The Korean Missile Crisis Thread

[OhOh]

Now here are some real quotes Sputnik left out, of course not on purpose.

Care to share the source of your own "quotes"?

Your right, someone here knows fuck all about politics

That makes me exceptional. I think not, look at the ramblings of most posters here.

It failed.

Care to inform "someone here knows fuck all" and all the knowledgeable here, why?

So anyway OhOH, back to the question... what is behind your rabid frothing sinophilia?

Dont be shy, you are among friends on the DOOR!

Dear FRIENDS,

China has started an alternative, along with more and more Asian countries, it may fail, it may turn into a copy of the ameristani empires dream. All I do know is that their dream is different to the rape and pillage of our fellow global citizens, which so many westerners including it seems yourself, are content with.

It is too early to say if they will succeed but indications point to more and more acceptance, of the alternative offered, to all.

Thank you for your attention

OhOh

[Hugh Cow]

Dear FRIENDS,

China has started an alternative, along with more and more Asian countries, it may fail, it may turn into a copy of the ameristani empires dream. All I do know is that their dream is different to the rape and pillage of our fellow global citizens, which so many westerners including it seems yourself, are content with.
It is too early to say if they will succeed but indications point to more and more acceptance, of the alternative offered, to all.
Thank you for your attention
OhOh

I hope you are right Oh, but unfortunately the history of rising empires would say unlikely. I think China has already flagged its' intentions by illegally claiming most of the south China Sea and flouting international law whenever it chooses. With building on reefs, to say nothing of their human rights record, their annexation of Tibet etc. I am sure you and your other anti American friends are now thinking Guantanamo, torture land mines etc etc and I agree. In many cases the U.S. cannot cast stones because of their stand on these issues and others. The Roman Empire,British Empire and all the others eventually fall as will the American Empire. The Chinese believe they will be the next empire and will rise in the near future but will fall like all the others that have been built on inequality of power and resources.

[David48atTD]

.
North Korea fires unidentified projectile, South Korean military says



North Korea has fired an unidentified projectile from a region near its west coast, South Korea's military says.

The nature of the projectile was not immediately clear, a South Korean military official said by telephone.

The Yonhap news agency reported the projectile launched appeared to be a ballistic missile.

The launch took place in the Kusong region, located north-west of the capital, Pyongyang, where the North has previously test-launched an intermediate-range missile.
The launch, if it is confirmed to be test-firing of a ballistic missile, would be the first in two weeks since the last attempt to fire a missile ended in a failure just minutes into flight.

The North has attempted but failed to test-launch ballistic missiles four consecutive times in the past two months, but has conducted a variety of missile testing since the beginning of last year.
Source
.

[misskit]

North Korea has fired a ballistic missile from a region near its west coast, the South Korean military say.

The missile was launched near Kusong, north-west of the capital, Pyongyang, and flew 700km (430 miles), it said.

North Korea has carried out a series of missile tests this year, causing international condemnation and increasing tensions with the US.

Two missile launches last month both failed, with the rockets exploding just minutes into flight.

South Korea and Japan both condemned the latest launch. The South's new President Moon Jae-in convened an emergency meeting of his security council to discuss the issue, Yonhap news agency reported.

Japan said the missile flew for about 30 minutes before landing in the Sea of Japan.

more North Korea carries out new ballistic missile test - BBC News

[OhOh]

So far they have kept the global economy ticking over when all others failed, have asserted thier agreed property back in a mainly unwarlike manner, stayed well within all international laws (as administered by competent authorities)

like all the others that have been built on inequality of power and resources.

One assumes the % of Chinese citizens raised from poverty are grateful, one assumes the countries whose infrastructure has or will be improved are/will be grateful, one assumes that the masses of western consumers that now have alternative choices when purchasing "trinkets" are grateful.

The Chinese recognise that they locally do not have all the resources they require and travel the world offering deals. If the other countries do not wish to sign they are free to go. Unlike the bullying, bombing, sanctioning western model.

Allegedly the DPRK and US were at Oslo last week discussing the price of poppy products. It seems the DPRK has plenty of those along with rare earths some countries need.

"China said on Tuesday it has noticed the talks between representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States in Norway, calling on solving the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue via peaceful means.

Dialogue between the DPRK government officials and US experts was held on Monday and Tuesday in Oslo, according to reports."

