Thread: Wikileaks and Thailand...

Wikileaks and Thailand | Asian Correspondent

Wikileaks and Thailand

Dec. 01 2010 - 09:00 pm

As you all know Wikileaks has in its possession some 251,287 cables from US Embassies, Consulates and the State Department. So far they have only released 471 cables and more are being released each day, but none from either the US Embassy in Bangkok nor the US Consulate in Chiang Mai. Most of the cables relate to the time period 2004- February 2010. For a complete list of the dates and subject of all the cables (unsure though if only for the US Embassy in Bangkok and thus not including the Consulate) go here. For a glossary of all the tags, go here. The cables include only those up to SECRET classification so any juicy communications intelligence, signals intelligence, or human intelligence material which would be classified as TOP SECRET is unlikely to be available (i.e if there was any information passed onto to Suthep by the US, it is unlikely to be there although the fall-out from it may be...)

Nevertheless, there are likely to be a number of cables on Thai domestic politics including Thaksin's human rights records, Thaksin and overseas bank accounts,, health issues, the PAD rallies and who the backers were etc. Some interesting dates or cables to look at will be:

Cables on the violence in the Deep South;

Cables on Thaksin's human rights records and corruption;

Cables on political protests of 2005-2006;

Cables on Cambodia-Thai relations and particularly Preah Vihear;

Cables in the lead-up to the September 19 coup and what the US was told in advance of the coup and US private thoughts on the coup;

Cables on US views on Sino-Thai relations particularly on the military exercises;

Cables on US CIA black sites - don't imagine the juicy ones, but there must be some particularly on Thai domestic reaction and the continual denials domestically in Thailand;

Cables on US Embassy views of the Surayud administration and particularly on the referendum and lead-up to 2007 General Election;

Cables on Samak and the military; Samak and Thaksin;

Cables on Thaksin and his travels and Thai representations made;

Cables on Bout's arrest;

Cables on PAD protests particularly seizing of Govt House and airports in 2008;

Cables on change of government in 2008 and military's role and the role of other players;

Cables on the rise of the UDD, the UDD protests of 2009, and related incidents;

Cables about health issues;

Cable of February 2010 on Saudi Arabia and Thailand relations (cough blue diamond cough)

BP: According to Der Spiegel there are 2,941 cables from the US Embassy in Bangkok and another 278 from the Consulate in Chiang Mai - slightly higher figures are also quoted elsewhere. You will also have cables from the State Department about Thailand. There could be some information in the cables that would be very embarrassing and revealing particularly on reports by US Embassy staff after meetings with senior Thai officials and members of the elite. Then with the news that Wikileaks is facing Distributed Denial of Services attacks today:

Both WikiLeaks and the cable site appeared to be operating normally by Tuesday afternoon EST. The latest assaults appeared to originate from IP addresses in Russia and Thailand, according to a blog post from security firm Arbor Networks

BP: Are there just so many compromised machines in Thailand or well where are the attacks coming from Thailand. If the later, why?......

A site, Thai Cables, has been set up (until is is blocked and another site is set up to replace it....) to provide details of the cables.

It seems there is some footage about Thailand and Thais on wiki-leaks that some hi-so Thais would like to see disappear. Do some searching....

None of the US Embassy Bangkok or Consulate Chiang Mai have been published yet.

^ This was months ago....

Leaking evidence of violence and machinations in Thailand

Leaking evidence of violence and machinations in Thailand

December 2nd, 2010 by Tyrell Haberkorn, Guest Contributor · Add a Comment

On 28 November 2010, the release of U.S. diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks, the insurgent citizen watchdog group headed by the elusive Julian Assange sent shockwaves throughout the ranks of the U.S. government and its allies. The released cables, which date from 1966 to the present, have suggested collusion between the ostensibly democratic U.S. regime and less savory regimes around the world, pointed to spying by members of the U.S. diplomatic corps, and raised significant questions about the objectives of U.S. foreign policy. WikiLeaks’ latest release has also prompted an outpouring of panic by the U.S. government about the effects of the cables on their legitimacy and work and conflicting responses by human rights groups that the released cables may contain unredacted information which may further endanger those who are already vulnerable.

At this stage, only a very small number of the documents have been released. WikiLeaks themselves have posted 291 out of 251,287 total documents, while a handful of news outlets who were given the cables — The Guardian, The New York Times, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, and El Pais — have also published either extracts of documents or analysis based on them. Although the published cables and analyses have covered a range of significant issues, there is one location, often overlooked in discussions of U.S. foreign policy, which has not yet emerged in the available cables.
This location is Thailand. Thailand has long been an important diplomatic ally of the United States as well as a willing host to overt and clandestine U.S. operations beginning with the Cold War and continuing through to the so-called War on Terror. Both the number of documents which mention Thailand and the number which originated the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok are in the highest fifth of all documents on WikiLeaks. In concrete terms, this means that there are 3,516 cables which mention Thailand, and 2,941 which originated at the embassy in Bangkok (75 classified as ‘secret,’ 1343 classified as ‘confidential,’ and 1523 that were ‘unclassified’).

While we wait for the cables related to Thailand to be released, it is worthwhile to ponder potential lacunae which might be cleared up by information contained within them. According to Der Spiegel, leaked cables which originated in Bangkok only date from 2004 but the 3,516 documents which mention Thailand may cover a wider period. The information contained in the documents which mention Thailand is potentially significant not only in relation to the U.S. role in Thailand, but also in terms of basic information about events in Thailand. In the context of relatively un-free circulation of information in Thailand, particularly about past episodes of state violence or anything else which could be argued to be related to ‘national security,’ the diplomatic cables may contain very significant revelations. While the list of topics covered by the cables is now available, as mentioned by Bangkok Pundit, the categories are not yet specific enough to pinpoint what may or may not be addressed.

Despite this uncertainty, I raise two topics which may, hopefully, be addressed in the leaked cables: one related to U.S. foreign policy and the other related to Thai domestic policy, but which the U.S. government may have tracked carefully.

1. What precisely occurred at the CIA ‘black site’ prison in Thailand? In 2005, Dana Priest of the Washington Post reported that Thailand was one of the sites of a CIA ‘black site’ prison. The ‘black site’ prisons were detention and interrogation facilities operated off the grid, which possessed shadowy legal statuses and were reported to include sites in 28 countries. Both Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah, who remain in U.S. detention at Guantanamo Bay, were renditioned and interrogated at the CIA ‘black site’ prison in Thailand. In 2008, the Washington Post reported that in late 2005, the CIA ordered that tapes of the waterboarding of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah at the ‘black site’ prison in Thailand be destroyed. When queried about the ‘black site’ prison, Thai authorities have persistently evaded questions about the location or even existence of the prison. Perhaps the cables might shed light on basic information about the ‘black site’ prison, as well as the kinds of relationships between Thai, U.S., and other state officials have sustained this network of shadowy sites in which those deemed to be dangerous to the U.S. state have been renditioned, detained, and tortured.
2. What precisely happened during the coup of 19 September 2006? What has happened during the episodic contention among the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the United Democratic Front Against Dictatorship (UDD), and the various regimes that have been in power? What has been the U.S. government perspective on the contention? The coup against former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was launched against him when he was at a meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York City. What machinations, among which actors, were necessary for the coup to occur, and what did the U.S. government know? In the subsequent months, up to February 2010, the last month covered by the cables, what facilitated the contention among the various actors inside and outside the streets? What was behind the failure of the PM Somchai Wongsawat regime to end the occupation of the airport by the PAD in December 2008? What occurred during the April 2009 Songkran violence between state security forces and the UDD? In each of these moments, what overt and more shadowy forces may have sustained the regimes in power, and what was known by the U.S. government?

