Thread: Divided Thailand seeks elusive 'normalcy'

http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/loca...ife-over-staff

LET IT BE

Two faces of the red shirts: one peaceful, the other fiery

• Published: 15/10/2010 at 12:00 AM
• Newspaper section: News

Sombat Boon-ngarmanong's peaceful protest epitomised by his "Red Sunday" activities is gaining momentum. Every weekend he takes red shirt sympathisers numbering in the hundreds swimming, cycling, or tying red ribbons at prominent places. Every now and then on significant dates, for instance, Sept 19 - a date marking the fourth anniversary of the 2006 coup d'etat and the four-month anniversary of the May 19 crackdown - or Oct 10, which marked 6 months since the April 10 shootings that left 25 dead, he urges thousands to gather in places around the nation and key cities around the world.

D’jango of peace: Sombat Boon-ngarmanong, the undeclared leader of red shirt sympathisers.

This is significant. Historically, Thais do not overtly show their political stance in defiance of the government especially now that the Emergency Decree is still in effect. In the midst of a conflict, they tend to keep quiet so as not to antagonise friends who disagree.

Of course, the demonstrators include friends and relatives of the victims of the violence between April and May. But within the crowds are many people not related to the victims. They are either supporters of the red shirts, have been converted to the cause through word of mouth, or feel strongly enough about the current state of Thai politics to come out and participate in the activities.

The government is clearly uncomfortable but is helpless when it comes to trying to stop this movement.

When Mr Sombat first organised the weekly event in June, he was arrested and later released under media pressure after spending more than two weeks in jail. Now minor arguments with the police are about the timing of dispersal, traffic management, etc. And since the protests have been peaceful, the government has no excuse to suppress them.

Strangely (though this may be a calculated move), Mr Sombat has never declared himself a leader or even a coordinator of the movement. Last Sunday, when many groups of red shirts converged, there was no stage, no speeches and no one asking for directives, unlike the red shirt gatherings under the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD).

Mr Sombat has a firm belief in the cause of calling for justice and democracy through peaceful means. An activist by nature, he believes in the power of the people to bring about change, and his activities are designed to make it easy for people to join in.

He especially hopes to bring back the trust of the Bangkok middle class who distanced themselves from the red shirts after the violence and arson of May.

Mr Sombat is not alone. Out in the provinces, groups of people around the country particularly in the North and the Northeast, are gathering around, exchanging stories and comparing notes on the red shirts' cause and what to do next. With the UDD leaders in jail, the red shirt sympathisers are virtually headless, but not so in spirit. Groups with new and locally groomed leaders are emerging. Some are glued to their satellite TV, watching a milder version of the closed red cable station, on the Democracy Channel.

Abroad, when Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva travelled to the United States or Europe, supporters of the red shirts have shown up with their protest signs held high and shouting obscenities. VDO clips of these deeds are then put up on YouTube and Facebook and twittered around the world for all to see.

In the cyber world, conversations are intense and engaging, challenging the government's campaign to shut down websites and block internet links. Social media networks get red-shirted "friends" together to share stories, pictures, articles, newspaper columns and VDO links - even if they have never met in real life.

These are the peaceful faces of the red shirt movement.

On the flip side of the red coin is the violence. The bombs, detonated or not, placed mostly in Bangkok, are disturbing. Not all of them can be linked to the red shirts since there clearly are other parties in the political conflict helping to fan the flames and joining in the blame game.

But much of the evidence collected points to some elements among the red shirts themselves, including former and present politicians on the opposition bench.

The suspicion is that there may be two components of the more radical red shirts. One is the rogue type which forms operation cells out of frustration and has sympathies for the red shirts and ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra. The other component is more organised, working under the direction of behind-the-scenes leaders.

The government's investigations into the bomb that exploded in an apparent accident at Saman Metta Mansion, confirms the involvement of red shirt supporters. A disturbing detail concerns a murky accomplice who could have come from the deep South, although a connection with southern insurgents has not yet been established. It is also not clear whether this was a rogue red shirt operation or an action taken by the more organised faction.

In a separate incident, the government is accusing the red shirts of organising a militia group to assassinate government VIPs. It remains unclear who are the culprits and whether they are red shirt factions or a set-up.

The bottom line is that all radical elements within or connected with the red shirts must be condemned. And whoever is behind the violence must be caught and punished in accordance with the law. This cannot be the route to any kind of victory, no matter what romantic revolutionary notions they hold.

Violence only works to alienate the general public from supporting the peaceful demonstrations for democracy and justice and the legitimate protest against the government's concealment of the truth regarding the 91 deaths in the May crackdown.

Violence also plays into the hands of those in power, who are using the politics of fear to avoid elections and a return to democracy. The present government can justify the reason for its existence without addressing the real concerns of the red shirts. It also fuels undemocratic tendencies of those who believe in and propose a national government model, who are waiting in the wings, ready to march out at the appropriate time.

As for Mr Sombat, his challenge is to keep the momentum and build it into a genuine political movement that will engage people from all walks of life. If he is successful, the movement could become a force to bring real change towards a more stable, democratic system.

Suranand Vejjajiva served in the Thaksin Shinawatra cabinet and is now a political analyst.

Keep it up Sombat (but be careful..you're more of a danger to the establishment than the red bogeymen)

http://www.tannetwork.tv/tan/ViewData.aspx?DataID=1036145

The Leader Class

UPDATE : 15 October 2010

The term “leader class” has been on the lips of political analysts as of late with many pointing to the executive ranks of Thai society, whether political or political activist, as the true key to unraveling the jumble that the nation is currently in. Chulalongkorn University professor Chaiyan Chaiyaporn recently referred to the role of the leader class in a radio interview.

