Thread: Divided Thailand seeks elusive 'normalcy'

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Suwat Thongthanakul, editor of ASTV Manager Weekly news magazine: The media's role must be different from the past... We must choose sides, choose the righteous side in order to protect national interests," he said, adding media must not be satisfied with merely being a messenger. It must perform the functions of a gatekeeper and censor on what it thinks the public ought not to read, watch or hear.

Similar views were expressed before the panel last week by Sonthiyarn Chuenruethai-naitham, owner and director of T news agency, a conservative royalist media. Sonthiyarn said he would not hire anyone who didn't share his political views to work at his news organization

It doesn't get any worse than this... Utter morons...

Poll a 'chance to bring about new social order'

Poll a 'chance to bring about new social order'

By Pravit Rojanaphruk
The Nation
Published on July 1, 2011

Thailand needs to re-negotiate its social contract and this cannot be imposed from the top but negotiated in an all inclusive and rule-based deliberation process, said Marc Saxer, Thailand director for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Saxer, who wrote an analysis paper on the future of Thai politics released yesterday, said Thai politics, which is still largely determined by "traditional power structures" behind facades, are being increasingly undermined by socio-economic development. However, democratic mechanisms are not yet powerful enough to satisfy the growing expectations of society.

"Thailand is experiencing the de-legitimisation of its traditional order, and fights fiercely over the re-negotiation of the social contract," Saxer wrote.

Sunday's general election, Saxer said, opens a window of opportunity for competing elites to strike a deal; a political stalemate has occurred since the 2006 coup. He pointed out that the support of the majority of the population, or at least their silent consent, is now needed to legitimise any future government. At the same time, new economic elites and a broader middle class depend to a much lesser degree on the patronage of traditional elites.

One major challenge is how the new emerging political culture can accept plurality in politics and identities.

"Today, the traditional resentments of the North and the Northeast against Bangkok are reflected in the red movement. But even in the centre, the diversification of ways of life creates a plurality of identities and value communities. Myriads of subcultures co-exist in the metropolis of Bangkok. Gender relations are beginning to change, and a broad spectrum of sexual identities is being embraced in the open. Consumerism and the ethics of globalised capitalism are contradictory to the widespread rediscovery of Buddhist traditions and ways of life. Dealing with this plurality is a challenge for Thailand's political culture."

Saxer concluded that the current political crisis can only be understood by recognising the underlying legitimacy crisis of the political, social and cultural order.

"The crisis goes well beyond the failure of individuals or institutions, but rather the centralist, semi-authoritarian governance system, the vertical social hierarchy and the unified political culture are no longer able to deal with the complexity, plurality and conflict of Thai economy and society," Saxer concluded.

Saxer adds that Thais need not feel fatalistic about the situation. "The vitality of social movements, an alternative media, the courage of civil society and the expertise of academia shows clearly that the country has already changed much more profoundly than many elites like to acknowledge."

Bangkok Post : Reform police and judiciary

EDITORIAL

Reform police and judiciary

• Published: 1/07/2011 at 12:00 AM
• Newspaper section: News

There is no peace without justice. This is the catchphrase at red-shirt rallies. Indeed, who can argue with that? From the victims of southern violence, the relatives of those killed in last year's May bloodshed, to the landless villagers persecuted by unjust laws, they all insist justice is the prerequisite for peace. Yet in Sunday's general election which will decide Thailand's path, no political party has dared touch the obstacles to justice _ unjust laws, police corruption and an out-of-touch judiciary.



Mention any case of social injustice in this country, and it almost always has to do with these giant glitches in the justice system which desperately need to be redressed.

Earlier this week, the US embassy condemned Thailand for failing to punish corrupt police and officials in human trafficking rackets, while highlighting the lack of a human rights approach among the judiciary as a compounding factor which prevents the victims of labour abuse from receiving justice.

It is the same story with the powerless Thais. Countless villagers have been jailed for forest and land encroachment, although they had lived on those plots of land long before the areas were earmarked as national forest, or before the commons were taken over by rich landlords with the help of corrupt officials.