What would also be of interest – and perhaps one could hope might be uncovered by WikiLeaks later – would be cables about the contention between the red-shirted members of the UDD and state security forces in April-May 2010 in Bangkok, in which 91 people died and over 2100 were injured. On 19 May 2010, the U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for Thailand, urging citizens “defer all travel to Bangkok and defer all non-essential travel to the rest of Thailand.” While this travel warning has expired and the violence in the streets has died down, the status of the events of April-May 2010 remain contentious. In particular, a clear sense of what happened, and who were the key actors, inside and outside the state security forces, remains unclear. In addition, an unknown number of people were arrested by the state security forces during and after the violence; their current status and the locations of detention centers remain unknown. Efforts by the government of PM Abhisit Vejjajiva — the regime in power when the violence took place — to discover the truth about what took place do not look promising. While a Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been appointed, their work may be constrained by the fact that the government which presided over the violence and excessive use of force remains in power. Within this context, U.S. diplomatic cables about the events may shed light on what really took place, who was responsible for the violence, and what contention is now being obscured by the relative calm on the streets of Bangkok. In other contexts and times when documents and information from a given government are not available, U.S. government documents have illuminated violence which has taken place. Perhaps most notably, the declassification of U.S. government documents about the regime of Augusto Pinochet in Chile both revealed U.S. complicity with the regime while also providing crucial information about the regime not available in Chilean documents.

In their explanation of why they published selected WikiLeaks cables, the New York Times explained that it is because, “the cables tell the unvarnished story of how the government makes its biggest decisions, the decisions that cost the country most heavily in lives and money…. As daunting as it is to publish such material over official objections, it would be presumptuous to conclude that Americans have no right to know what is being done in their name.” I would make a further claim to the broader international significance of the cables. In countries in which there state keeps information tightly controlled, U.S. intelligence analyses or even observations by embassy staff may reveal forms of violence and collusion which would emerge into public circulation otherwise. In the case of Thailand, as the contents of the leaked cables become publicly known, they may shed light on the mechanics by which the ruling regime has stayed in power, if the U.S. has been part of that retention or power, and may answer a series of questions not yet imagined. As noted by Bangkok Pundit, there is now a specific site set up for leaked cables about Thailand, which we should watch carefully in the coming weeks as cables are released. Whether or not WikiLeaks should release the cables has become an immaterial question. Instead, the question has become a different one: now that startling revelations are emerging, what are we — critics, journalists, activists, and others — going to do with the released information?

Some of the Bangkok cables are starting to be released.

Cable Viewer


The government is sometimes blocking them though.

Cable Viewer

First embassy cables from Bangkok released, both about Viktor Bout.

Mobs, these ones are about Viktor Bout and aren't blocked yet. They are the first to be released...

NickDay13 First 2 US Wiki leaks cables about Thailand + Bout have nothing surprising. US lobbied Thai Govt to act. Nothing damaging to Thai govt.

this is actually great,

you know with all the talks about Internet surveillance by the CIA and NSA, this is a good way to "flash" their monitoring activities and take them into their own game.

I'm looking forward to it...However, I wonder how much is safe to post here, as it will get blocked. DD?

http://asiancorrespondent.com/bangko...5Bcablegate%5D

WikiLeaks: US 'can't trust Thailand on extraditions'


Dec. 02 2010 - 10:45 am

The first release of cables from the US Embassy in Bangkok is now available on WikiLeaks. There are two cables. First, is entitled "AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT AND DEFENSE MINISTER" and is dated February 13, 2009 and the second is entitled "NEXT STEPS ON THE VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE IN THE WAKE OF LOWER COURT DEFEAT" and is dated August 13, 2009. Both are classified as secret.

Key excerpts from the first cable:

(S) Summary. During a February 12 meeting, the Ambassador raised with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning Russian international arms trafficker Viktor Bout and serious concerns that Bout’s associates had been able to influence testimony given by [xxxxxxxxxx]. Abhisit told the Ambassador that he would address any “irregularities” in the case through “appropriate channels.” The Ambassador also raised USG concerns with the xxxxxxxxx testimony during a February 13 introductory call with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan. Prawit committed to looking into the testimony in order to determine the truth.

¶2. (S) Comment. Since Viktor Bout’s arrest in Bangkok almost a year ago, moving towards a successful extradition to the United States has been at the top of our bilateral agenda here. In addition to Embassy efforts over the months, President Bush raised it with then-Prime Minister Samak during his August 2008 visit to Bangkok. Overall, our sense has been that while the extradition proceedings have been painfully slow (and have required constant nurturing by our DOJ and DEA personnel every step of the way), they are moving in the direction we want. Lately, however, there have been disturbing indications that Bout’s xxxxxxxxxx and Russian supporters have been using money and influence in an attempt to block extradition. The most egregious example was the false testimony of xxxxxxxxxx that Bout was in Thailand as part of government-to-government submarine deal. Thus, we felt it was time to once again raise the matter at the top of the government and make clear that, while we understand the judicial process must take its course without political interference, we insist that the process be free of corruption and undue influence. We will continue to do so in the months ahead. We understand AG Holder may soon call the Thai AG to review the case (as previous AG Mukasey did three times in addition to his visit to Bangkok last summer). Combined with our efforts this week, the call will make for an important one-two punch. End Summary and Comment.

ABHISIT PROMISES TO LOOK INTO IRREGULARITIES IN BOUT CASE

¶3. (S) During a February 12 meeting at the Parliament, the Ambassador raised with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning international arms trafficker Viktor Bout. (Note: Bout faces terrorism-related charges in federal court in New York for conspiring to sell millions of dollars of weapons to the FARC for use in killing Americans. He has remained in custody in Bangkok since his arrest on March 6, 2008. End note.) The Ambassador noted that, while the U.S. and Thailand enjoy a strong extradition relationship, our countries must ensure that the bilateral extradition treaty worked in our most important cases, such as those involving terrorism. In this regard, the Ambassador emphasized to Abhisit that the extradition case against Bout is a high priority for the United States. Citing the United Nations’ sanctions against Bout, the Ambassador also noted that the extradition case is one of global importance. Abhisit told that Ambassador that he believed that his office had limited means to affect ongoing extradition proceedings, stating that the judicial system was designed to afford due process to the parties and expressing an unwillingness to be seen as “overruling” this process, or “helping one side.”