Ajarn Chaiyan asserted that it is the leaders; party leaders, colored-shirt leaders, movement leaders so on and so forth, who have been at the crux of the Thai crisis. He stressed the role of the leader class, saying that though much of what has occurred was done under the name of the “masses” it has actually been the conflicts of their individual heads.

Ajarn Chaiyan went on to conclude that though it seemed crude, the nation's various group leaders would simply have to find a way to “split the cake”, explaining that in a highly divided society the answer is not establishing unity but rather finding a way for the different spheres to coexist.

The Chulalongkorn professor later stated that majority rule and democracy do not always go hand in hand, as the combined weight of minorities can add up. Ajarn Chaiyan pointed to basic agreements as a starting point, positing that if each group could carve out their niche based on broad agreements with others then Thailand could experience some semblance of peace. He commented that it has become apparent that neither side can do away with the other and it is thus time to seek alternatives to pure competition. Directly addressing the matter, Chaiyan stated that if the yellow-shirt group defines its satisfaction as the complete obliteration of the red-shirt group and vice-versa, strife will continue without end.

Ajarn Chaiyan included former premier Thaksin Shinawatra in his theory. The professor called Thaksin a clear member of the leader class and indicated that his participation in the “cake splitting” would be pivotal.

Asked about the feasibility of a national government, Ajarn Chaiyan acknowledged the idea as in line with his theory but qualified the comment by saying that any agreement between the leader class would allow for the current conflict to pass.

In simple terms, it is the leader class that has led the nation into its current mess and it is now time for them to own up to the masses they allege to represent and get it out. With terms like “grass root” and “aristocrat” seeming to fade away, may be the true face of Thailand's rotten apples is finally coming into focus and it is none other than our very own leaders.

Bangkok Biz News Editorial, October 15 2010

Translated and Rewritten by Itiporn Lakarnchua

Please note that the views expressed in our "Analysis" segment are translated from local newspaper articles and do not reflect the views of the Thai-ASEAN News Network.

http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/loca...tterly-corrupt

The good, the bad and the utterly corrupt

• Published: 16/10/2010 at 12:00 AM
• Newspaper section: News

Often the social news in local newspapers features a rich businessman hosting a sumptuous dinner to congratulate his friends who are police officers, generals or civil servants for their promotions during the October annual reshuffle, notes Prof Nanthawat Boramanant, a law faculty academic at Chulalongkorn University, as quoted by Matichon.


Commerce Minister Porntiva Nakasai could well be Newin Chidchob’s ‘‘sacrificial lamb’’.

What the social news fails to tell is how these people advanced in their careers. Did they earn their promotions through personal ability, luck or connections? Of course, those who leapfrog their colleagues through connections are in the minority while the bypassed majority are much greater in number as there are limited high positions available for annual promotion.

This is the state of Thai society, the well-known patron-client relationship with its sinister connotations, that only those in high positions and power can generate interest, recognition and honour in society.

In recent months, news of the annual reshuffles and assignments has featured constantly on the front pages of newspapers in both a positive and negative light, but the negative news seemed to dominate, especially involving the Interior Ministry.

Career bureaucrats who can serve their political masters effectively and faithfully are often promoted to a high position even though they may have a shady history, can sour international relations, can cause rifts among coalition partners, etc. In short, Mr Nanthawat said these people advance not because they have done something good for the country but because they are deemed by their political masters to be capable of serving their every need, good or bad.

Throughout Thai history, favouritism has been the key to appointing career bureaucrats to high position. No matter the passage of time, the relationship between politicians and career bureaucrats retains client-patron characteristics. In fact, several military coups were caused by conflicts between politicians and military brass about appointing candidates to commander-in-chief.

As long as the Thai bureaucracy is centralised and politicians have the ultimate say in appointing high-ranking officials, there will always be efforts by unscrupulous bureaucrats to try to rise to the top of the career pyramid by leapfrogging their colleagues, employing every means possible.

In the past, some retired officials came out to criticise unjust transfers and appointments and try to convince serving bureaucrats and society to oppose unjust political meddling in the annual reshuffle. However, all past efforts resulted in indifference and failure as the media would soon lose interest and the issue would die.

Even though career bureaucrats have been successful in convincing governments to issue a regulation that only a minister can name a permanent executive (C-11) to head a ministry, while the rest of the appointments must be approved by a committee and/or a permanent secretary, in practice the minister or deputy minister can always name their men to any position, from director-general (C-10) on downwards.

The present coalition government is no better than past governments in this regard. The country has a prime minister who cannot solve the most important problems in the country because he does not have real power as he must rely on MPs from other coalition parties and the military establishment. Even though some ministers and their bureaucratic minions are involved in corrupt practices, the only thing the country hears from this prime minister is "someone must bear responsibility", but no one has stepped forward to shoulder that responsibility. There is no punishment, no demotions and no dismissals.

Why should appointing career bureaucrats play an important role in advancing politicians' interests? The obvious answer is these bureaucrats can help in canvassing votes and lining politicians' pockets with illicit gains from various procurement projects.

Mr Nanthawat noted that he did not necessarily see politicians in a negative light, but from his long observation of Thai politics, politicians try to place their people in positions that help them to derive benefits in many forms. It has become a cultural norm for politicians of every hue and persuasion, and this culture prompts some ambitious and unscrupulous bureaucrats to seek to push themselves to the top of the pyramid by faithfully serving their political masters in return for command over other career bureaucrats.

