects have been marred by delays, financial implosions and (occasionally violent) outpourings of negative public sentiment.

How China's Belt And Road Became A 'Global Trail Of Trouble'

Oh dear:

After a seven hour meeting, China gives NaGastan National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan some homework.

US fails to trap China over Ukraine at Yang-Sullivan meeting

By Chen Qingqing and Fan Anqi

Published: Mar 15, 2022 11:18 PM

"On the same day as a seven-hour meeting between senior Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in Rome on Monday which was described by some media outlets as "intense," US Air Force General Kenneth Wilsbach blatantly threatened to teach China a lesson from the Ukraine situation, which could be applied to the Taiwan question. Such conceit was defied by the first direct high-level engagement between Chinese and US officials over the situation in Ukraine on which Washington had tried to misguide Beijing to serve its own interests, although failing to do so as the Chinese side stressed its consistent stance on the issue and urged the US side to correct its wrong words and deeds.

Ahead of the meeting, the US has been constantly spreading disinformation about China's role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and some US officials tried to mix the Ukraine crisis with the Taiwan question, trying to hijack China over the issues and portraying a false image of the "China-Russia alliance." All these ill-intentioned tactics, in the eyes of Chinese experts, reflect little goodwill from the US for constructive talks while its contradiction between its words and deeds dampens the prospects of a healthy and stable China-US relationship.

Hours after the meeting between Yang and Sullivan finished, China released an 850-word readout reiterating its stance on core issues such as the Taiwan question and the current situation in Ukraine. In rejecting Washington's continuous pressure on misleading Beijing over the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Yang called for taking a long-term view, actively advocating a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, encouraging relevant parties to conduct equal-footed dialogue, and set up a balanced, effective and sustainable European security framework based on the principle of indivisible security in a bid to preserve peace in Europe and around the world.

"The Chinese side resolutely opposes any words and deeds that spread false information, or distort and discredit China's position," he said.

On the heels of the high-level meeting, some US media outlets, citing unnamed US officials, hyped the role of China in the crisis by saying that "Russia asked China to give it military equipment and support for the war," and based on that disinformation, Sullivan expressed "deep concerns" about China's close ties with Russia during the meeting.

In addition, some other Western media outlets also hyped China's willingness to provide "military assistance to Russia," and before the meeting with Yang, Sullivan warned the so-called consequences if China helps Russia evade Western sanctions.

Some Chinese experts believe that the Rome meeting was an occasion for the senior Chinese official to straightforwardly lay out the country's consistent position on the Ukraine issue, when the US-led West continued to pressure China to "pick a side." Not only has the US failed to understand the essence of the China-Russia relationship, it also maliciously connected the Ukraine crisis with the Taiwan question, despite the different nature of the two issues, some experts said, noting that with the strategic composure, China has not fallen into this trap.

Failed trap

Although the Ukraine issue was a priority for the US during Monday's meeting to pressure China to take a stand, it seems the attempt was unsuccessful, Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, told the Global Times on Tuesday.

"Not only did China's position remain unchanged, but it also refuted the rumors and false information the US was spreading. It means that the goal of the US for this meeting has failed," Wu said.

Compared to the readout from China, the US summarized the meeting in only 80 words, as a statement published on the White House website showed, and this shorter-than-expected readout shows the US did not reach any fruitful results from the meeting, some experts said, noting that it also reflects that Washington only focused on its own issues of concern, making the latest China-US talk superficial.

Experts said that it is worth noticing that when Yang talked about China-US relations, he particularly brought up the Taiwan question, as after the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, many Western media have been hyping the relevance of the Ukraine issue with the Taiwan question, but these two are fundamentally different, and attempts to combine them are considered "villainous".

On the same day as the Rome talks, top US Air Force General Kenneth Wilsbach connected the situation in Ukraine with the question of Taiwan, saying that one of the "key lessons" the Chinese are taking from the Ukraine situation is the "solidarity of the global community," and that if China behaves in a similar way against the island or another neighbor, "something more robust will happen," he said at an online discussion on Monday, according to Air Force Magazine.

"From this perspective, we can tell the Sullivan team has not talked with the Chinese side from a position of goodwill and it continued ramping up the pressure, forcing China to yield to its will. But I think they seriously underestimate China's firm position," Lü Xiang, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times on Tuesday.

The Ukraine crisis is part of the extension of the Cold War, which is also the result of the longstanding strategic conflict between the US and Russia, but the Taiwan question is about China's core interests on which neither extreme pressure nor hyping international opinion would shake China's position and determination, Lü said.