¶4. (S) Expressing growing concern about the extradition proceedings, the Ambassador then described evidence showing that the extradition proceedings against Bout have become tainted as a result of the efforts by Bout’s associates to bribe Thai officials. In particular, the Ambassador detailed false testimony on Bout’s behalf from xxxxxxxxxx to the effect that Bout came to Thailand to conduct official business with the Thai government relating to a submarine project; recorded statements by a Thai associate of Bout that he had procured xxxxxxxxxx to testify on Bout’s behalf; evidence of bribery schemes gathered throughout the world; and a scheme to arrest and thereby embarrass two U.S. diplomats - i.e., DEA agents assigned to the Bout investigation - on meritless charges of participating in illegal recordings of Bout on the day of his arrest. If the xxxxxxxxxxxx false testimony remained unrebutted, the court could possibly deny extradition based on an erroneous conclusion that RTG had legitimate dealings with Bout, a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker.

¶5. (S) In light of this evidence, the Ambassador asked the Prime Minster to take steps to ensure that the proceedings in Bout’s extradition case were free from the taint of bribery and corruption. In particular, the Ambassador suggested that testimony from an authoritative witness from the Royal Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense should be offered to repudiate the xxxxxxxxxx statement and make clear that the RTG supports the extradition request. The Ambassador also reminded the PM of the recent case of Jamshid Ghassemi, in which the Thai authorities denied a U.S. extradition request under apparent pressure from Iran, and stressed the importance of avoiding a similar result here. (Note: Ghassemi is under indictment in San Diego for violations of the Arms Export Control Act and money laundering relating to his conspiracy to acquire accelerometers used in missile navigation. End note.) The Ambassador also stated that Thailand’s failure to ensure an extradition process in Bout that is free from corruption and undue influence would constitute a major setback to the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Thailand, especially in the area of law enforcement.

¶6. (S) After listening to the evidence provided by the Ambassador suggesting that bribery had infected the Bout proceedings, Abhisit committed to addressing any “irregularities” in the extradition case through the “appropriate channels.” At the conclusion of the meeting, the Prime Minister sought the identity of the individuals involved in the bribery schemes, and the DOJ Attache, who accompanied the Ambassador to the meeting, supplied an aide to the PM with the requested information.

DEFENSE MINISTER COMMITS TO LOOKING INTO TESTIMONY

¶7. (S) During a February 13 introductory call, the Ambassador highlighted to Minister of Defense Prawit Wongsuwan the importance the USG places on the Bout extradition proceedings. The Ambassador noted that the USG understood that extradition cases take time and that the USG respected the Thai judicial system, but we were concerned about efforts by Bout to improperly influence the proceedings. Of particular concern was the false testimony by xxxxxxxxx the Ambassador told Prawit. Thexxxxxxxxxx testimony was not true and, as such, it was very important that the Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense correct this falsehood with testimony to the court. Doing so would ensure that the proceedings were kept on track and would publicly clarify that the Thai military was not associated with a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker. Prawit told the Ambassador that he was unfamiliar with the case but that he would give priority to looking into the issue to determine the truth regarding the testimony ofxxxxxxxxx. The Defense Minister also committed to examining a non-paper with more details on the testimony of xxxxxxxxxxx that the DOJ Attache provided to an aide to Prawit.

BP: There was mention of the submarine deal in a NYT story that BP blogged about here where a Thai naval officer testified that "he had been told to expect a Russian expert to assess whether a particular Thai port was suitable for docking submarines" and that an Russian involved in the procurement came to Thailand and was arrested (ie implying it was Bout). Interesting to know the US says it is false (seemingly confirmed by a letter mentioned in the second cable mentioned below). It was a Thai naval officer who testified too.... BP has mentioned in the past based on what BP has heard and that is the Russians were very involved before the lower court ruling.

Second cable (after the lower court ruling):

Summary and comment. The disappointing August 11 Thai Lower Court ruling against the extradition of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, and its dubious legal reasoning, requires a multi-pronged effort to seek a successful reversal during the appeals process. The lead judge’s foray into foreign policy, rejecting the terrorism label and in effect embracing the FARC’s activities as purely political in nature, not criminal or acts of terrorism, has implications for Thailand. His confusion of the “dual criminality” concept with jurisdictional issues similarly raises questions for efforts by Thailand to extradite fugitive former PM Thaksin to face justice. The Embassy is working with Thai authorities to file an appeal of the lower court’s ruling and to press home the implications of the court ruling were Bout to walk free. In the early afternoon on August 13, we were assured that the notice of intention to appeal has been filed.

¶2. (C) At the same time, the Embassy recommends the State Department, Attorney General Holder, and the US Mission to the UN in New York engage the Thai Ambassador in Washington and the Thai PermRep in New York in parallel. In addition, the Department should seriously consider asking Belgium, which issued an arrest warrant for Bout in 2002 for money laundering and conspiracy, Colombia, in the case of the FARC, and African countries which have suffered greatly from Bout’s arms trade in the past to weigh in with the RTG. Finally, we recommend consideration of laying down a marker in Moscow about Bout, looking forward to the possibility that Bout may end up back in Russia were the appeal of the Lower Court ruling might not succeed. End Summary and comment.

Thai Lower Court rules against Bout extradition

¶3. (C) On August 11, the judge in the Viktor Bout extradition case ruled against U.S. and Thai government efforts to extradite Bout to the United States. Two key elements of his reasoning were: that the FARC in Colombia, to which Bout was conspiring to send weapons, was a political rather than a terrorist group; and that the “dual criminality” standard of our extradition treaty with Thailand had not been met since Bout could not be prosecuted in Thailand on the charges which the U.S. wants him to face in the U.S. In our view, the judge was wrong on both counts.

¶4. (C) After the verdict, as the Department has seen, the DCM spoke on the record to press outside the court room and expressed disappointment and mystification over the ruling and stated that we would fully support RTG efforts to appeal the decision. We have continued the same themes in subsequent interactions with the press.

