Warning lights are flashing in eastern and central Europe, where Hungary and Ukraine are seeking bail-outs from the International Monetary Fund to avoid the turmoil that threatens to bankrupt Iceland.
A number of countries have had their credit ratings slashed to junk status amid worries that the next leg of the credit crunch is about to explode. Economies are on the verge of collapse after years of easy credit that fuelled an unsustainable property and consumer boom, roaring inflation and widening current account deficits.
A research paper by Lars Christensen, head of emerging markets research at Denmark's Danske bank, written before Hungary and Ukraine appealed for international aid, makes for unsettling reading.
Here is what he says about Bulgaria: 'We see a major risk that the Bulgarian boom could turn into a serious bust. A property market bubble threatens economic stability.'
Elsewhere, Estonia is already in the lurch: 'The hard landing has become a reality; Estonia faces years of sub-trend growth to reduce the excesses.'
Latvia looks like a basket case: 'Larger imbalances here make the economic adjustment more painful.'
In countries such as Hungary, the economy is in free fall as foreign banks and investors withdraw capital, leaving an acute shortage of credit. The Hungarian banks can't help because they are over-leveraged and face calls from overseas institutions for loans to be repaid, threatening the local banking system with meltdown.
If banks in emerging markets implode, it puts a further strain on the international financial system when even a small shock could lead to more panic-selling on global stock markets, as well as undermine efforts to restart interbank lending and restore credit lines.
'Are there more Icelands out there?' asks Christensen. 'Yes, quite a few, it's worrying.'
What happened in Iceland is instructive. It's not the Icelandic government that has gone bust, as the Russian government did a decade ago, but the Icelandic banks. But that has a devastating effect on Iceland's economy; as confidence has drained away, the currency has gone into free-fall.
For Iceland, which is heavily dependent on imported goods, that means costs for businesses and consumers go through the roof, raising the spectre of shortages in the shops, especially where companies have lost money in the banking collapse. And that is quite apart from the devastating effect on confidence flowing from the failure of three of the country's biggest banks.
The value of Icelandic bonds - debt instruments sold to global investors in return for interest payments - have recorded sharp falls. Standard & Poor's has slashed Iceland's debt to just above investment grade; other countries are faring worse, with Ukraine and Serbia reduced to junk status.
Even more alarming, billions of euros worth of credit default swaps, linked to emerging market debt, could leave institutions that underwrote these contracts - banks, hedge funds and insurance companies - with huge liabilities. Credit default swaps make up a $60 trillion market that has grown massively since 2000 and is largely unregulated. CDS products are used by investors to offset the risk of a country defaulting or its prospects deteriorating. They have often been comfortingly described as being like insurance contracts. If only it were that simple.
A parallel derivatives industry has grown up around CDSs, with the risks passed on to speculators prepared to buy swaps in the hope of making a profit when they sell them on.
'It is a bit like shorting a bank share,' says a London-based stockbroker. 'Except that you are betting on the contract's value rising; the more risky the outlook, the more valuable the swaps contract.'
If a country defaults, the liabilities must be paid by the CDS counterparty or counterparties. But CDS prices are an indicator of how close the market believes a country is to defaulting. For example, the cost of using a CDS to insure against Iceland today stands at $15 for every $100 of insurance, up fourfold in three years. Further afield, Pakistan is judged to be very close to default - perhaps a 90 per cent chance - with the cost at $30 for every $100. For Argentina, the price is $24.
It is quite likely that many banks in emerging markets will go bust as they have over-extended themselves.
But what happens if a country defaults? For answers, look back to the Russian banking crisis of 1998, where the state (which owned all the banks) was forced to disclose that it was no longer solvent.
International investors fled, dumping Russian assets, which led to a run on the currency. Wages to state employees went unpaid, causing widespread social unrest. The Russian stock market lost 75 per cent of its value. There was political upheaval.
The International Monetary Fund eventually stepped in with a $23bn financial package and the Russian government was forced to devalue the rouble. Eventually, calm was restored and global panic was narrowly averted.
But remember that crisis was against a backdrop of relative economic stability. The credit crunch, however, has seen the MCSI emerging markets index lose $1.8 trillion of value in a year, while many exchanges in developing countries have notched up a 50 per cent fall in share prices. The West's banking system (not to mention the state of the global economy) remains fragile. Another systemic shock is the last thing it needs.
Another storm is brewing in eastern Europe | Business | The Observer