Corruption can and does happen in Thailand because greedy politicians and ambitious bureaucrats work closely together to cream off millions from mega-project procurements to line their pockets. As long as politicians can supervise and authorise procurements, they can always take a huge commission. But to do so, they must have their people do their bidding. For this reason, politicians always want to appoint their people to influential positions that can help them secure kickbacks or in canvassing for votes in the provinces.

Mr Nanthawat advocates that to tackle corruption in government procurement projects, the only way is to strip politicians of their power to appoint their people to influential positions. If this cannot be done, there is no way that Thailand can be rid of corruption.

Another source of corruption is the patron-client relationship. As long as positions and favours are bestowed by connection, not by merit, it will lead to corruption as often those who receive favours will have to return the favour either in cash or in kind.

Another loophole is outdated regulations. Every year, procurements either large or small are the source of corruption and leakage. The PM's Office's Procurement Regulation 1992 has been in force for nearly two decades. This regulation is full of loopholes that can easily be exploited by corrupt bureaucrats. Mr Nanthawat advocated that this regulation should be overhauled into full-fledged legislation with severe penalties imposed on those who break the law. If this tool is a good one, it can help reduce the level of corruption.

Mr Nanthawat concluded that it was time career bureaucrats united and fought the attempts of politicians to place their people in influential posts. They must also fight fellow bureaucrats who want to advance their careers not by merit but by seeking favours from politicians. If the career bureaucrats fail in this task, the corruption problem in Thailand will never subside.

Newin may let go of Commerce

With the recent rumours of the Democrat Party expelling the Bhumjaithai Party from the coalition and inviting Puea Pandin's 3Ps - Pinij Jarusombat, Preecha Laohapongchana and Pairoj Suwanchawee - back into the fold, Bhumjaithai spokesman Supachai Chaisamut cautioned Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to be steadfast and not easily fall prey to political manipulation, noted a Thai Rath writer.

The rumour is not without substance as there has been constant news this week about the urgency of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) in tackling past corruption involving certain people in the Bhumjaithai Party.

The first news was about the excessive price paid by the Agriculture Ministry to procure scientific equipment from the Central Lab when Bhumjaithai de facto leader Newin Chidchob was deputy agriculture minister in Thaksin's cabinet. The NACC commissioners ruled that ministry officials colluded with the vendor in fixing a high price.

The second was the NACC investigating possible corruption at the Commerce Ministry in selling rice and cassava from the government's stocks to certain traders at below market prices.

The latest news is that the NACC indicted former Provincial Administration Department director-general Wongsak Sawadipanich for alleged corruption in the district chief entrance examination and computer procurements. It is believed political leaders are behind the corruption charges.

It is also believed that armed with such news, Mr Abhisit will take action to pressure Bhumjaithai to reduce its influence in the government by sacrificing one of the three Grade A ministries under the party's control: Interior, Transport or Commerce. A veteran politician like Mr Newin is unlikely to baulk at such a prospect and will not abandon the coalition government and force a general election. He knows full well this is not sensible as his party cannot compete against the Puea Thai Party in the North and Northeast. All the recent polls point to this.

If Mr Newin has to sacrifice one of the three ministries, it is unlikely that he will abandon Interior under Chavarat Charnvirakul, father of Anuthin Charnvirakul, Mr Newin's close ally in Bhumjaithai.

It is also unlikely that Mr Newin would sacrifice Transport as it commands huge infrastructure projects and he has entrusted it to his loyal Buri Ram MP Sohpon Zarum.

So the likely ministry is Commerce, supervised by Porntiva Nakasai, a supporter of Somsak Thepsuthin who is Mr Newin's political ally but not so close that he is a real buddy.

If it comes to the crunch, Mr Newin will likely inform Mr Abhisit to take away the Commerce Ministry, which is quite acceptable as the Democrat Party wants to control all ministries that are involved in driving the economy.

Time is short before a general election is called next year. Mr Abhisit and the Democrats must overcome their image of weakness in tackling the country's economic problems when compared to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. By taking over the Commerce Ministry, Mr Abhisit can unify the government's effort to boost the country's growth, increase people's standard of living and alleviate poverty, concluded Thai Rath.

^^ The Wiener class.

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

The present coalition government is no better than past governments in this regard. The country has a prime minister who cannot solve the most important problems in the country because he does not have real power as he must rely on MPs from other coalition parties and the military establishment. Even though some ministers and their bureaucratic minions are involved in corrupt practices, the only thing the country hears from this prime minister is "someone must bear responsibility", but no one has stepped forward to shoulder that responsibility. There is no punishment, no demotions and no dismissals.

Why should appointing career bureaucrats play an important role in advancing politicians' interests? The obvious answer is these bureaucrats can help in canvassing votes and lining politicians' pockets with illicit gains from various procurement projects.

Mr Nanthawat noted that he did not necessarily see politicians in a negative light, but from his long observation of Thai politics, politicians try to place their people in positions that help them to derive benefits in many forms.

Corruption can and does happen in Thailand because greedy politicians and ambitious bureaucrats work closely together to cream off millions from mega-project procurements to line their pockets. As long as politicians can supervise and authorise procurements, they can always take a huge commission. But to do so, they must have their people do their bidding. For this reason, politicians always want to appoint their people to influential positions that can help them secure kickbacks or in canvassing for votes in the provinces.

Mr Nanthawat advocates that to tackle corruption in government procurement projects, the only way is to strip politicians of their power to appoint their people to influential positions. If this cannot be done, there is no way that Thailand can be rid of corruption.