Engaging the Thai immediately

¶5. (C) The Ambassador called Foreign Minister Kasit immediately after the verdict on August 11 and expressed deep disappointment, noting that the verdict was not justified on legal grounds and that the judge had clearly been in error on several key points. He reminded Kasit that over the past year and a half since Bout’s arrest in Bangkok, the USG had repeatedly underlined the importance of the case, all the way up to the Secretary of State and POTUS levels. In the short-term, the Ambassador told Kasit, we need the Foreign Ministry to do its part in forwarding the necessary documentation to the Attorney-General’s office so that the intent to appeal can be filed in the requisite forty-eight hours. (Note: Although the court’s ruling and a new extradition law specify that the appeal must be filed within 72 hours, the applicable extradition law sets forth the shorter time frame, which we have followed.) Kasit assured the Ambassador that he had already instructed his legal department to do so. The Ambassador also told Kasit that we expected Bout would remain in detention during the appeals process. The MFA’s Legal and Treaties Department faxed the Attorney General’s office late evening August 11 supporting the appeal; at the request of the Office of the Attorney General, the Embassy sent a diplomatic note to the MFA and the OAG on August 13 requesting that the RTG appeal the lower court verdict prior to the forty-eight hour deadline (note: the RTG was closed August 12 for a National Holiday, the Queen’s Birthday.) At approximately 1:25 p.m. on August 13, the MFA and OAG advised the Embassy that the requisite notice of intention to appeal had been filed and received by the court.

Next steps
----------

¶6. (C) The Embassy’s “Bout team” met August 13 to review next steps that will help us prevail on appeal. Our immediate priority was to ensure that the notice of intent to appeal was filed on time (within 48 hours of the verdict) and that the appeal itself is filed within thirty days of the verdict.

¶7. (C) We will make clear to the RTG that we expect Bout to remain incarcerated during the appeals process, as specified under Thai law and the August 11 court ruling. Given that the same judge will rule on any bail motions brought by Bout (we expect Bout’s attorneys to push hard on bail), however, his custody status during the pendency of the appeal is a genuine concern. We also intend to make clear to the Thai government (the Ambassador is seeking to call FM Kasit, in Malaysia August 13-14 on a working visit, and will engage the highest available MFA official in Bangkok) that we expect this deficient ruling to receive a comprehensive and meaningful review by the appellate court. Moreover, the Ambassador plans to tell Kasit and other senior Thai officials that, given that the Thai government arrested Bout and sought his extradition to the U.S., the Thai government should be as alarmed by the judge’s ruling as we are. Therefore, we would encourage the RTG to issue a public statement expressing disappointment in the judge’s decision, its intention to win on appeal, and a reiteration of Thailand’s commitment to both the struggle against international terrorism and to its extensive law enforcement relationship with the United States. The Ambassador intends to make similar points to newly appointed NSC Secretary General Tawee and to key figures at the Palace. Without being counter-productively heavy-handed, we will make clear that we see Thai executive branch reaction to the ruling as a test of the relationship.

BP: Making the point to key figures at the Palace. Why ever would there be a need to do that given that key figures would never be able to play a role given they do not interfere with politics as we have been told many times (we haven't been misled, have we?)

Agree with John that the lower court ruling was dubious as blogged about here.

Cable continues:

¶8. (C) At the same time, however, we believe it is important to remember that our partners in the Royal Thai Police, the Office of the Attorney General, the Foreign Ministry, and even the Royal Thai Navy, largely did everything we asked them to do on the Bout case, including going the extra mile to facilitate our requests. Our posture and actions thus should make clear that we are disappointed with the judge’s ruling but not with Thai government cooperation in the Bout case.

¶9. (C) That said, coming on the heels of the September 2008 Thai appellate ruling affirming a lower court’s denial of our request to extradite Iranian Jamshid Ghassemi, who was in Thailand to procure controlled technology in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, the question has to be asked whether we can count on the Thai courts to do the right thing on high-profile extradition cases that will affect Thailand’s relations with third countries (we continue to have a perfect record on routine extraditions from Thailand to the United States). Our reluctant conclusion is that we cannot.

¶10. (S) The Department will recall that in February of this year, after significant indications that the Russians were trying to use bribes to influence the outcome of the case, the Ambassador made representations to Prime Minister Abhisit (reftel) that we expected the process to be free of inappropriate influence and Abhisit undertook to do so. The Ambassador also intervened at the same time with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan and the Royal Thai Naval Commander Khamtorn Pumhiran to insist that false testimony by xxxxxxxxx (that Bout had been in Thailand as part of a routine naval procurement) be rebutted. The Thai Navy subsequently issued a letter to that effect. We will remind the Thais of their commitment to a clean process and ask that they assure us again on the front.

BP: Telling that the US Ambassador doesn't think they can trust the court in regards to high profile extradition cases that will affect Thailand's relations with third countries. One hope he isn't implying that politics somehow influenced the lower court ruling and thus casting aspersions about the Thai judicial system (a Bangkok Post editorial denouncing the Ambassador is probably being drafted now)....

btw, the (S) at the beginning of the paragraph 10 indicates that there is information in this paragraph tht is classified as "secret" whereas the (C) before the other paragraphs indicates it is confidential.

The Cable continues:

What We are Doing here/What We Suggest Washington Do

¶11. (C) Given the above, we are undertaking the following steps here in Bangkok, most of which should also be reflected when the Department calls in Thai Ambassador Don Pramuwinai, a move we fully support: -- The Ambassador will immediately seek a meeting with Foreign Minister Kasit and other appropriate senior Thai officials to make clear that, while we appreciate the cooperation on Bout over the past year and a half, we are disappointed and mystified by the judge’s ruling, which is flawed on several key points. -- In particular, the judge’s characterization of the FARC as a legitimate political actor would suggest that insurgent groups in southern Thailand are likewise political in nature, perhaps outside the scope of Thailand’s new counterterrorism laws. The ruling also suggests that anyone seeking to send them arms from a third country could not be extradited to Thailand on political grounds. -- Moreover, the judge’s misguided analysis of the “dual criminality” standard suggests that fugitives cannot be extradited from Thailand unless a Thai court actually had jurisdiction over the alleged crime, not whether the alleged conduct is viewed as criminal conduct under the laws of both countries. This decision comes at the same time Thailand is pursuing extradition of fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra for abuse of power/corruption-related charges; the judge’s ruling would also seem to undermine RTG positions in their Thaksin extradition effort. -- Therefore, we expect that the AG’s office will vigorously pursue the appeal of the ruling and that Bout will remain incarcerated during the pendency of the appeal. -- We seek assurances that the case will be afforded a comprehensive and meaningful appellate review, presumably handled by serious, experienced Thai judges. (Note: Appeals are normally handled by a panel of three judges. End Note.) -- We ask that the Thai government issue a statement making clear its own disappointment with the judge’s ruling and reiterating its commitment to the fight against international terrorism and to the law enforcement relationship with the U.S. -- We will continue to make our points to the press and we are pulling together a “FARC fact sheet” for public distribution that we will send in to Washington for comment and clearance today.