The law is no help to ease the heated land rights conflicts that are raging across the country. Written by the forestry authorities, the draconian forestry law makes the Royal Forestry Department the sole owner of the forests and turns forest dwellers and small farmers into illegal encroachers. With the power of money, however, big-time miners or landlords with rubber and oil palm plantations in national forests remain intact.

The judiciary is of no help, either. In strictly going by the letter of the law without any knowledge of local realities and themselves the product of city prejudice against the rural poor, many judges feel it is perfectly all right to send the powerless victims of unjust forestry laws to jail. Meanwhile, the costly and extremely lengthy legal procedures are a social injustice in itself, because it prevents the poor from receiving justice while giving more legal access to the rich and the powerful.

To effect judicial reform, all unjust and discriminatory laws must be amended through the open participation of civic groups and the people directly affected by those laws. The extremely conservative Council of State, the government's legal arm, which often tampers with the drafts of liberal laws, must be prohibited from doing so. The education of judges and legal personnel must be revamped to undo gender and ethnic prejudices, and to instil in them the significance of human rights.

Police reform is a much more difficult task. Not that no one knows how to do it. Demilitarise the police force. Decentralise its operations. Make the police accountable to the communities. Improve their salaries and welfare to prevent corruption. All these solutions have been discussed, and are supported by junior police officers. But they have been fiercely vetoed by police big shots. Politicians dare not upset the police force because that would spell big trouble for many shady businesses under their patronage network. This is why all previous efforts have failed to open up the essentially feudal and authoritarian system that is deeply corrupt.

Despite the uphill tasks, Thailand can no longer postpone reform of the police and the judiciary. Without these crucial reforms, social injustice and double standards will be here to stay, threatening to push the country deeper into political disarray.

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Poll a 'chance to bring about new social order'

Poll a 'chance to bring about new social order'

By Pravit Rojanaphruk
The Nation
Published on July 1, 2011

Thailand needs to re-negotiate its social contract and this cannot be imposed from the top but negotiated in an all inclusive and rule-based deliberation process, said Marc Saxer, Thailand director for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Saxer, who wrote an analysis paper on the future of Thai politics released yesterday, said Thai politics, which is still largely determined by "traditional power structures" behind facades, are being increasingly undermined by socio-economic development. However, democratic mechanisms are not yet powerful enough to satisfy the growing expectations of society.

"Thailand is experiencing the de-legitimisation of its traditional order, and fights fiercely over the re-negotiation of the social contract," Saxer wrote.

Sunday's general election, Saxer said, opens a window of opportunity for competing elites to strike a deal; a political stalemate has occurred since the 2006 coup. He pointed out that the support of the majority of the population, or at least their silent consent, is now needed to legitimise any future government. At the same time, new economic elites and a broader middle class depend to a much lesser degree on the patronage of traditional elites.

One major challenge is how the new emerging political culture can accept plurality in politics and identities.

"Today, the traditional resentments of the North and the Northeast against Bangkok are reflected in the red movement. But even in the centre, the diversification of ways of life creates a plurality of identities and value communities. Myriads of subcultures co-exist in the metropolis of Bangkok. Gender relations are beginning to change, and a broad spectrum of sexual identities is being embraced in the open. Consumerism and the ethics of globalised capitalism are contradictory to the widespread rediscovery of Buddhist traditions and ways of life. Dealing with this plurality is a challenge for Thailand's political culture."

Saxer concluded that the current political crisis can only be understood by recognising the underlying legitimacy crisis of the political, social and cultural order.

"The crisis goes well beyond the failure of individuals or institutions, but rather the centralist, semi-authoritarian governance system, the vertical social hierarchy and the unified political culture are no longer able to deal with the complexity, plurality and conflict of Thai economy and society," Saxer concluded.