Another source of corruption is the patron-client relationship. As long as positions and favours are bestowed by connection, not by merit, it will lead to corruption as often those who receive favours will have to return the favour either in cash or in kind.

While this is a pretty frank assessment of the way it probably works, it still seems to lay the blame of all corruption at the feet of elected politicians who tempt the senior bureaucracts to get involved. I'd suggest it's actually the other way around.

In other words, this article is the latest example of avoiding the real nut to crack - that of amatayathipihithai rule.

It's probably more likely in the amat system that the politicians are being used by the senior bureaucrats whose extensive family networks and their businesses have already decided on a mega project and where the contracts will go. Only then are politicians brought in to "propose the project" find the funding and push it through parliament. In this scenario, the politician is the useful pawn..but profits too of course.

That's why a certain old general once made the famous remark that "governments get to ride the horse, but the horse is actually owned by someone else'. That someone else is the amat.

Thailand is anything but a Meritocracy.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home...-30140246.html

Army man calls it as he sees it

Published on October 17, 2010

Army Colonel Teeranan Nandhakwang, deputy director of the Strategic Studies and Research Division, is one of the rare vocal soldiers who speak, 'tweet' and blog about the role of the military in politics and Thai society. The Nation's Pravit Rojanaphruk talks to Teeranan about the military, politics and society. Excerpts:

Why do you fear that there might soon be yet another military coup?

First, because there're still no peace and order. There exists a belief which is a remnant from the past [that a coup is the solution]. The previous coup moved the armed forces too close to politics, to the point that it was seen as a mechanism of politicians instead of a mechanism of the government.

Nobody wants to see it happen again but it can't be ruled out. Today, it has become difficult for the Army to withdraw itself.

If another coup takes place, will Thailand increasingly resemble Burma?

Many feel that way but it won't be like that because when changes took place in Burma [in 1988] communications technologies were not efficient. There may be an attempt to take [Thailand] to that point but it won't be easy.

Some contend that the current situation - with the continued imposition of the emergency decree in Bangkok, the continued existence of the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) and suppression of red-shirt media - is tantamount to a silent coup being staged already.

I have told many people that the continued imposition of special [security] laws is not good for Thailand. But in this transitional period, those involved in the operations still believe it to be necessary.

As a "democratically-minded" army officer, what should be the ideal role for the Thai military?

In the short-term, it's to carry the country through the conflicts. In the long term, I would like to see professional soldiers protecting the country [from external threat].

Why does there seem to be no end to military meddling in Thai politics?

It's the Thai context of things. We evolve from there and it has become a continued tradition. The Army tried to become a professional force though. The May 1992 [uprising] saw a clash between the military and democratic forces and led to the military being stationed a very good distance [in relation to other institutions], until the 19 September [2006] coup that is.

Do you think the military should be responsible for the 91 deaths which occurred between April and May this year?

Whenever the military are ordered [to deal with street protesters] we automatically become the accused in the eyes of society. Soldiers are trained to use force and whenever force is used it easily leads to loss of lives. All this must be the responsibility of the people who gave the orders.

Why do many people in Thai society still expect or depend on the Army to solve political problems?

We must blame Thai society, for people often yearn for a knight on a white horse and chose to solve problems by whatever means without considering the repercussions.

Does the Army need to have so many radio stations plus television stations under its control?

The birth of Army TV stations took place during the [cold war] conflicts and Field Marshal Sarit [Thanarat] initiated it. The future, however, ought to be about television as privately owned stations plus public television and local stations. Though we have [televisions and radios] if they are not utilised effectively it's as if we do not have them.

Why is there no military coup in the US?

The US constitution was a result of war and participation. Civil war gave a crucial context to US armed forces. The way forces are mobilised and operate differs. If it is centred at one spot it creates absolute power. In Thailand, all operational command is up to the commander of the forces.

Why do you dare to criticise the Army? Are you not afraid of punishment?

I love the Army and my profession. And my views [about the military] are honest and academic.

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Why is there no military coup in the US? The US constitution was a result of war and participation. Civil war gave a crucial context to US armed forces. The way forces are mobilised and operate differs. If it is centred at one spot it creates absolute power. In Thailand, all operational command is up to the commander of the forces.

His answer was very muddled so I'm not sure if he really knows.

The short answer is because the military is subordinate to the civilian government, the President is Commander in chief, in principle and in practice.

The long answer has to do with cultural attitudes about the military, laws, less corruption among the ranks, the de-politicization of the military, and the expectation that the military serves as protectors, not enforcers of government regimes.

Thailand's political turmoil remains unresolved four years after coup

Speculation about a possible military coup persists amid continuing turmoil

By Jonathan Manthorpe, Vancouver Sun October 18, 2010

Read more: http://www.vancouversun.com/sports/T...#ixzz12rSOOunR

A tire burns as Thai soldiers clash with anti-government protesters at Bangkok's financial district in May. Ninety-one people were killed during that insurrection, and the government declared a state of emergency.

Photograph by: Sukree Sukplang, Reuters, Vancouver Sun

There are increasing questions in Thailand about the exact balance of power and authority between the civilian government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and the army commander-in-chief, Gen. Prayuth Chanocha.

Only the most vehement Thai political dissidents are claiming that there has been another military coup and that Prayuth, who is a staunch monarchist and was one of the leaders of the 2006 coup that ousted the prime minister at the time, Thaksin Shinawatra, has done it again.

But what is evident is that the military, the royalist establishment and its supporters, and their chosen prime minister, Abhisit, are strengthening their defensive measures in the face of a persistent, bitter and violent political and social divide in the southeast Asian nation.