BP: John clearly knows how to push Kasit's buttons by including the reference to Thaksin.... How can the choice of judges be affected and why would it matter given all Thai judges are honest......
The cable continues

¶12. (C) We suggest that Washington strongly consider the following actions: -- In addition to the Department calling in the Thai Ambassador, we recommend that Attorney General Holder also call him in. AG Holder could point out the extensive U.S. commitment of law enforcement resources to Thailand (DEA and other), as well as our judicial training efforts, and that a statement from the RTG as outlined above would be very helpful as the U.S. decides where best to commit its law enforcement resources around the world. A senior DEA official might also wish to sit in to highlight the massive DEA commitment to Thailand. (Note: Our DOJ Attache who has led our legal efforts on Bout here will be in Washington on August 20-21. End Note.) -- Discussion of a POTUS telcon to PM Abhisit has been under way for some time; they have not spoken in the seven months both have been in office. We suggest that the call be accelerated and that it include a serious discussion of our concerns over the implications of the Bout verdict, as outlined above. We believe POTUS involvement on Bout would have significant effect here. -- We suggest Washington engage the Colombian government on the implications of the Bout verdict. We suggest inquiring whether Colombia considers the FARC to be a terrorist organization, whether it would be willing to submit a brief in the appeals process, and also make public statements to that effect. We also suggest exploring whether Colombia would be willing to ask Thailand for Bout’s extradition while he (hopefully) is still in detention during the appeals process. (Note: There is no Colombian Embassy in Bangkok; the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur covers Thailand. We understand the Thais cover Colombia from their Embassy in Lima. End note.) It would be useful if the Government of Colombia also raised its concerns in Moscow. -- We also suggest exploring the possibility of whether governments whose citizens have borne the bloody results of Bout’s activities over the years, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, would be willing to publicly express dismay/engage the Thai government on the verdict and whether any affected government would be willing to ask for his extradition. -- While the Bout focus is now on Thailand, this is at heart a U.S.-Russian matter. The Department may wish to make clear to Moscow our concerns on Bout’s activities and seek assurances that they will cease. Also, we should consider asking the Russians to prosecute Bout if, in the end, he walks here in Thailand. At the very least perhaps we could force the Russians to publicly refuse to do so. -- The Thai ruling seems inconsistent with several United Nations determinations on Bout’s nature over the years (see below). We suggest our USUN call in the Thai Permrep and lay out how we view the issues in terms of Thailand’s standing with the United Nations. Better yet would be for the appropriate UN official to call in the Thai Permrep and seek an explanation of how the verdict can be justified in light of Thailand’s support of relevant UN resolutions: - UNSCR 1521 (2003) - Liberia - UNSCR 1343 (March 2001) - Liberia - Report of Experts Panel under 1343 - Final Monitoring Report on Angola Sanctions (2000)
-- Finally, despite the listing by the US and EU of the FARC as a terrorist organization, we understand that the FARC is not listed as such by the UN. A move to have the FARC listed formally by the UN would assist the effort to keep Bout in custody. JOHN

BP: Most of this is not surprising - well at least from what BP has heard. The US role behind-the-scenes increased dramatically after the lower court ruling after taking a more hands-off-approach earlier on.... It is pity we don't have the Russian cables too.

And these are just the first two cables although one would expect the more interesting material (from an international affairs POV) to be released early on....

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

I'm looking forward to it

me too,

basically they think they can spy on us without consequences, so fair game for us to spy on them this time

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-e...cuments/238045

US embassy cables: Russian mafia active in Thailand

Wednesday 1 December 2010 21.30 GMT

• Friday, 04 December 2009, 08:28
• 
  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 003066
  SIPDIS
  
  EO 12958 DECL: 11/25/2019
  TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, RU, TH
  
  
  SUBJECT: RUSSIA LOOKS TO REINVIGORATE BILATERAL RELATIONS
  WITH THAILAND, AGAIN
  
  BANGKOK 00003066 001.2 OF 005
  Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
• Summary
  1. mproved relations between Thailand and Russia have led to an increase in tourism but also the presence of Russian organised crime networks, partuclarly around the resorts of Pattaya and Phuket. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
  2. Read related article
  1. (C) Summary: The Thai-Russia bilateral relationship blossomed earlier this decade after years of stagnation during the Cold War but has had little forward momentum since then, despite a November 27 visit to Bangkok by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sobyanin and Thai pledges that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister will travel to Russia in 2010. The resurgence earlier in the decade occurred as a result of a flurry of high-level visits, first by then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to Russia in 2002 and a reciprocal visit by former President Vladimir Putin to Thailand in 2003. For its part, Russia has advocated the construction of a regional energy facility in Thailand to be supplied by Russia, aspired to become a dialogue partner for the East Asia Summit (EAS), and expand arms exports in Southeast Asia. Thailand enjoys a rapid expansion of Russian tourists visiting Thailand but has to deal with an unwanted side effect - the presence of Russian organized crime networks around the popular beach destinations of Pattaya and Phuket. The biggest headline grabber of 2008-09 has likely been the arrest of Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, whose extradition to the U.S. remains under review by an Appellate Court.
  
  2. (C) Comment: The Thai-Russia bilateral relationship saw a period of re-engagement from 2002-03 during fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's outward-looking administration (2001-06), with Thaksin pursuing possible arms purchases from Russia in barter deals to boost Thai exports of agricultural products and to lessen Thai military dependence on U.S. systems. However, since Thaksin's ouster in a bloodless coup in 2006, Thailand has primarily been inwardly focused. For his part, Thaksin has continued to travel regularly to Moscow, including a December 2-3 visit, meeting quietly with Putin. With Thailand's foreign policy centered primarily on ASEAN, the U.S., and China, there is little space for Russia to be an influential player. Putin's continued willingness to host Thaksin in Moscow--the Russian government refused to confirm the visit to the Thai Embassy in Moscow, even as Thaksin's brother was announcing it to the Thai media and Thaksin's lawyer and lieutenants were discussing freely with us--certainly will win Russia few favors with the current Thai government.
  
  3. (C) Comment, cont: That said, there is an interesting well-spring of enduring pro-Russian sentiment among many Thai based on historical ties between the Siamese and Russian royal families: King Chulalongkorn and Tsar Nicholas II exchanged reciprocal visits in 1909-1910; and the Tsar provided what many Thai consider a critical boost to Siam's independence in the face of British and French pressure on Siam's borders and sovereignty. Queen Sirikit's 2007 State visit to Russia reminded many Thai of this century-old emotional bond. Some commentators suggest a Thai reluctance to offend Russia by extraditing Viktor Bout to the U.S., manifested in the initial August Lower Court ruling denying the extradition request, may have been grounded in part in this enduring sentiment. End Summary and Comment.
  
  Thai-Russian Bilateral Re-engagement
  
  4. (C) 2002-03 was the seminal period for the renewal of Thai-Russia relations, Professor Kantassa Thunjitt from Thammasat University's Russian Studies Program told us recently. Despite warm relations a century ago between Imperial Russia and Siam, the relationship had been largely dormant during the Cold War era and afterwards until Thaksin made an official visit to Russia in October 2002, with Putin reciprocating in October 2003, when Thailand hosted APEC. Kantassa highlighted Putin's audience with King Bhumibol during his visit as particularly significant. Bangkok Post Senior Reporter Achara Ashayagachat told us recently that Thaksin had looked to Russia to expand market opportunities. Achara also believed that Thaksin sought to balance Thailand's relationships with both the U.S. and China through BANGKOK 00003066 002.2 OF 005 engaging Russia, while simultaneously looking at ways to maximize profits.
  