Saxer adds that Thais need not feel fatalistic about the situation. "The vitality of social movements, an alternative media, the courage of civil society and the expertise of academia shows clearly that the country has already changed much more profoundly than many elites like to acknowledge."

Here's a link for a PDF download of Marc Saxer's paper: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08228.pdf

BTW, it's a lot more readable than Pravit's article maybe suggests. Very good insights.

Thai-ASEAN News Network

Rural Thailand in Transition

UPDATE : 1 July 2011

In an article published in Matichon newspaper on June 24th , Kasien Techapeera, a political science lecturer at Thammasat University, wrote, citing research conducted by a group of scholars, that Thai society is dominated by the middle class.

The research considers the middle class as those with incomes more than 5,000 baht a month. In 2009, 32 percent of Thai households were considered as lower class by that measure. Most of them are farmers or unskilled labor who earned an average 3,214 baht a month and 75 percent of them have savings set aside in case of emergency.

Many of them can save 10 to 20 times more money than families from 20 years ago.

In addition, the research found urban residents are divided in their attitudes towards the rural.

One group saw rural people as those who are poverty-stricken and uneducated, and so tend to engage in vote selling. However, in terms of economics, they are seen as examples of pure, simple and sustainable living.

The other group thought of people in the upcountry as those who make political and economic decisions based on benefits just like people in the city.

However, both are negative attitudes. They suggest that rural residents not only sell votes because they are under the influence of the patronage system, but also because they expect economic benefits.

Kasien quoted one of the scholars as saying that politics in rural Thailand has never changed, but it is in a transition from the patronage relations to the one characterized by markets, telecommunications and activities.

He said the transition is currently in its preliminary stage and could revert.

The article left an interesting question as to what and how much the upcoming election would impact Thai society, given the ongoing transition.

Editorial, Khao Sod, Page 2, July 1st, 2011

Translated and rewritten by Wacharapol Isaranont

Originally Posted by SteveCM

Thai political parties must publicly commit to respect human rights, Amnesty International said today, on the eve of the country’s first national elections in more than three years.

With respect does anyone give a flying f*ck what AI says?

^
Courtesy of Zawacki, I'd say the majority consensus is that they've become hugely discredited in terms of their (non-)activity in Thailand.

Originally Posted by SteveCM

Courtesy of Zawacki, I'd say the majority consensus is that they've become hugely discredited in terms of their (non-)activity in Thailand.

I remember visiting the AI office in London maybe as long ago as thirty years (not sure) and I wasn't impressed then and I haven't been impressed since.

It appears on the face of it that many in the organization are making a very good and comforatble living, I hope they have enough administrators and senior managers to continue their great work?

Originally Posted by The Bold Rodney

I remember visiting the AI office in London maybe as long ago as thirty years (not sure) and I wasn't impressed then and I haven't been impressed since.

of course you were not impressed, you are a fucking authoritarian follower ala Faux News, in short a little fucking fascist

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Rural Thailand in Transition

From a democratic standpoint, it is 'big city' Thailand in transition actually.
We only have one.

AI in Thailand is a disgrace, plain and simple. Ditto Anfrel.

Originally Posted by sabang

AI in Thailand is a disgrace, plain and simple. Ditto Anfrel.

Absolutely disgraceful. Fully agree. And as I said before where are the REAL international election monitors. Why isn't Amsterdam talking about that?

I'll try to green you on that - didn't work last time.

Originally Posted by SteveCM

^
Courtesy of Zawacki, I'd say the majority consensus is that they've become hugely discredited in terms of their (non-)activity in Thailand.

Hey - why don't we start an annual International NGO Shame Award? Like the idea? PM me those who do.. AI can be the first to receive the award.

Originally Posted by sabang

AI in Thailand is a disgrace, plain and simple. Ditto Anfrel.

or maybe they are better informed than you are and not as brainwashed as you are,

From the blog world.....


Sovereign Myth: Questions on Pending Thai Election: Bloomberg

July 4, 2011

Questions on Pending Thai Election: Bloomberg


On 27th June I emailed responses to three questions from Bloomberg News about the pending election.