Last week Prayuth, who was appointed army chief in September, deployed nearly 2,000 soldiers in communities in the 50 districts in and around the capital Bangkok.

Their job is to develop relations with local people so they can act as the eyes and ears of the authorities in the hope of being able to forestall violent political unrest.

Such direct acts by the military quickly remind all Thais that their country has had 18 military coups since the 1930s. Prayuth went halfway toward calming apprehension that the army is in charge.

"I will try to step back from politics, be clear of it, and leave it with the government," he said last week. "But if the nation has not returned to order, the military -as a mechanism of government -must help build order first."

Prayuth's new district troop deployment is in addition to soldiers already guarding train stations and other public places in response to a serious outbreak of political violence earlier this year. On Oct. 5, the Thai cabinet extended for a further three months the state of emergency powers enacted at the end of May when troops stormed a massive compound erected in central Bangkok by political reform activists and supporters of Thaksin, known as "Red Shirts."

Ninety-one people were killed, mostly Red Shirts, during that insurrection and more than 1,500 injured.

Several of the leaders are awaiting trial on terrorism and other charges.

But the Red Shirts, whose formal name is the United Front for Democracy Against (UFDAD) Dictatorship, have rebounded.

They continue to defy the emergency regulations by holding mass rallies.

There have also been over 70 terror bombings in Bangkok since the Red Shirt compound was stormed.

Targets have included the Royal Turf Club, a ruling party political office, a school, a shopping mall parking lot and the Public Health Ministry.

But the worst injuries came on Oct. 5 when four people were killed in an explosion in an apartment block. Police say one of the four was a suspected bombmaker who was awaiting trial for involvement in the May Red Shirt insurrection.

Some blame an ultramilitant breakaway group from the UFDAD called Red Siam for the bombings.

Last week this led to a renewed diplomatic storm with neighbouring Cambodia. A senior officer with Thailand's Department of Special Investigation said interrogation of 11 arrested Red Shirts revealed they were among 39 men given military training in Cambodia where, until recently, the exiled Thaksin was a government economic adviser.

Cambodia's prime minister, Hun Sen, angrily denied the allegation and the Abhisit government seems to have accepted his word. Others blame the Thai government, especially the military, for engineering the bombings in order to justify continued emergency rule. Such uncertainties and conspiracy theories are a feature of Thai politics where the interplay between courtiers around King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the military, and the elected parliament and government is often shadowy and hard to fathom.

That there is a degree of normalcy in the current uncertainty and unresolved political tension may be why there is no evidence that the Thai economy is suffering.

The currency, the baht, has risen 11 per cent in recent months and is at a 13-year high against the U.S. dollar. The predictions are that the Thai economy will grow by about seven per cent this year and there's no indication that one of the country's major money-earners, tourism, has been affected by the action on the streets.

The motivation for the September 2006 military coup was outrage among royalists at the activities of then prime minister and billionaire businessman Thaksin, who was seen as attempting to undermine the role of the monarchy as the unifying and binding force in Thai national life.

<edited one sentence out, as too sensitive imho>

Prayuth and his predecessor as army chief and fellow coup plotter, Gen. Anupong Paojinda, are close to Prem.

Indeed, Prayuth was and is responsible for the Internal Security Operations Command, among whose responsibilities is the monitoring of people who might be anti-monarchists.


Read more: http://www.vancouversun.com/sports/T...#ixzz12rSAbYZN

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Only the most vehement Thai political dissidents are claiming that there has been another military coup and that Prayuth, who is a staunch monarchist and was one of the leaders of the 2006 coup that ousted the prime minister at the time, Thaksin Shinawatra, has done it again.

Quite, I believe the term de jour' is half coup.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home...-30140493.html

BURNING ISSUE

Is Thailand becoming morally bankrupt?

By Pravit Rojanaphruk
r_pravit[at]hotmail.com
Published on October 21, 2010

There are times when observers will be tempted to ask if Thai society is corrupt in its thinking and morally bankrupt beyond redemption. Consider the following examples:

New Army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha on Monday promoted dozens of Army officers who had taken part in the April-May crackdown on red shirts, which resulted in 91 deaths, even though the government appointed fact-finding panel looking into these deaths is nowhere close to providing details on the exact circumstances on each.

Prayuth apparently cannot and will not wait until the findings "clear" these officers of any possible wrongdoing, despite the fact various sources in the Army say excessive and lethal force was employed.
Apparently Prayuth doesn't care.

Senator Kamnoon Sitthisamarn, one of the brains behind the yellow-shirt People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), suggested in his column in the October 11 edition of ASTV-Manager Daily that the so-called symbolic protests on September 19 and October 10 in Bangkok and beyond - initiated by red-shirt supporter Sombat Boon-ngarm-anong - which attracted close to 10,000 people were "more dangerous" than an armed rebellion.

Kamnoon urged the government to stop Sombat and his followers before it was too late.

"The struggle outside the system, outside the frame of law, without form and without a command centre is now spreading widely. It is believed that even if Pol Lt-Colonel Thaksin Shinawatra ordered them to stop, it wouldn't work because it's not clear who should be sent the orders."

There was a time when those who opposed the red shirts said that Thaksin had hired and herded mostly poor and uneducated farmers to come out and protest. Now, people like Kamnoon are worried that the red shirts are acting on their own accord.

This is not "a scarier future", as Kamnoon concludes in his column, if you are all for democracy. A more participatory and democratic transformation of reds ought to be welcomed. Many reds are now taking initiative, forming their own small groups, while people like Kamnoon continue branding as "more dangerous" than armed reds.