  5. (C) While Thaksin and Putin visits prompted a flurry of diplomatic re-engagement at the most senior levels, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Department of European Affairs official Wacharin Vongvivatachaya told us that Thai-Russian relations peaked during Queen Sirikit's State visit to Russia in July 2007. During the Queen's trip, she visited Moscow and St. Petersburg, met Putin and then First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and was deeply impressed by the Mariinsky Ballet. As a result, the RTG arranged for the Mariinsky to visit in December 2007 to perform for King Bhumibol's 80th birthday. The ballet performed once during a closed session for the King and the palace, and twice for sold out Thai audiences. Wacharin commented that these performances had led to yearly participation of Russian opera and ballet troupes at the annual September Bangkok International Festival of Dance, which the Queen has attended the past two years.
  
  6. (SBU) The latest Russian effort to reinvigorate the bilateral relationship came November 27, with the visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Sobyanin to Bangkok to meet with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and to convene the Fourth Thai-Russian Joint Commission Meeting with FM Kasit. Sobyanin looked to increase trade and investment, signaled Russia's willingness to cooperate with Thailand in research and development in the oil and natural gas sector, and underscored Russia's desire to cooperate with Thailand on security and culture issues, according to a statement posted on the Thai MFA's website. As a sign of recent drift in Thai-Russian relations, however, the Joint Commission meeting, intended to convene every two years, came after an eight year hiatus.
  
  7. (SBU) DPM Sobyanin also extended an invitation to Abhisit to visit Russia in early 2010, according to the MFA statement. Wacharin told us December 2 that Abhisit plans to accept this invitation and will likely travel to Moscow in the first half of next year, and that FM Kasit would separately travel to Moscow for the Fifth Joint Commission Meeting.
  
  Russia Interested in Economic Ties...
  
  8. (SBU) After visiting Thailand for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting in Phuket July 22-24, and having an audience with King Bhumibol Adulyadej in Hua Hin to reaffirm Russia's historical ties with Thailand, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivered a keynote speech at Chulalongkorn University July 24 in which he outlined Russia's key economic goals for further cooperation and integration with the Thai economy. Lavrov highlighted Russia's eastern territories as holding natural resources -- such as oil, gas, and coal -- that could become the means to further engage with countries like Thailand. As such, one of Russia's critical goals was to promote energy cooperation between Russia and Thailand; Lavrov announced Russia's interest in developing a regional facility in Thailand for storing, processing and trading Russian oil and gas.
  
  9. (C) MFA official Wacharin downplayed the significance of Lavrov's proposal for a regional oil facility in Thailand, explaining to us that it was currently only a Russian idea. She commented that this plan was first proposed by the Russians under Thaksin's administration; the MFA in 2008 had previously told us that then Samak government continued to push the idea, even though the Thai state-owned energy firm PTT doubted its economic viability. Wacharin stressed that the energy policy of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's government was markedly different from that of its Thaksin-associated predecessors. She said that while the Royal Thai Government (RTG) continued to study the proposal further, there were many technical issues that needed to be reviewed, such as transportation costs. BANGKOK 00003066 003.2 OF 005
• ...And a political voice in the region
  
  10. (C) Watcharin said that the MFA viewed Russia as eager to become a major player in the Asia Pacific region. Russian Embassy diplomat Andrey Dmitrichenko told us that Russia had previously taken a more active approach in engaging ASEAN in hopes of facilitating Russian participation in the East Asian Summit (EAS) as a dialogue partner. However, Russia currently was now willing to wait, not pushing its case; Dmitrichenko suggested that it was more realistic for Russia to become a dialogue partner at the same time that the U.S. was invited to become a dialogue partner. Dmitrichenko noted that Russia had acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2004, held an ASEAN-Russia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, and looked forward to the second ASEAN-Russia Summit in Vietnam, which would follow on the establishment of an ASEAN Center in Moscow in late 2009.
  
  11. (C) The opinions of non-official Thais we talked to about the Russian diplomatic push was in general rather dismissive. Professor Rom Phiramontri, Director for the Center of Russian Studies at Chulalongkorn University, commented that in general Russia has had very little influence in Asia, particularly in Thailand. In his opinion, Russia was attempting to gain more influence with Thailand, geographically in the center of ASEAN, in an attempt to expand influence throughout the region, especially economically. Professor Kantassa of Thamssat similarly told us that Russia was trying to play a larger role in Southeast Asia, noting it has attempted to raise its status in the region by offering itself as an alternative to the U.S. and China.
  
  Trade, Tourism, and Organized Crime
  
  12. (SBU) Wacharin underscored that trade and tourism were the most important elements to the Thai-Russia bilateral relationship. For Russia, Thailand was its number one trading partner in Southeast Asia with trade accounting for over $1 billion annually. (Note: U.S.-Thai trade exceeds $30 billion annually. End Note.) Wacharin stated that Russia's main exports to Thailand were rolled steel, scrap metal, fertilizers, unprocessed minerals, synthetic rubber, diamonds, pulp, and paper. Thailand's main exports to Russia were sugar, rice, gems, clothes, shoes, canned food, and furniture. Thailand's premier multi-national, the CP Group, had invested in Russia by establishing an animal food producing factory in Moscow's suburbs, Wacharin added, though there has been little Russian investment in Thailand, mainly in small businesses.
  
  13. (SBU) Wacharin commented that the number of Russian tourists to Thailand had steadily increased, to 300,000 Russians in 2008. Thailand was the number two destination in Asia for Russian tourists, who did not need visas for short visits. The Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) reported that as of October 2009, six direct scheduled weekly flights are being operated between Moscow and Bangkok by Thai Airways International and Aeroflot Russian Airlines. While traditionally the main destination for Russian tourists was Pattaya, leading to Russia establishing a Honorary Consul covering Pattaya, Rayong, and Chonburi on the eastern seaboard, in the past several years Russians had started flocking to the up-market resorts on Phuket on the Andaman coast in large numbers, where a second honorary consulate has been established.
  
  14. (C) Russian organized crime circles established a presence in Thailand in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A number of U.S. law enforcement agencies are involved in investigating or monitoring cases involving Russian organized crime in Thailand in cooperation with Thai partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the BANGKOK 00003066 004.2 OF 005 Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These law enforcement agencies report that criminal networks composed of mostly Russian nationals operating in Pattaya and Phuket are responsible for the commission of numerous crimes, including extortion, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, real estate fraud, financial fraud, human smuggling, pandering, counterfeiting, document fraud, cybercrime, and illegal importation of cars.
  