1. What's at stake for the military/<snip> in this election?

This is the election in which fundamental decisions about Thailand's future will have to be made. I do not mean by that the electoral choices of the Thai people which have long been subverted even before the 2006 coup, but how the incumbent royalist and militarist elite will react to the electorate's choice and, conversely, what strategies the pro-Thaksin counter elite will employ.

The key question should the Democrat Party not have sufficient numbers to form a coalition government, is whether its backers in the anti-Thaksin establishment will remain in denial about the recurrent rejection they face at the ballot box. This is a possibility. Should they choose that path, no doubt with splits along the way, they know that more violence will follow. The military-on-military and militia violence witnessed during April-May last year may return with greater intensity. So, it's a high cost strategy, so high its protagonists may not win over the less hawkish elements.

Undoubtedly, there will be some brinkmanship, as those most committed to the 2006 coup hold to the hope their long denied objectives of breaking Thaksin forces can still be executed. But the last five years prove otherwise, and they now confront a mobilised movement with depth well beyond anyone imagined. My guess is that even though there are elements willing to go for broke, the exhausting toll of the last five years weighs very heavily on those who rode with the coupsters, but who are dismayed by the securitisation of Thailand's politics and the repositioning of hardline military and royalist elements. The highly corrupt and repressive nature of elements of the current Thai regime, by which I different forces that are articulated to the state apparatuses not just the government, is not what they wished for when they tacitly supported the coup. They really did envisage an elite liberal outcome. But they bought into a logic of decisionist politics which meant embracing highly repressive politics rather than abiding by constitutional niceties, in order to to defeat a perceived enemy. But that repressiveness has almost become a norm, not the exception. These fellow travellers of the 2006 coup might be eating humble pie and make a conditional deal. Thaksin for his part will be happy to oblige. Bringing some kind of settlement together in the form of a smooth transition will be extremely difficult. At the same time, there might be an alliance of convenience among the authoritarians in both camps. Thus, think of the future as one of further mutations and splits.

2. What would a win for Pheu Thai mean for the establishment that backed the coup? What is the likelihood that Pheu Thai will be able to govern?

There is certainly a chance that Pheu Thai may have the numbers to form government in coalition. Such a prospect, for the anti Thaksin forces will be a loss of face, and will threaten their existing position. For some of them it will mean permanent marginalisation from the centres of political life. Thaksin is an astute coalition builder and one can expect that in the event of a Pheu Thai government being formed, the chairs will quickly be rearranged and space made available to everyone who plays the new game. But some soft payback can be expected; it will also be a time for the upper echelons to consider retirement. The other option facing the incumbent forces - to fight a Pheu Thai victory - would mean buying into a genuine rewriting of Thailand's constitutional settlement well beyond the electoral democracy it still adheres to (notwithstanding recent retreats). The charade of the Peoples Alliance for Democracy's "new politics" , of limiting the number of elected MPS and moving towards a form of selectocracy might be one outcome. Even though it has looked like a fanatical reactionary fringe stoking up war and hatred for the last year, the seemingly anti-political agenda of "new politics" has powerful backers, who are waiting for an opportune moment.

So, oddly, Thailand may face a situation in which the western-oriented royalist establishment, by refusing to accept a Pheu Thai victory, faces up to its failure to win in the game of elite liberal democracy by abandoning the facade of democracy and move towards a more transparently authoritarian politics.

Alternatively, should Thaksin finally emerge triumphant (and I see this as the long term scenario) you would have a government claiming a democratic mandate pursuing a look East and South policy, and merging populist rhetoric with authoritarian structures. Either prospect looks disturbing if your interest is in genuine democracy.

As for the movement of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship, the redshirts, will it be able to hold any new pro-Thaksin government to democratic standards? The sad fact is that for all its shedding light on double standards and political hypocrisy, it has only done so selectively. When will the UDD publicly be honest about the authoritarian nature of the Thaksin years?