Clear stance

Stressing that the Taiwan question concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Yang said during the meeting that in the three Sino-US joint communiqués, the US side explicitly recognized that there is only one China and that the one-China principle is the premise for establishing diplomatic relations between China and the US as well as the political foundation of their relations.

The current US administration has pledged to adhere to the one-China principle and not to support "Taiwan independence" in regard to the Taiwan question, but its actions are obviously inconsistent with its statements, he said.

Asked about the Yang-Sullivan meeting, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian told a routine press conference on Tuesday that China demands the US to clearly recognize the high level of sensitivity of the Taiwan question, adhere to the one-China principle and avoid going down on the wrong path.

The Taiwan question is China's core interests and concern, therefore we must emphasize this point to the US at such a time. It also shows that China has been very unsatisfied with the Biden administration's stance toward the Taiwan question, Wu noted.

"As the Biden administration has not changed its fundamental mindset of dealing with China and its diplomacy is controlled by hawks toward China, I hardly see any significant improvements in China-US relations," he said, noting that a major issue now is about the credibility of the US government.

Experts believe that Washington's efforts to use the Ukraine crisis to demonize the image of China or impede the process of China's reunification process would only end up in vain.

"No matter how much the US attempts to bluff public opinion or threaten potential sanctions [on China], it won't have any impact on the core interests of China," Lü said, noting that if the reunification needs to be done by force given the escalation of the situation, China will finalize it without hesitation."

US fails to trap China over Ukraine at Yang-Sullivan meeting - Global Times

Upwards of a trillion dollars

You mean...... as much as was spent by the USA in Afghanistan? Wow, what a waste.


^ I don't think it is very enlightened Diplomacy to come cap in hand as a supplicant to a foreign power, but loudly declare you are 'warning them'.

Originally Posted by OhOh

Oh dear:

Global Times

Oh dear, yes, hoohoo has absolutely no opinion other than the one the chinkies give him.

Originally Posted by sabang

I don't think

Yes, everyone has been aware of that for some time.

Fraught U.S.-China relations will continue entering 2022. This year, leaders of both countries will be focused on domestic politics, the ongoing pandemic and uneven economic recoveries — challenges that have further added to existing bilateral tensions.

It is an important political year in both countries. U.S. President Joe Biden is facing midterm elections with the Republicans likely to gain seats in the House and potentially the Senate, complicating his administration’s ability to implement its policy agenda. By contrast, China's Xi Jinping is on the verge of assuming a third term as President and is strongly positioned to ensure that his vision for China is carried through.

POLITICS ASIDE, THIS SYSTEMIC DYNAMIC – DIMINUTION VS CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL — IS REFLECTED IN THE VIEWS THAT AMERICAN AND CHINESE CITIZENS HAVE ABOUT THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

Politics aside, this systemic dynamic – diminution vs consolidation of control — is reflected in the views that American and Chinese citizens have about their respective governments. While accurate numbers are always hard to come by in China, our 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer allows us to follow the trends. Trust among Chinese citizens in their government is a record 91 percent, the highest seen in a decade. The result is even more striking compared to the U.S., where trust in government is at 39 percent.

Focusing on China, several internal and external factors explain why popular support was so high this past year.

China was the first major economy to reopen — and thrive — after the Covid-19 outbreak. It was the only major economy to see growth in 2020, and that momentum continued throughout most of 2021. The centralized system of governance allowed Chinese officials to take draconian measures — shutting down travel, instituting a zero-tolerance policy and strict quarantines, and monitoring its citizens —but the swift action and success in rapidly bringing the pandemic under control created confidence with Chinese citizens.

For much of China, life was relatively back to normal by spring of 2020. People were back to work, children returned to the classroom, and new tracking technologies on smartphones enabled individuals to move around with relative confidence that any outbreaks could be traced. The government rolled out the Sinopharm vaccine for emergency use through the state-owned enterprise, China National Pharmaceutical Group, in the summer of 2020, rapidly distributing it throughout the country in early 2021. At one stage, China was vaccinating a staggering 20 million individuals a day.

China has since helped vaccinate the world. Chinese vaccines currently account for almost half of the over 7 billion shots distributed globally. Despite the controversial beginnings, the government’s “vaccine diplomacy” played well at home and contributed to confidence in the government.