Does this writer think the red shirts ought not to have any political voice at all? Or are the red shirts only good if they become yellow? What's the point of being a democracy then?

The continued denial by members of the National Reform Committee that they were appointed by the government. They say only the head of the committee, former premier Anand Panyarachun in this case, was appointed by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.

Then we must ask: Why did Abhisit appoint Anand and leaders of other committees in the first place? Could it be a political manoeuvre after the 91 deaths?

Doesn't Anand think he would be seen as a bit more independent if he chose not to be appointed by Abhisit and initiated the entire thing himself without using the taxpayers' money?

And what about the three-year mandate the government has given the panel? The red shirts' boycotted it, as well as a parallel event organised last week by academics and activists who felt the project was just a tool of the elite to prolong their rule over society.

There must be some logic in all these three examples. After all, the key characters are shamelessly dedicated in achieving their less-than-democratic goals at whatever price. And they think they can get away with it too.

So who are we to say they are morally bankrupt?

http://www.prachatai3.info/english/n...+in+English%29

Friday, 22 October 2010

UK Government confirm Thai nationals received refugee status - evidence update

Fri, 22/10/2010 - 10:47 Andrew Spooner, Siam Voices

I have finally obtained cast-iron proof that a Thai national was granted refugee status in the UK in 2009 after I made direct contact with the relevant UK Government ministry responsible for deciding who recieves refugee status in the UK.

The result was that a spokesperson from the UK's Home Office, the UK Government ministry that controls the Border Agency, confirmed that at least one Thai national was granted refugee status in the UK in 2009.

In addition to this I also contacted the Refugee Council, the largest independent body in the UK which deals with asylum seekers and refugees, to get their insight into whether the refugee documentation provided to me by my interview subject was, in their opinion, likely to be authentic. A spokesperson from the Refugee Council stated that the papers I was provided with do look like documents that would verify that a person has refugee status. However, they did say only the Home Office can confirm the status of a client and its authenticity.

Adding all this together, I am more than happy that my original story and interview was 100% accurate. What is now clear is that a precedent has been set and more Thai nationals seeking refuge from political violence and intimidation could emerge. One simple fact must be considered in all of this - that the present Thai regime does very little to control the extremist acts of intimidation, threats & violence perpetrated by the supporters and members of the PAD. The evidence of the present regime's collusion with the PAD is overwhelming and substantial, as is the same regime's refusal to uphold the rule of law vis a vis the actions of the PAD. One may even go so far to assume that the PAD acts as an agent of the regime, such is the legal and politcal cover it recieves. This has become one of the salient features of Thailand's present political predicament.

If anyone has any proof to refute the evidence I've produced so far as to the veracity of my interview subject's refugee status, please put it in the comments section. Just saying it isn't so or calling my "biased" doesn't count, I'm afraid.

Source:
http://asiancorrespondent.com/siamvoices/thailand-s-refugee-problem-evid...

^

dynamite

looks like some rich Thai kid found a way to stay in England illegally for a bit longer

brilliant,

blog reports of another seeking refugee status in Norway also .

Originally Posted by Mid

blog reports of another seeking refugee status in Norway also .

probably a katoye looking for work

quite hilarious, isn't it ? can't blame the Thai for being opportunist little bastards

Originally Posted by Mid

The non-State actors that I refer to are supporters of the fascist PAD who took over and wrecked Government House, used violence and weapons outside Parliament and took control of the two international airports in 2008. As an NGO activist I personally knew many PAD supporters and they knew me well enough to make death threats to my mobile phone and to make abusive comments to my face when I was carrying out my NGO duties.

ask a friend to send SMS with death threats: 3 THB/SMS
Find NGO reports of human right abuses on the Net: Free

Get a 5yr refugee visa in the UK: Priceless

yep it's really that easy

your a twat butters

you still live in Disneyland mid

Originally Posted by Mid

your a twat butters

No. But he'd like to be.

http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/o...world-go-round

What makes the World go round

• Published: 24/10/2010 at 12:00 AM
• Newspaper section: News

On Oct 20, Reporters without Borders published its latest world press freedom index. In it, Thailand is ranked 153rd out of 178 countries. We're sandwiched between two former Soviet satellites most Thais have never heard of, Belarus and Azerbaijan. More familiar to us is Cambodia, ranked 128th.

Think about it. In this context, the country under the regime of Premier Hun Sen has more freedom than the nation whose moniker literally translates to ''Land of the Free''.

The UK's Guardian newspaper recently published a story about how Southeast Asian governments - Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand - are following in the footsteps of China in the ''authoritarian censorship of the digital world''.

However, those countries rank lower than Thailand on the world press freedom index. But that's like saying a midget is taller than a dwarf. The point is rather moot to everyone apart from the midget and the dwarf. No offence intended to any midget or dwarf.

I will let everybody in on a little secret that is not really a secret. I will not speak for any other Asian country, because it is not my place. But I will speak for Thailand, because it is my right and duty as a citizen.

So prick up your ears and lean a little closer. Ready? Excited? Here goes: ''We don't really want democracy. We only pretend to want it to fool the West.''

Now by ''we'', I of course do not mean all 63.7 million of us. The majority of us unfortunately lack the education to understand, and therefore do not have the knowledge required to decide one way or the other about the ideals of democracy.

For example, the Thai labour force is 37 million strong, and according to the Labour Ministry, 10 million of them have not even completed primary education. The numbers naturally beg to question the word ''strong'' and explain why democracy to most Thais is neither here nor there. We have more immediate worries.