That said, we can not discount the possibility that a Pheu Thai victory will reluctantly be accepted, and new energies will be put into using constitutional avenues (santioned by the 2007 military sponsored constitution) and political strategies to fight Thaksin at the next election. Such an extraordinary outcome would mean a public return of democracy, while various machinations take place behind the scenes. That is what most democracies amount to these days.

3. What are the prospects of a power-sharing arrangement between Thaksin and his opponents?

Apart from hardline elements who mistakenly view Thaksin as the nadir of monarchist Thailand, my guess is the economic and political costs of proteacted conflict is now weighing heavily on some of the incumbents who still want to steer Thailand to a prosperous and modern future. There must be considerable distress felt in royalist circles at the anti-royalist feeling that is emerging among rank and file redshirts and frankly the only genuine way to stop this growing is by bringing Thaksin back into the fold. Thaksin has time and time again shown his willingness to abide by most public protocols in relation to the monarchy. The inane propaganda efforts of the various security agencies are a lesson in blowback and the stupidity of force feeding people with "correct ideas". The more men in khaki wax lyrical about the royal family the more their standing is diminished. Thaksin has always signalled his willingness to do a deal and moreover is happy to deploy royalist imagery. This is what he offers and no one else can play this card. This will be the basis of any power-sharing arrangement.

In some senses the stark choice facing the rival camps is continued conflict at the cost of mutual destruction and seeing Thailand meltdown, or some step back from this and working out a formula for power sharing or at the very least a situation in which a "loyal opposition" has a credible chance of electoral victory at the following election. And should something be "agreed" this raises another question, how would such a historic anti-climax be received among those mobilised yellow and red -shirted citizens. This takes us to the final of the many unknowns of the post election period: the potential of a rising democratic mass in the face of this intra-elite bargaining and game-playing. Of all the possible game changers, this seems the least unlikely on the balance of probabilities. I'd like to be proven wrong.


Posted by Sovereign Myth at 10:03 PM
[Michael K. Connors - author of "Democracy and National Identity in Thailand"]

Can Yingluck End Thailand's Five Years of Chaos?

Can Yingluck End Thailand's Five Years of Chaos?

By A. LIN NEUMANN/ Jakarta Globe
Tuesday, July 5, 2011


Yingluck Shinawatra, the leader of the Pheu Thai Party, talks to media before a meeting at the Pheu Thai Party headquarters on Tuesday, July 5, 2011 in Bangkok, Thailand. (Photo: AP)

If the reactions to Sunday’s stunning electoral win by Yingluck Shinawatra in Thailand’s general elections hold, perhaps the nation has finally found a way out of the mess created by the 2006 military coup that ousted her older brother, Thaksin Shinawatra.

All sides, it seems so far, are willing to accept the Puea Thai party’s majority win. “I can assure that the military has no desire to stray out of its assigned roles,” General Prawit Wongsuwan, a former army chief close to the leaders involved in the 2006 coup, told Reuters. “The army accepts the election results.”

This is a very good thing.

Regardless of what one thinks of Thaksin, the one-time populist strongman pulling the Puea Thai strings from his exile perch in Dubai, even the Thai army and the royalist insiders who orchestrated the coup must see the futility of trying to battle the popular tide by now.

A tycoon with a dismal human rights record and little regard for the niceties of independent media, courts or regulatory bodies, Thaksin redrew the map of Thai politics with his direct populist appeal to a rural population that had long been taken for granted by the establishment in Bangkok.

Having learned his craft building a virtual mobile phone monopoly that saw nearly every Thai chipping a few baht a day into his corporate coffers, Thaksin knew something about marketing. With his background as a police officer and a strong regional business family from the northern city of Chiang Mai, he also knew something about raw power, which he wielded with a heavy hand in shooting drug dealers and sending the army into the restive southern Muslim provinces to enforce a get-tough policy that backfired.