  15. (SBU) While much of the Russian organized criminal activity in Thailand has occurred quietly, three specific cases generated public awareness of the phenomenon. In April 1998, Russian restaurant owner Konstantine Povoltski was found shot dead in a car near one of his two restaurants in southern Pattaya. In August 2003, police apprehended three Russian bank robbers when their speedboat ran out of fuel after they held up the Bank of Ayudhya in South Pattaya, stole 2.4 million baht, and killed a Thai police officer in the process. Rinat Koudaiarov was sentenced to death for the shooting. In February 2007, two Russian women were found murdered on the beach of Jomtien 10 km from Pattaya, amidst speculation that it had been a Russian OC-ordered hit.
• 
  Weapons for Sale
  
  16. (SBU) One area in which potential cooperation has not been fully realized is in military armaments. Thaksin started pursuing possible deals for Russian weapons in 2003 in exchange for debts Russia had incurred earlier in purchasing Thai rice. In 2005 Thaksin had attempted to broker a deal with Putin in which Russia would sell a dozen Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets to Thailand in exchange for 250,000 tons of frozen poultry worth $500 million. In the end, however, the deal fell through; in October 2007, Thailand signed a $1.1 billion agreement to purchase six Saab JAS-39 Gripen jets from Sweden.
  
  Viktor Bout
  
  17. (C) Russian arms merchant Viktor Bout was apprehended in a joint U.S.-Thai undercover DEA sting operation March 6, 2008 and remains in Thai custody. The U.S. requested extradition in order to try Bout in the Southern District of New York on a four-count indictment charging conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and officers; acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and provide material support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization. The Thai lower court ruled in favor of Bout, and against extradition, on August 11, 2009, with the Thai judge stating that the FARC was engaged in a political cause, not terrorism.
  
  18. (C) Initially, the primary publicly-known Russian interest in defending Bout came from the Russian Duma, but later, the Russian Government took a more active role in pressing Thailand not to extradite Bout. Members of Parliament (MPs) Sergey Ivanov and Vice Chairman of the Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky have been active in supporting Bout from the beginning. Ivanov testified at Bout's trial as a defense witness, stating that if Bout were to be extradited to the U.S. it would adversely affect the Thai-Russia bilateral relationship. Zhirinovsky has picketed the Thai embassy in Moscow for Bout's release, lobbied the Thai ambassador, disrupted the Thai Ambassador during public speeches, and portrayed Bout as the victim of an anti-Russian witch hunt. The Thai DCM in Moscow, and the Thai MFA's Russian desk, have acknowledged to Embassies Moscow/Bangkok the diplomatic pressure the Russian MFA and Embassy in Bangkok have placed on Bout's behalf.
  
  19. (C) Professor Rom told us he thought that U.S.-Thai relations would not be negatively affected over the long-term if the U.S.'s appeal failed and Bout was able to return to Russia; he stressed that Thailand had already cooperated with the U.S. by apprehending Bout at U.S. request. Professor BANGKOK 00003066 005.2 OF 005 Kantassa admitted that Bout was a businessman who would sell weapons to anybody, but suggested that the Thai court would take a neutral stance between the U.S. and Russia on the extradition, a sentiment we occasionally heard from MFA contacts since Bout's arrest (Note: the August 11 Lower Court ruling rejecting the extradition certainly could not be characterized as "neutral"; we await the Appellate Court panel decision).
  
  20. (SBU) Note: this cable was coordinated with Embassy Moscow. JOHN

Thailand has long been an important diplomatic ally of the United States as well as a willing host to overt and clandestine U.S. operations beginning with the Cold War and continuing through to the so-called War on Terror.

Both the number of documents which mention Thailand and the number which originated the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok are in the highest fifth of all documents on WikiLeaks.

In concrete terms, this means that there are 3,516 cables which mention Thailand, and 2,941 which originated at the embassy in Bangkok (75 classified as ‘secret,’ 1343 classified as ‘confidential,’ and 1523 that were ‘unclassified’).

New Mandala — New perspectives on mainland Southeast Asia

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2010...-30143707.html

Tsunami of leaks

By The Nation
Published on December 3, 2010


The first wave of the WikiLeaks hurricane has hit Thailand, exposing behind-the-scenes information on the tug-of-war over Viktor Bout's extradition. Here is what outgoing US ambassador, Eric G John, said to his government during the three-way diplomatic tussle between his country, Thailand and Russia, as well as his statement, given exclusively to The Nation yesterday, in response to the whistle-blowing website.

Two classified cables sent by US Ambassador to Thailand Eric G. John to Washington concerning the extradition of alleged Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout have been leaked to the public by Wikileaks.

The first reported on a meeting between John and Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva on February 12. Abhisit promised the ambassador he would address "irregularities" in the case through "appropriate channels".

In an introductory call with Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan the next day, John raised US concerns over testimony provided by "xxxxxxxxx", a person whose name was removed by WikiLeaks. Prawit committed to looking into the testimony to determine the truth.

The ambassador wrote in the first cable that there were disturbing indications Bout's "xxxxxxxxx" (also removed by WikiLeaks) and Russian supporters were using money and influence to try to block extradition. The most egregious example was the false testimony of xxxxxxxxx claiming Bout was in Thailand as part of a government-to-government submarine deal.

The second leaked cable was sent after the primary court rejected the extradition request. The ambassador called Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya immediately after the verdict on August 11 and expressed deep disappointment, claiming the verdict was not justified on legal grounds and that the judge had clearly been in error on several key points. The ambassador told Kasit the United States needed the Foreign Ministry to forward the necessary documents to the Attorney-General's Office so its intent to appeal could be filed in the requisite 48 hours.



The United States would encourage the Thai government to issue a public statement expressing disappointment in the judges' decision, its intention to win on appeal and a reiteration of Thailand's commitment to both the struggle against international terrorism and its extensive law-enforcement relationship with the US, John wrote.

The ambassador made similar points to newly appointed National Security Council secretary-general Tawin Pleansri and to key figures at the Palace. "Without being counter-productively heavy-handed, we will make clear that we see Thai executive branch reaction to the ruling as a test of the relationship," he wrote.

John said in his cable that the judge's characterisation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) as a legitimate political actor suggested insurgent groups in Thailand's South were likewise political in nature, perhaps outside the scope of Thailand's new counter-terrorism laws. The ruling also suggested that anyone seeking to send the groups arms from a third country could not be extradited to Thailand on political grounds.

"Moreover, the judges' misguided analysis of the 'dual criminality' standard suggests that fugitives cannot be extradited from Thailand unless a Thai court actually had jurisdiction over the alleged crime, not whether the alleged conduct is viewed as criminal conduct under the laws of both countries," John wrote.