Then there are those idealistic fools like me who stand on a platform and scream ''democracy'', while the real decision makers of the country chuckle and go, ''Yeah, dream on.'' Or if we rock the boat a little too much for comfort, we may end up like Chiranuch Premchiaporn, editor of Prachatai.com, who faces up to 70 years in jail.

Perhaps the political and business elite (after all, the ties between the two are inseparable) are simply masquerading as wanting democracy, but have a not-so-secret desire to build an authoritarian utopia.

For example, look at the ''wonderful'' things China is doing. No need to be a democracy to be rich, power and feared. But we're not China, so we need the word ''democracy''.

And this is why we need to ''fool the West'' _ it's because we want to be a part of the global community, which of course is dominated by Western power and money. To have allies. To trade. To do business. It's what makes the world go round. And they love that word ''democracy'' over there.

But then again, on the flip side, if the Western world is truly sincere about democracy, then no one from the West would be trading with or investing in China. So there you go. A bit puzzling, perhaps?

Burma, North Korea, Cuba and Iran are considered ''rogue states'', supposedly sanctioned for being undemocratic and for their abuse of human rights and freedoms. But China is dhdifferent. What's the difference? Lots of money to be made there. It's what makes the world go round.

Really, Thailand is no more hypocritical than anyone else, are we? In truth, we aren't fooling them, nor are they fooling us. They just have 1st class tickets, while we are 3rd class passengers, but we all travel aboard the same ship of fools.

So let's all pretend. To masquerade as a democracy is easy. All we need to have are elections. So just have them. Lots of countries do.

For many countries of course it's a given that every four or five years you elect an authoritarian ruler, or an oligarch. No need to mind human rights, liberty and civil rights.

Then just make sure to put ''democracy'' under the system of government for your country's entry in Wikipedia _ and no one will be the wiser. You'll be a proud member of the global village.

Human rights abuses? Suppression of freedoms? Bah! There will be columns and reports condemning it, of course. World leaders will make stirring Academy Award-worthy speeches against it, naturally. But at the end of the day, what makes the world go round will continue to make the world go round.

Money doesn't need democracy. Money needs stability.

All that said, my cup is always half full. After all, such is the nature of the idealistic fool. Others may shed tears over the more than 100,000 websites blocked in Thailand. And perhaps many do deserve to be blocked for abusing freedoms rather than exercising them.

But in my half-full cup, I see more than 100,000 websites, even if I strongly disagree with their content, standing up for freedom. And that's more than ever before, isn't it? That is progress. The bans are simply the obstacles. Obstacles to progress are simply the natural order of things. Freedoms aren't served up on a silver platter.

Some may say, ''Voranai, you traitor, you! How can you write so badly about Thailand, saying we are only pretending and masquerading!'' To which I reply: You are very welcome to prove me wrong by putting a stop to the suppression of freedoms.

http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/o...s-for-thailand

National Security Laws: Key implications for Thailand

There are at least five sets of laws which pertain to security under the umbrella of the 2007 constitution, and this leads to a high potential for abuse

• Published: 24/10/2010 at 12:00 AM
• Newspaper section: News

The rise of the nation-state in the past century has witnessed a proliferation of laws concerning national security. In reality, the grand question is not whether to have national security laws _ of course, there must be some laws _ but rather what kind of laws and what type of checks and balances in their application so as to prevent abuse of power. It is this quandary which challenges many societies today, and Thailand is no exception to this dilemma.

The rationale behind all these laws is usually the need to counter the risk or threat posed to society. Yet, care has to be exerted here to forestall a disingenuous approach, as there may be three kinds of threats: actual threats, potential threats and fictitious threats.

In Thailand, there are at least five sets of laws which pertain to the issue under the umbrella of the 2007 constitution. First, there is criminal law, represented by the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. There are a variety of provisions in Thai criminal law which can be invoked on this front. The most notable in recent times is the addition of the crime of terrorism to the Criminal Code. In section 135 of the Criminal Code, this offence is defined as covering acts which intimidate the Thai government, a foreign government or an international organisation, leading to violence or disorder creating fear among the population. This crime may lead to the death penalty. Yet, the Criminal Procedure Code, together with the constitution, provides various safeguards including the right of access of accused persons to the courts within 48 hours of their arrest.

Second, there is the Martial Law Act, which dates from the time of an absolutist setting, enacted nearly a century ago. Basically, under this law, the military can arrest people without a court warrant and detain them for seven days without access to the courts. Effectively, the administration of justice is transferred from civilian to military authority. The law also brings into play military courts, thus conferring on these courts (rather than civilian or civil courts) the power to deal with offences on the part of the military, with fewer safeguards to respond to civilian grievances.

This law is still applied in Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces in the South, although its application in areas of Songkla province was revoked a few months ago.

Third, the presence of the 2005 State of Emergency Decree. This law has been the subject of greatest discussion in recent years due to a variety of anomalies inherent in it. The law allows the authorities (the executive branch in cooperation with law enforcers, especially the military) to limit the exercise of various rights such as the freedoms of expression, communication and assembly. A person can be arrested with a court warrant and detained for seven days without access to the courts; this is renewable, leading to possible preventive detention for 30 days without trial before the courts. Section 12 of this law enables the authorities to detain people in unofficial locations (beyond prisons and official detention centres), leading to opacity in the administration of justice. Moreover, the law prevents aggrieved persons from accessing the Administrative courts to seek redress. Officials carrying out their duties are exempted from responsibility, thus giving rise to the shield of impunity, and aggrieved persons can only claim compensation in the quest for justice. The government also needs to renew application of the law every three months (through cabinet approval) and this has been done some twenty times.