However, his strong-arming, coupled with pro-poor policies, was — and is — popular. Just how popular the past five years have shown as the state and the Bangkok royalist elite have failed miserably to put together a government that could win a victory at the polls, instead using the courts and the army to get their way. Now, finally, it appears that everybody has decided to calm down and accept the Thaksin reality after five years of pointless chaos.

If the Thais had simply gazed south at Indonesia, they might have arrived at this conclusion before they sent the tanks into the streets on Sept. 19, 2006.

Indonesia is a country where ethnic, religious and geographic divisions are taken seriously and have frequently threatened to upend the fragile ties that bind the nation together. There were fierce battles to hold the country together after independence in 1949 and the anti-communist bloodletting that followed the failed — and still murky — coup against Sukarno in 1965 proved how hideously wrong things could go when the guns are unleashed.

In the aftermath of the ouster of former dictator Suharto in 1998, the country quickly frayed at the edges. It seemed that whole regions might break away or the army might step in or Islamic terrorism might run out of control.

The Indonesians held it together, though. They quickly instituted broad political reforms, held a series of successful elections that kept the military at bay and gradually became accepted as an island of stability in the region. The country is now the most successful democracy in Southeast Asia while Thailand’s political reputation has plummeted.

By contrast, the Philippines — having had a successful and understandable extra-legal ouster of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 — opted for no particularly good reason other than the anger of the Catholic church and the Makati elites to stage a de facto coup against Joseph Estrada in 2001. An inept, crooked and embarrassing drunk, Estrada was replaced for a decade by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, whose government was accused of much more efficient corruption and massive human rights abuses. By contrast, Estrada would have been gone for good in 2004 had the elites kept their powder dry.

That Thailand’s elites chose to follow the Philippine model and rid themselves of a presumed curse without the benefit of legal procedures sent the country into a tailspin that accomplished nothing.

Now there are reports that the same people who organized the ouster of Thaksin are negotiating a way out of the dilemma and are willing to accept having his baby sister run the country. It seems possible Thaksin will be granted an amnesty from the corruption conviction that forced him to flee the country, and in exchange he and his allies will promise not to go after the Democrat Party and the army over the bloody crackdown on so-called Red Shirt protesters last year.

This is an outcome much to be wished for, despite the bitter irony. The NGOs, liberals and small “d” democrats who supported the overthrow of Thaksin in 2006 have to accept that they cannot simply engineer a democracy that runs in their favor.

The shadowy Bangkok royalists who apparently feared that Thaksin’s power could undermine the <redacted> have to accept that he — or at least his proxies — will not go away.

If anything, their actions — censorship, coups, crackdowns — <redacted>.

One hopes, for Thailand’s sake, that all those who must be terribly humbled by this five-year failed experiment in government by coup and fiat will follow the lead of defeated Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, whose quick concession on Sunday was both classy and calming. On the other side, Yingluck and her big brother would be wise to follow through on promises of national reconciliation and avoid a return to past bad practices. Gloating would be a bad idea.

Perhaps Thailand has finally learned what Indonesia knows only too well — tearing up the rule book is messy and destructive. The country is lucky to have a chance to make things right.

A. Lin Neumann is a senior adviser to the Jakarta Globe. He has reported from Southeast Asia since 1983.

Originally Posted by Bettyboo

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Suwat Thongthanakul, editor of ASTV Manager Weekly news magazine: The media's role must be different from the past... We must choose sides, choose the righteous side in order to protect national interests," he said, adding media must not be satisfied with merely being a messenger. It must perform the functions of a gatekeeper and censor on what it thinks the public ought not to read, watch or hear.

Similar views were expressed before the panel last week by Sonthiyarn Chuenruethai-naitham, owner and director of T news agency, a conservative royalist media. Sonthiyarn said he would not hire anyone who didn't share his political views to work at his news organization

It doesn't get any worse than this... Utter morons...

ASTV and its cohorts are a sign of a total failure of a free media.
Most free media outlets do not 'censor'.
Their jobs is to tell the public and let them judge whether it is to be believed or not.
A good journalist will put forward a story eithen if they disagree with it.