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1046133.shtml

[HermantheGerman]

"Newly-elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in said Wednesday he is ready to engage in "sincere negotiations" with both the United States and China in an attempt to resolve the issue of the Terminal-High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment in the Asian nation."
A unified Korea in the SCO is my bet. Bye bye ameristani military and missile bases. An isolated Japan.
All good for Asians.

I guess newly-elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in just received a congratulation note from Kim.

North Korea has carried out another ballistic missile test, days after a new president took office in the South.

All good for Asians

[HermantheGerman]

^
Will be fun to see how OhOh will blame Ameristani for these great developments.
In the meantime Sputnik reports:

Russia's air defense units in the country's Far East have been put on high alert the recent missile launch conducted by North Korea.

when reading a bit further down.....

We understand that Russia's territory is neither a target of the launch, nor the place, where the missile has fallen.

brought to you by the reporters of Chernobyl

https://sputniknews.com/russia/201705141053598740-russia-air-defenses-missile-test/

[HermantheGerman]

Looper has a very good point.

Agree... very good post Loopie..

NK's nuclear programme is not defensive - it is a dangerous grab for extra threatening leverage when trying to engage in their time-worn modus operandi of belligerent threat followed by economic concession from the west in return for settling down for a while.

Really Looper...? As the cornerstone of your argument, tell me about these 'time worn' economic concessions that NK has recieved from the West.

The New York Times 24.05.2017

Analysts say North Korea has often raised tensions to test new leaders in Washington or in Seoul or to increase its leverage when its foes propose negotiations.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/w...lear.html?_r=0

[Klondyke]

The New York Times 24.05.2017

And moreover, the ol' good NY Times knows that the bloody Kim will make new provocations again next week...

[Looper]

Analysts say North Korea has often raised tensions to test new leaders in Washington or in Seoul or to increase its leverage when its foes propose negotiations.

Time to spank fatboy's lardy sweaty arse cheeks

[Neo]

Looper has a very good point.

Agree... very good post Loopie..

NK's nuclear programme is not defensive - it is a dangerous grab for extra threatening leverage when trying to engage in their time-worn modus operandi of belligerent threat followed by economic concession from the west in return for settling down for a while.

Really Looper...? As the cornerstone of your argument, tell me about these 'time worn' economic concessions that NK has recieved from the West.

The New York Times 24.05.2017

Analysts say North Korea has often raised tensions to test new leaders in Washington or in Seoul or to increase its leverage when its foes propose negotiations.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/w...lear.html?_r=0

And yet it doesn't offer a single example of when that has happened, or indeed who the 'analysts' are.

News for sheeple. Eat it up.

[Looper]

Looper has a very good point.

Agree... very good post Loopie..

NK's nuclear programme is not defensive - it is a dangerous grab for extra threatening leverage when trying to engage in their time-worn modus operandi of belligerent threat followed by economic concession from the west in return for settling down for a while.

Really Looper...? As the cornerstone of your argument, tell me about these 'time worn' economic concessions that NK has recieved from the West.

The New York Times 24.05.2017

Analysts say North Korea has often raised tensions to test new leaders in Washington or in Seoul or to increase its leverage when its foes propose negotiations.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/w...lear.html?_r=0

And yet it doesn't offer a single example of when that has happened....

Neo, stop being a broken record google-muppet and whining for 'links' and 'examples' and just state your argument.

I could easily google up some links of examples of the US and UN providing food aid and medical aid to NK as part of the carrot approach which NK wants to leverage.

I could just as easily restate my argument without the reference to concessions since it is not the 'cornerstone of the argument' - here you go:-

NK's nuclear programme is not defensive - it is a dangerous grab for extra threatening leverage when trying to engage in negotiations with the west over keeping the peace in the region.

Eitherway the point is that NK's nuclear programme is not defensive.

The only reason the US is threatening to engage NK in the first place is precisely because they are engaging in a nuclear programme. They are of no military engagement interest to the US or anyone else if they just dropped their provocative nuclear programme.

So I say if they won't drop the programme then military action is justified and on.

What do you say?

[Neo]

What do you say?

You're full of shit and terminally dull.

[Looper]

Analysts say North Korea has often raised tensions to test new leaders in Washington or in Seoul or to increase its leverage when its foes propose negotiations.

Time to spank fatboy's lardy sweaty arse cheeks

Avid TD plane spotters will of course recognise the arse end of the legendarily deafening supersonic Rockwell B1 Lancer.

But what is your strategic bomber of choice for ripping fatboy a new one?

We also have the veteran B52 available to celebrate its 65th birthday last month...