In practice, this law has been much used in Thailand's South, and in the past year more broadly in response to the altercations between groups of different political colours. Application of the law in the South has meant that many suspects are detained without access to the courts for 30 days ( plus another seven days under martial law) and there is no guaranteed access to lawyers. Moreover, suspects who are released are often rearrested on the basis of multiple warrants issued by the authorities, compounded by the limited granting of bail. The emergency decree is still applied in Bangkok today.

Fourth, the advent of the 2008 Internal Security Act 2008. This law integrates various elements of the State of Emergency Decree, such as constraints of the various freedoms mentioned, into a more permanent framework. The act establishes a national security command centre under the prime minister, with a strong presence of the armed forces and a number of other stakeholders, including at the regional level. Intriguingly, the law introduces a provision (Section 21) whereby suspects can be sent to training camps, subject to a court order and the suspects' consent, for up to six months to help change their ways. Compliance with this measure leads to delisting of the suspects from the ''blacklist''. The law also prevents aggrieved persons from gaining access to administrative courts, but access to ordinary courts is possible.

Interestingly, this law has been much used in the past year, particularly in regard to the violence marring the Bangkok metropolitan area. Various proclamations under this law also enable the authorities to interlink with other laws, thus allowing them to exercise powers under these laws. For instance, the proclamation on April 1, 2010 empowers the so-called command centre to apply the following ''other'' laws under their purview: the Ministry of Defence Act, the Munitions Act, the Prevention of Disaster Act, the Act to Control Use of Loudspeakers, the Land Traffic Act, the Vehicles Act, the Dangerous Substances Act, the Firearms Act, the Navigation in Thai Waters Act, the Hotels Act, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code.

Fifth, there are a a number of other laws which bolster a broad notion of national security. Section 112 of the Criminal Code establishes the crime of lese majeste. Anyone can invoke this against anyone else, thus giving rise to the intriguing situation a few years ago whereby a coup leader invoked this provision against a social critic/human rights advocate. The court wisely dismissed the case. The law is now being reviewed by one of the ministries and one of the issues will be the question of locus standi, namely: who should be able to take action in the courts on the basis of this law. Globally the principle of locus standi implies that only those who are directly aggrieved (rather than the general public) have the capacity to litigate/prosecute. Incidentally, coups d'etat are illegal under Thai criminal law, as witnessed by Section 113 of the Criminal Code.

Another law which has been much used recently in the name of national security is the Computer Crimes Act 2007, which has led to the blocking of over 100,000 web pages under this government, according to some sources.

Given that these laws are used cumulatively in several situations in Thailand today, they give rise to the following ambivalent effects:

Geographic spread. While two years ago discourse on these laws would have been largely concerned with the southern provinces of Thailand, the use of the laws in recent months has spread and affects Thailand as a whole.

Cluster effect. Use of these laws opens the floodgate to the conferment of powers derived from other laws on the authorities, with all the attendant dangers. The centrifugal force of the Internal Security Act above is clear: it opens the door today to a cluster of more than 10 other laws listed above as part of the seepage of national security claims.

Rule by exceptionalism. While the constitution and much of the verbal commitment of policy makers is to uphold the rule of law, exemplified (in theory) by access to courts and safeguards to protect accused persons from harm, reality suggests otherwise. The exceptions imposed on rights and freedoms are pervasive on many fronts, thus establishing by default rule by exceptionalism.

Permanency of the temporary. The preferred assumption of national security laws, especially of a draconian kind such as the State of Emergency Decree, is that they should only be resorted to temporarily. Yet, the fact that these laws have been used for so long implies permanency of what should only be temporary measures. In effect, this strikes at the heart of the constitution, since its essence is now compromised by the perpetuation of limitations.

Subjectivisation of justification. While the concerns of the national authorities claiming to protect the public in any country are understandable on one level, care should be exercised to avoid being too subjective in one's claims.

This is the reason why there are international treaties pertaining to human rights and national security, so that a sense of balance can be established more objectively. In particular, Thailand is a party to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establishes key parameters on this front. For instance, various rights such as the freedom from torture are absolute rights which allow no exception ( even on the ground of national security).

In regard to other rights, such as freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, limitations are possible but they must comply with various criteria: limitations are permitted if they are backed by law (rather than arbitrary power/discretion); if they are necessary in the interface with ''risk(s)''; if they are proportionate to the circumstances; and if they are in the pursuit of a democratic society.

The state of emergency has also to be declared to the UN for the sake of transparency. This year, Thailand made a declaration to the UN for the first time in this regard, leaving an aftertaste of the omission that prevailed beforehand.

Clearly, the preferred approach is to overcome the excesses of the spate of national security laws, while safeguarding rights and responsibilities under international law and the constitution. It is high time to repeal both the Martial Law Act and the State of Emergency Decree. Even if they are not repealed, they need to be reformed to curb the impunity factor and to respect the many rights that they undermine today.

As for the Internal Security Act, while it opens the door to more transparency than the other two laws, its negative centrifugal impact should not be underestimated.

Thus, the bottom line is that it is best to use the ordinary criminal law and ensure compliance with international standards. As a seminal academic publication on national security laws pronounced once upon a time: ''Support, not Supplant, Civilian Authority''.

Vitit Muntarbhorn is a professor of law at Chulalongkorn University. He has helped the UN in a variety of capacities, including as a consultant, expert and special rapporteur. This article is derived from his presentation at the recent conference on national security laws and Thailand, organised by the Institute of Security and International Studies, Bangkok.