Beyond Covid, in 2021, the Chinese government made progress in other areas. China’s war against pollution has seen real results. For the first time, this year, Beijing has met the state air quality standards as have other parts of the country.

President Xi’s anticorruption campaign — netting over 100,000 individuals — has provided a sense of a more level playing field for individuals and business. In China, over 90 percent of businesses are small or medium-sized, yet they are the engine of growth for the country. This is one reason why Xi has been focused on eliminating barriers and encouraging growth of the private sector, while cracking down on monopoly and other anti-competitive behaviors.

Yet the past two years were not all smooth sailing for China. Outside the country, China faces a growing “trust deficit.” As part of its early vaccine diplomacy, Chinese firms exported millions of masks and other emergency materials, often to lesser developed countries. Unfortunately, quality issues reflected poorly on the Chinese companies distributing them. The Chinese government’s response to international criticism has increasingly tended toward so called “wolf warrior diplomacy,” reflecting the growing sense of nationalism and pride within China, but which has also further exacerbated geopolitical tensions, including with the United States, Australia and the European Union.

In the United States, President Biden largely continued his predecessor’s China policy. Since taking office, the administration has expanded sanctions on Chinese technology companies, implemented new accounting rules for U.S.-listed Chinese firms, and kept in place over $360 billion in tariffs on Chinese imports. While it is essential that the United States (and other countries) protect sectors and technologies vital to their national security interests, the implication of some of these policies has been to propagate the view that Chinese firms overall are bad actors.

Rightly or wrongly, Chinese firms are often viewed as the representatives of the Chinese government. Given the tensions of the past year — both at the governmental level as well as at the firm level — the perception of China Inc, or trust outside of China of its firms, has dropped to a low of 31 percent.

Here there is an interesting contrast. In the developed economies surveyed, people expect firms to take on many of the social and economic issues that are traditionally the responsibility of the government. But in China, people still trust the government to remain the leader on social and economic issues and — at least abroad — Chinese companies have harmed rather than helped confidence in the country.

This year will remain a challenging one for U.S.-China relations, arguably the most important relationship globally. There is an obvious trust gap. Yet finding ways to work together rather than in conflict is important to effectively address many of the common global challenges — from the lingering pandemic to climate change, global economic growth, and nuclear proliferation. Xi Jinping enters the year in a strong domestic position. And while President Biden is facing political challenges at home, the combined confidence in the U.S. business community with the U.S. government leaves the United States well placed to work with China in tackling many of these global challenges — if both leaders have the political will to do so.

Deborah Lehr is CEO, Edelman Global Advisory.

Trust in China | Edelman

Xi considered invading Taiwan this fall: Leaked FSB document


Document believed to be leaked from Russian FSB claims Xi considered invading Taiwan in fall for 'little victory to get re-elected'


TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — An apparently leaked Russian intelligence document states that Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) had considered launching an invasion of Taiwan in the fall of this year before the "window of opportunity" closed with the disastrous Russian invasion of Ukraine.


The head of the Russian human rights group Gulagu Net, Vladimir Osechkin, recently on Facebook began releasing the contents of classified documents leaked from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) concerning the war in Ukraine. In one document, which Osechkin claimed was written by an analytical unit of the FSB, an intelligence officer apparently revealed China's original timeline for attacking Taiwan before Russia began its invasion.


According to the March 4 report, Xi had been "considering taking over Taiwan in the fall." Part of the rationale given for that timing was that Xi "needs his own little victory to get re-elected for a third term," a reference to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, amid what the analyst described as a "colossal" power struggle among China's elite.

However, "after the Ukrainian events, this window of opportunity has been closed for (Xi)," wrote the author of the report. He asserted that this gives the U.S. the opportunity to "both blackmail Xi and negotiate with his competitors on favorable terms."


Earlier in the document, the analyst wrote that China may give Russia an ultimatum to "end the war to stabilize oil prices." The author warned that given Russia's negative image due to the war, the U.S. will "easily sell sanctions against China, at least to Europeans, if (China) risks bypassing sanctions on Russia."


The intelligence officer observed that China is so dependent on exports and vulnerable to raw material price swings that sanctions would be a "near-fatal blow." The agent lamented that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has "launched a trap mechanism for China."


As for the authenticity of this document, Christo Grozev, a Bulgarian journalist who won the European Press Prize for Investigative Journalism, cautioned on Twitter on March 6 that Ukraine had released fake FSB documents as part of its psyops strategy, but he vouched for Osechkin as a reputable source. Grozev argued that the length of the letter points to its authenticity, based on the rationale that "the longer the text, the more risk of making an error."