And the invisible B2 Spirit...



I think the B2 is overkill for NK as they don't have the air power or tech to mount any kind of interception.

I think the shock and awe B1 is the way to go.

[Neo]

to prove my point

[HermantheGerman]

And yet it doesn't offer a single example of when that has happened, or indeed who the 'analysts' are.
News for sheeple. Eat it up.

How is this ?

The Unraveling of North Korea?s Proliferation Blackmail Strategy - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The Unraveling of North Korea’s Proliferation Blackmail Strategy


Tristan Volpe April 10, 2017 Georgetown University Press


Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has repeatedly attempted to compel concessions from the United States by wielding the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the early 1990s, North Korea threatened to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons unless Washington provided energy assistance.1 During the Six-Party Talks a decade later, the North Koreans returned to concession-seeking diplomacy by restarting their mothballed plutonium facilities, producing large quantities of fissile material, and testing a nuclear device.2 After these negotiations reached an impasse, North Korea avoided using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip until February 2012, when it agreed to a moratorium on “missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities” in exchange for food aid.3 But a satellite launch in April 2012 and another nuclear test in February 2013 left US officials wondering “why Pyongyang would edge close to a deal and then rip it to pieces within days.”4 Subsequent efforts in New York to privately broach terms for resuming denuclearization talks also came to an abrupt end when North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear weapon test in January 2016.5

North Korea’s steady development of nuclear weapons raises the question of why Pyongyang used its underlying nuclear program to pursue coercive diplomacy at all. North Korean decision making is notoriously difficult to estimate, but the historical record suggests that the ruling Kim regime long desired nuclear weapons to offset conventional inferiority.6 As the Cold War ended, Pyongyang needed to ensure its continued survival amid a dramatic loss of power and Soviet protection. Nuclear weapons offered a robust and efficient deterrent shield.7 Furthermore, North Korea was isolated from the international economy and community, so the material consequences and normative opprobrium associated with nuclear proliferation were probably of little concern for the pariah regime.8 Finally, North Korea had invested considerable sums in its nuclear program for decades but received few material benefits from using this technical capacity to proliferate as a form of compellence against the United States.9
Despite these strong drivers of proliferation, North Korea appears to have employed its nuclear program as a bargaining instrument for two reasons. First, diplomacy allowed North Korea to protect and enhance its emerging nuclear program during a critical period of development. By cutting a deal with the United States in 1994, for instance, North Korea reduced the threat of preventive military action against the vulnerable Yongbyon plutonium complex and opened up room to develop other strategic assets— notably ballistic missiles and uranium enrichment—at other undeclared sites. Second, the ruling Kim regime’s survival came to depend on extorting concessions from foreign governments to sustain the military and political elite.10 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pyongyang needed fresh sources of foreign patronage and soon found that the threat of proliferation provided it with the ability to compel concessions from the United States.11 North Korea may have stumbled onto the blackmail potential of its nuclear program by accident, but it was well versed in identifying American and South Korean “pressure points” throughout the Cold War and then exploiting these vulnerabilities with coercive diplomatic campaigns.12
But when did nuclear latency give the North Koreans the strongest bargaining advantage over the United States? This chapter claims that there was an optimal range of nuclear technology for North Korea to possess for the purpose of successful compellence. The North Koreans were in the best position when the plutonium-production capability was just coming on line in the early 1990s. At this emerging stage of technical development, North Korea could issue a credible threat of proliferation backed by a relatively low-cost assurance to suspend and eventually disable nuclear activities at Yongbyon in exchange for concessions. Once North Korea’s nuclear program left this fissile material “sweet spot” by producing large quantities of plutonium and testing a nuclear weapon during the Six-Party Talks, it became prohibitively costly and unattractive for the regime to reverse course or even freeze these activities. The North Koreans may have liked to pretend that they were still in the sweet spot during subsequent discussions, but the mature nuclear enterprise no longer provided an easy means to practice coercive diplomacy.
The fissile material sweet spot explains in part why North Korea’s buildup of nuclear capabilities over the last decade did not translate into an enhanced edge to extract concessions from the United States. As Thomas Schelling noted long ago, coercive threats have to be “stopped or reversed when the enemy complies, or else there is no inducement.”13 While North Korea continued to issue demands and consider offers at the negotiation table, the proliferation blackmail strategy unraveled because the government was unwilling to freeze or cap its strategic capabilities. Once the nuclear enterprise matured into an operational capacity, the Kim regime would likely pay high domestic costs in terms of “delegitimization and destabilization” if it decided to barter away this valuable asset.14
The rest of the chapter reviews two episodes of North Korean diplomacy to illustrate the bargaining benefits the Kim regime was able to reap from its emerging proliferation threat, as well as the barriers to denuclearization that set in as the nuclear enterprise matured over time. The first case of proliferation blackmail from 1991 to 1994 shows how North Korea’s threat to produce plutonium applied enough pressure on the United States to comply with demands without requiring the regime to make a hard choice about proliferation. The second episode of nuclear diplomacy during the Six-Party Talks a decade later demonstrates how the menu of denuclearization options became more expensive, while the Kim regime grew increasingly unwilling to trade away its nuclear assets. The chapter concludes that North Korea is unlikely to freeze its modern nuclear activities in the absence of a major catalytic shock.
This is an except from North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence
Notes

1. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).
2. Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2009); Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security (Abingdon [UK]: Routledge, 2011).
3. US Department of State, “U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Discussions,” press statement, February 29, 2012.
4. Andrew Quinn, “Obama’s North Korean Leap of Faith Falls Short,” Reuters, March 30, 2012; Ankit Panda, “A Great Leap to Nowhere: Remembering the US-North Korea ‘Leap Day’ Deal,” Diplomat, February 29, 2016.
5. Alastair Gale and Carol E. Lee, “U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks before Latest Nuclear Test,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2016.
6. North Korea’s desire for nuclear weapons stems back more than half a century. During the 1950s and 1960s, Kim Il-sung reached out to the Soviet Union to train North Korean scientists and founded the nuclear research complex at Yongbyon. Beset by insecurity, Kim apparently saw nuclear weapons “as a strategic ‘equalizer’ and deterrent” against US-ROK combined forces in the South. But since Kim maintained personal and secretive control over the nuclear program at its genesis, North Korea’s “nuclear intentions were never written in any DPRK regulations or explicitly developed. . . . Instead, they were ‘hidden away’ in Kim Il-sung’s head, and he might have shared only reluctantly his thoughts and intentions with his close associates.” Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program,” Nonproliferation Review (Spring–Summer 1995): 30.
7. Victor Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?,” Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 2 (2002): 209–30.
8. Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 19, no. 2 (Autumn 1994): 126–69; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995); T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000).
9. Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Ecco, 2012), 300.
10. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy,” International Security 35 (Summer 2010): 64.
11. Nicholas Eberstadt, Mark Rubin, and Albina Tretyakova, “The Collapse of Soviet and Russian Trade with the DPRK, 1989–1993,” Korean Journal of National Unification 4 (1995): 87–104; Marcus Noland, “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 4 (July 1, 1997): 106; Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), 93–110.
12. Narushige Michishita, North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008 (Abingdon [UK]: Routledge, 2009).
13. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 76
14. Nicholas Eberstadt quoted in Gale and Lee, “U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks.”

[Neo]

Well done Herman... first time you've posted something worth reading

[Looper]

^Now that you have your precious google link pacifier are we allowed to hear your view on how the NK nuclear proliferation problem should be dealt with or are you still working on the fine details?

[HermantheGerman]

Well done Herman... first time you've posted something worth reading

Thank You !
Now it's your turn

[Neo]

^Now that you have your precious google link pacifier are we allowed to hear your view on how the NK nuclear proliferation problem should be dealt with or are you still working on the fine details?

a) I haven't checked it all out yet, it could be total bs
b) Herman did the hard work not you
c) It was never about me
d) You are still a massive tool

[Looper]

Time is of the essence Neo.

If the Trumpster busts a move on Fatboy tomorrow and the tits hit the fan then we will hold you responsible for not sharing your master plan on how the NK nuclear proliferation problem could have been solved peacefully...

[Neo]

Clearly regime change is the only answer, the leader is highly unstable and his country has proven to be a threat to all mankind.

[Looper]

Neo's answer to the question about how to deal with NK is to change the subject.

Anyone could be forgiven for thinking that maybe he doesn't have any ideas after all - and after keeping us in suspense for days...

Oh dear...

[Neo]

Changing the subject...? Rightee-oh, because Trump and the US have nothing to do with this

It's easy to keep an idiot in suspense...

[Looper]

The question is how would you deal with the NK nuclear proliferation problem?

Lets pretend your are president for the day.

You can even wear a Trump wig and everything!