The reason Thailand is divided is not actually because of who people vote for.


The reason Thailand is divided is because some people have refused to accept who other people vote for.



Which is really quite childish.

I was thinking the same - politically one of the most immature democracies around really..

Irony at the reins as the bandwagon starts rolling

EDITORIAL

Irony at the reins as the bandwagon starts rolling

By The Nation
Published on July 6, 2011

Thailand has come full circle, with one of its richest clans back in power via a claim to be speaking for the poor

Prime minister-to-be Yingluck Shinawatra started her first couple of days at work by meeting with coalition partners, small parties whose main purpose is to provide political protection and comfort to her Pheu Thai Party which, in spite of winning more than 50 per cent of Parliamentary seats, does not feel as secure as one might think.

It would have been a strange way to reconcile the past, but the Matubhum Party of the 2006 coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin was not in the line up. However, the fact that Sonthi said he would be part of the Pheu Thai-led government proves he has the kind of audacity often possessed by Thai politicians.

Speaking of gullibility, Chart Pattana Puea Pandin Party's chief strategist Sanan Kajornprasart said the Bhum Jai Thai Party of Newin Chidchob would understand why they had to be ditched. The two parties made a pact just weeks before the election, but it wasn't exactly holy matrimony. The so-called desire to serve the people was just too great, Sanan seems to be suggesting.

But that's life in Thailand's smaller parties. You go where the circus goes. And thanks to the billboards of animals all over the country - monkeys, lizards, buffaloes - this recent election came very close to looking like a circus.

It's tempting to romanticise the outcome of the poll as a victory for the poor, the downtrodden struggling for social justice. But look just a little deeper, and the romantic viewpoint is shattered.

Sadly, the outcome reflected a nation deeply divided along geographical lines. The North and Northeast went to Pheu Thai while the South went to the Democrats. We arrived at the polling booths with a lot of anger, and it will take some time to subside.

Some have tried to paint the event as a class conflict, but there are poor people on all sides. One can also argue that there is no real ideological basis among the pro- and anti-Thaksin movements. Leftists and rightists from the political stage of yesteryear were in both camps.

Thailand is entering a phase of reconciliation, so they said. The chief manager for this daunting task is - get this - Chalerm Yoobamrung. Wouldn't it be great if he could bring his boys along?

Chalerm's appointment was not the only irony in this election. Thailand's biggest sugar daddy Chuwit Kamolvisit - who admitted to paying millions of baht each month in police bribes but decided to enter politics after he fell out with the then police chief - got elected on an anticorruption ticket.

Meanwhile, hailing from one of the richest clans in the country, winner Yingluck claimed to be speaking for Thailand's poor.

Interestingly, no one seems to see the glaring contradiction - that the leadership of the red-shirt movement, the main backer of the Pheu Thai Party, is made up of millionaires and elites, the very people the movement supposedly despised.

But with Yingluck in power, one can say that Thailand has more or less come full circle. It started with Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party in 2001. At the time, the country gave him a red-carpet welcome, overlooking the fact that the man had transferred billions into his maid's bank account to avoid paying taxes.

One could say that we lost our chance of being a country of law and order back then, and whatever came after - the 2006 coup, the street battles, the arson attacks - was a consequence of that missed opportunity.

In spite of the fact that his populist policies were unsustainable, and that his administration favoured the business sector just as much as any administration, Thaksin succeeded in projecting himself as a champion of the poor.

His greed got him into trouble and his quest for absolute power put him on a collision course with the establishment and the military. A coup was launched in 2006, but those who ousted him were not able to uproot the seeds he had planted.

Ten years later, it's his sister's turn. Some say this is all about getting Thaksin's money back, as well as an amnesty for him and the red-shirt leaders who burned down one of Bangkok's fanciest shopping malls.

But let's hope this next administration is about much more than just one man and one wealthy family.

^ Sour grapes make poor whine.