In a follow-up tweet, Grozev stated that he had shown the letter to two confirmed FSB contacts and that they "had no doubt it was written by a colleague." He noted that his FSB contacts did not agree with all of the analyst's conclusions, "but that's a different story."

Xi considered invading Taiwan this fall: Leaked FSB document | Taiwan News | 2022-03-16 11:38:00

I'm just surprised Mr. Shithole isn't having a pop now while everyone is distracted with Ukraine.

It's exactly the sort of sneaky, duplicitous shit the chinkies would pull.

Originally Posted by harrybarracuda

I'm just surprised Mr. Shithole isn't having a pop now while everyone is distracted with Ukraine.

It's exactly the sort of sneaky, duplicitous shit the chinkies would pull.

He is probably smart enough to know that would be the spark to ignite the tinder box. He will sit back and see how his new puppet Putin gets on.

Xi has no interest in having a nuclear confrontation - no winners there. He would rather see what concessions Putin gets before he forms his final plan.

One interesting thing about the on and off 'war of words' between Taiwan and China is that- it is only that. No economic sanctions, no trade, investment or travel restrictions, not even cultural 'sanctions'- and certainly no bullets flying. Actually the taiwanese and chinese economies are closely intertwined, and both parties would only lose by compromising that.

Originally Posted by Iceman123

He is probably smart enough to know that would be the spark to ignite the tinder box. He will sit back and see how his new puppet Putin gets on.

Xi has no interest in having a nuclear confrontation - no winners there. He would rather see what concessions Putin gets before he forms his final plan.

Yes, you're right, Mr. Shithole is a sneaky little bastard.

Originally Posted by sabang

One interesting thing about the on and off 'war of words' between Taiwan and China is that

"War of words"? You fucking moron.

It is basically one-way traffic from Mr. Shithole consisting of nothing but insults and threats.

I see some of our denizens are feeling very insecure and easily triggered right now. Sign of the times?

I asked this question elsewhere, but why don't you stop being a wanker, sabs?

To see a clearly intelligent man revelling in his supposed role as some kind of provocateur championing dictators who kill innocent civilians on a whim is really quite pathetic. And while all this is taking place in front of our eyes at this very moment.

Despite what you may think, you're certainly not covering yourself in glory here.

It is absolutely not being a wanker to inform you that, not only is China doing well but an overwhelming majority of it's citizens are happy with the Chinese government. Neither to inform you that the failed 'Uyghur genocide' narrative is a load of claptrap. It is being a wanker to suggest otherwise.

This is not a Russia/ Ukraine thread, but I quite publicly apportion a triangle of blame for the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, being Putin, the Zelensky regime, and 'US lead Nato' (for want of better term). I, in common with many other people more prominent than I, quite clearly state that this war could and should have been avoided. You however, are caught up in the herd mentality, whipped up by a frenzied media, and therefore incapable of any rational, objective analysis. You are welcome.

Q.E.D.

Being party to my reactions to the wars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Libya you know full well that is not the case PH. Grow up a bit.

Another excellent opportunity for a relaxing coffee break and an informative read.

Regardless of whether Beijing had advance warning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s decision to issue a statement last month outlining a “no limits” partnership with Moscow was arguably the single biggest foreign policy blunder of his nearly ten years in power. Russian President Vladimir Putin will receive the overwhelming share of the blowback for his unprovoked assault on Ukraine, but Xi’s public declaration, coupled with Beijing’s continued diplomatic support for Moscow, has undermined China’s reputation and provoked renewed concerns over its global ambitions. Indeed, the intensifying war in Ukraine has already prompted calls for Taiwan to improve its defense capabilities and has given security partnerships such as NATO, the Quad, and AUKUS a renewed sense of purpose.

Xi’s ill-advised support for Moscow on the eve of Russia’s disastrous military campaign is not his first major foreign policy misstep. His decision to retaliate against EU officials last March in response to sanctions over human rights abuses in Xinjiang cost Beijing a long-coveted investment deal with Europe. His threats toward Taiwan are driving Washington and Taipei closer together and forcing other regional powers, such as Australia and Japan, to declare their own compelling interest in Taiwan’s security. And the Chinese military’s 2020 clash with the Indian army in the Galwan Valley galvanized hard-line opinion in New Delhi. These mounting failures highlight an increasingly evident trend: the more powerful Xi becomes and the more direct authority he exerts over Beijing’s foreign policy, the more adverse the outcomes are for China’s long-term strategic interests. After decades of relatively nimble and effective maneuvering by the post-Mao leadership, Xi has wrenched foreign policy in a new direction—one defined by a greater tolerance for friction with the United States, Europe, and neighboring powers and characterized by little internal debate or external input. What is taking shape is less China’s foreign policy than Xi’s.