"This decision comes at the same time Thailand is pursuing extradition of fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra for abuse of power/corruption-related charges; the judges' ruling would also seem to undermine the Thai government's positions in their Thaksin extradition effort."

John noted that discussion of a teleconference between the US president and Abhisit had been under way for some time and that the pair had not spoken in the seven months they had both been in office.

"We suggest that the call be accelerated and that it include a serious discussion of our concerns over the implications of the Bout verdict, as outlined above. We believe the president's involvement on Bout would have significant effect here," John wrote in the cable.

Abhisit said yesterday that John had raised the issue of irregularities in Bout's case when they met in February but that he did not talk with US President Barack Obama about the case.

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Abhisit said yesterday that John had raised the issue of irregularities in Bout's case when they met in February but that he did not talk with US President Barack Obama about the case.

Hmmmm interesting to see the Yanks getting their nose put out of joint by one of their closest (if not the closest) allies in Asia!

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2010...-30143701.html

ASK THE EDITORS
Leaks reveal pressure on Govt in Bout case

By Tulsathit Taptim
The Nation
Published on December 3, 2010

Whether it's just the tip of the iceberg or the first wave of a tsunami, the WikiLeaks "cables" exposure involving Thailand, the United States and Russia in the Victor Bout extradition saga has wreaked considerable diplomatic havoc.

But which nation has emerged with the biggest bruise?

As a small country caught between two superpowers, Thailand is less affected by the disclosure of what the US Embassy said to Washington during the extradition episode. The exposed "secret" messages the US mission sent to its headquarters only confirmed what anyone could have guessed - how much Bangkok had been squeezed by two giant friends.

To sum it up, while the communications mentioned efforts and tactics employed to block the extradition, they also showed how far the Americans themselves were ready to go to get their man. There were suggestions that President Obama should call Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, that the Bangkok government should express disappointment at a Thai court decision viewed as a setback to the extradition push, and that US authorities should not underestimate the possibility of Thaksin Shinawatra becoming a pawn.

The US Embassy here, as well as its counterparts around the world, must have been on its back foot. American diplomats have been busy with damage control globally, struggling to change perceived "interference" to something less damaging such as routine engagement. Outgoing US Ambassador Eric G John must have hoped for a quiet departure, but thanks to WikiLeaks, he's leaving his Bangkok posting with a bang.

Russia must have been laughing in general at the way the diplomacy of the Leader of the Free World has unravelled, at least temporarily. But in the Bout case, Moscow can't be all smiles, due to the bombshell accusations in the US Embassy-Washington contacts that witnesses were bribed in an effort to overturn the extradition.

In other words, the subtext of the "American diplomatic intervention" in the Bout case is the implicit claims that the other side did something probably worse. Will Russia respond to such claims? A mere "That's not true" reaction from Moscow to the bribery allegations will be a sweet revenge, no matter how the Russians write their statement, because it will lend credence to WikiLeaks documents, something America never formally does. However, since the bribery insinuations were implicit, implicating only those who "support" Victor Bout, Russia will run the risk of admitting guilt without being actually accused.

The same goes for the Thaksin-Bout swap claims. Russia and Thailand will be better served by just keeping silent about this.

For the Americans, they got Victor Bout and that is what matters the most. There are worse loose ends to be tied up elsewhere as a result of the opening of the WikiLeaks Pandora's box. The relationship with Thailand will hardly be affected by news that all kinds of pressure were put on Bangkok to get the alleged "Merchant of Death" extradited. Anyone who has read enough newspapers and watched enough movies can easily guess what must have happened behind the scenes. People of small countries, whether they like it or not, can't be shocked by strong-arm diplomacy.

That final analysis depends on one major condition, though. Whatever comes next in the ongoing "cables exposure" drama, where Thailand is concerned, had better be nice or at least not too bad. There are several "topics" capable of overshadowing the Victor Bout affair, of making it just the real tip of the iceberg.

The Russians can just continue to sit tight and watch, Thailand can keep quiet and let the world see what it had to go through in the Bout saga, and the Americans have more to lose.

So, the real question is not who has the biggest bruise. It's what next? The bad news is, it may come pretty soon.

Originally Posted by The Bold Rodney

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Abhisit said yesterday that John had raised the issue of irregularities in Bout's case when they met in February but that he did not talk with US President Barack Obama about the case.

Hmmmm interesting to see the Yanks getting their nose put out of joint by one of their closest (if not the closest) allies in Asia!

Suspect the South Korea and Singapore are far higher on that list.
TH

Mundane stuff, let's wait for the cables about Thaksin and the red shirt demos. Though you may have to leave the country to access them.

http://www.tannetwork.tv/tan/ViewData.aspx?DataID=1038136

Foreign Ministry to Probe WikiLeaks Report on Bout Extradition

UPDATE : 3 December 2010

The Foreign Ministry is currently verifying documents leaked on the WikiLeakss website regarding Moscow's attempt to thwart the extradition of Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout.

Government Spokesman Panithan Wattanayakorn said the Foreign Ministry is currently investigating the report released on the WikiLeaks website regarding Russia's attempts to obstruct the extradition of Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout to the U.S. He added that it will take some time for the ministry to verify the documents leaked on the site.

The website earlier claimed the U.S. ambassador to Thailand believes the Russian authorities were trying to block Bout's extradition.


Prime Minister Abhisit said he has discussed WikiLeaks's report with the U.S. ambassador, while asking the public to use careful judgment about the information posted on the Internet.

However, he believes the information leak will not threaten the relationship between Thailand and Russia.

http://www.tannetwork.tv/tan/ViewData.aspx?DataID=1038135

US Ambassador Reaffirms Relationship After WikiLeaks Rampage

UPDATE : 3 December 2010

The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand has issued a letter to reaffirm the relationship between the U.S. and Thailand, after the infamous wikileaks the recent leak.

Eric G. John, the U.S. ambassador to Thailand, has issued an open letter indicating that U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are working hard to strengthen the existing relationship between the U.S. and the world, as well as to build new relationships.

The letter came as the rampage of WikiLeaks continues.

The infamous international non profit media organization that has been publishing controversial documents from anonymous sources and leaks has released a large number of the U.S. government's confidential documents and communications between its officials online, damaging the credibility of Washington DC.


In the letter, John points out that the leaked cables have not yet been authenticated, but the U.S. government regrets the publication of the confidential documents and condemns those responsible.

The U.S. ambassador said any diplomatic communication must be direct and its level of confidentiality must be maintained, to ensure the interests, peace, and stability of the countries involved.

He also expressed his hope that the Thai diplomats will share his view on the issue.

From - Abhisit denies US pressured govt in Bout extradition

Acting government spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn said the Thai and US governments would deny the authenticity of the documents on Viktor Bout released by WikiLeaks.

Ratchaprasong News


Wikileaks has been kicked off its domain (again) thanks to a global collaboration of governments and businesses who are afraid of an informed public... but they are already back! New address below.

Cable Viewer