With Xi set to assume a third five-year term as China’s leader at the upcoming 20th Party Congress, it is critical for the United States and its allies to understand not just the drivers and contours of his foreign policy but the political and bureaucratic ecosystem in which he makes decisions. As Putin’s reckless gambit in Ukraine has proved, an autocratic leader surrounded by sycophants and fueled by historical grievances and territorial ambitions is a menacing prospect. Xi is not Putin, and China is not Russia, but it would be unwise to ignore the growing parallels.

To say that Xi has consolidated power in China is to state the obvious. Few dispute that Xi holds a singular position within China’s bureaucratic apparatus, and it is increasingly hard to deny that something akin to a personality cult is developing in state media and other propaganda channels. Yet the implications of this reality are insufficiently appreciated, especially its impact on the behavior of the Chinese party-state.

Consider a pattern that has emerged across authoritarian political systems in which leaders remain in office far longer than their democratic and term-limited counterparts. The longer a leader stays in power, the more state institutions lose their administrative competence and independence as they evolve to fit that leader’s personal preferences. Successive rounds of purges and promotions shape the character of the bureaucracy, moving it incrementally in the same direction as the leader’s grand vision. What might begin as formal punishment for explicit opposition to the leadership eventually becomes a climate of informal self-censorship as members of the bureaucracy come to understand the pointlessness of dissent and grow better attuned to unspoken expectations of compliance. The leader also becomes more distant and isolated, relying on a smaller and smaller group of trusted advisers to make decisions. Most of those individuals remain at the table because they display absolute loyalty.

This small circle, in turn, acts as the leader’s window to the world, leaving much dependent on how accurate a depiction of external reality its members choose to provide. Such an opaque decision-making process makes it difficult for external observers to interpret signals from the central leadership. But even more crucially, it makes it hard for actors within these autocratic systems to anticipate and interpret their leaders’ actions. The result is an increasingly unpredictable foreign policy, with the leader formulating snap decisions in secret and the rest of the bureaucracy racing to adapt and respond.

The obvious parallel in the Chinese case is Mao Zedong, who oversaw a tortuous hollowing out of China’s nascent political and administrative institutions. Subservience to Mao defined the bureaucracy, and promotions were based on ideological correctness. Although other actors influenced Beijing’s foreign policy, notably Premier Zhou Enlai, the most important factor shaping China’s strategic behavior was Mao’s personal opinion. But identifying Mao’s dominance over China’s bureaucracy did not by itself provide clues about future foreign policy decisions. Mao’s belief in global revolutionary struggle led him to support armed movements in Southeast Asia, and his sense of realpolitik led him to normalize relations with the archcapitalist United States just a few years later. The key point with Mao’s foreign policy, as it is today with Xi’s, was that external observers needed to be attuned to his worldview, his ambitions, and his anxieties if they were to understand, anticipate, and survive his moves.

Xi, of course, is not Mao. He has no desire to foment global revolution, and his view of the proper domestic political order is far more conservative than Mao’s was. It is also important to note that internal opposition to Xi’s increasingly nationalistic and bellicose foreign policy clearly exists and is likely to grow as his decisions take their toll on China’s interests. But at the same time, there is little a would-be opponent can do to meaningfully constrain Xi—such is the level of overwhelming political and bureaucratic authority he now wields. His supporters occupy positions at the apex of all of the state’s power centers, including the military, the domestic security sector, and the state-owned economy. Xi does not run China’s political system alone, but as in Putin’s Russia, the consolidation of personalized authority over an extended period of time has rewired the decision-making processes in favor of the incumbent and his advisers. As a result, on issues ranging from Taiwan to Ukraine, the entire political system in China waits for Xi’s orders. Foreign policy in the 20th Party Congress period, which lasts from 2022 to 2027, will therefore be driven by Xi’s subjective view of international events and the increasingly isolated decision-making ecosystem that surrounds him.

What might this new era look like? On a practical level, it will feature the continued marginalization of the government’s externally facing bodies. Consider the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On paper, the MFA should be a vital conduit for understanding the actions and the intentions of China’s senior leadership on foreign policy. Indeed, this is why the MFA’s daily press conference was historically seen as important, as it was one of the few windows outside observers had into Beijing’s thinking. In practice, however, the MFA is increasingly scrambling to interpret signals coming down from Xi’s office, as evidenced by its frequently shifting day-to-day talking points on the Ukrainian crisis. The same dynamic exists within the Taiwan Affairs Office, which is, on paper at least, responsible for cross-strait policy. It has become apparent in recent years that the TAO is often blindsided by Xi’s decisions and left scrambling to both interpret and then implement his policies. It will be important to understand the functional realities of such bureaucratic marginalization moving forward, as statements by the Chinese government may not always accurately reflect Xi’s views. More important than traditional bureaucracies will be opaque and secretive bodies such as the National Security Commission and the various “leading small groups” that Xi commands.

Xi’s circle of advisers will also continue to shrink. Although it is not uncommon for leaders in any political system to prize the counsel of a select few voices, effective decision-making demands that these advisers bring competing points of view. There is still much to learn about how Putin came to believe that he could achieve a quick victory over Ukraine, but early signs indicate that his military advisers misled him about the true state of the Ukrainian army. This is a tragic reminder of how critical accurate information is to any political organization, especially in more closed and authoritarian systems. From what analysts understand, Xi’s confidants, including Li Zhanshu, Ding Xuexiang, and Wang Huning, are formidable bureaucratic actors, but there is no indication that they challenge his judgments or priors. And as some of these senior officials retire, Xi will be increasingly surrounded by younger, more inexperienced, and more pliant senior leaders. What Xi needs is a team of rivals. What he has now and will likely have in the future is a group of yes men.

Then there is the critical issue of Xi’s worldview. It is becoming clear from his speeches and articles that Xi’s outlook on China’s security environment in the coming decade is increasingly pessimistic. As he said recently, “the international situation continues to undergo profound and complex changes,” adding that “the game of major powers is increasingly intense, [and] the world has entered a new period of turbulence and change.” The United States, Xi believes, has formalized a policy of containment toward Beijing. When Washington speaks of working with “allies and partners,” Xi hears echoes of Cold War–era encirclement, enacted through what he calls “exclusive small circles [and] blocs that polarize the world.”

This diagnosis arguably led Xi to draw closer to Putin and Moscow in the months leading up to their meeting in February and is why he will not abandon Russia moving forward.

But it is not just pessimism that animates Xi’s worldview; it is a strong sense of nationalism, fueled by his confidence in the Chinese Communist Party’s economic and military power and his dismissive attitude toward the cohesion and stability of the United States and other democracies. Although it is arguably true that Beijing has overemphasized a narrative of U.S. decline for domestic propaganda purposes, Xi’s actions nevertheless indicate that he is comfortable asserting Beijing’s interests even when they clash with the capabilities and resolve of the United States and its allies. There are numerous examples of this dynamic, from China’s evisceration of Hong Kong’s democratic institutions to its ongoing campaign of economic coercion against Australia. The point here is less that Beijing adopts these confrontational policies without paying a price (it does) but rather that Xi’s risk tolerance appears to have grown in response to his shifting assessments of the global balance of power.

The combination of an unconstrained and nationalist autocrat who harbors an increasingly bleak view of the external environment makes for a potentially volatile period ahead. China’s position in global affairs is far more consequential today than it was during the Mao era. The international environment in which Xi attempts to steer Chinese interests is also significantly different from what it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Without the relative predictability of Cold War–era bipolarity, competition today is more complicated and harder to navigate. To compensate, the United States and its allies must prioritize direct communication with Xi to ensure that alternative ideas puncture his leadership bubble. It will also be critical for the leaders of like-minded countries to convey consistent messages during their own separate interactions with China’s leadership. After all, it is one thing for Xi to dismiss Washington as stuck in a “Cold War mentality” but another to ignore a broad coalition of democratic allies. Over the past four decades, China has repeatedly shown that it can change course before it courts disaster. The question now is whether it can do so again under Xi.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-03-16/xi-jinpings-faltering-foreign-policy?check_logged_in=1

Almost brought tears to my eyes that did. Tears of laughter. What sanctimonious, pusillanimous drivel.

Originally Posted by sabang

Almost brought tears to my eyes that did. Tears of laughter.

That is because you are an unrepentant gormless shill.

Originally Posted by sabang

What sanctimonious, pusillanimous drivel.

Thanks for reinforcing my statement above.