From Robert Peston, BBC's Economics Editor:
Wednesday's Picks
UBS's real loss
For months now, bankers have been taking some small comfort from the nature of their losses on subprime lending.
- Robert Peston
- 21 May 08, 08:29 AM
They have suffered markdowns, but these are not real cash losses. They are reductions in the market value of securities backed by subprime, to reflect a fall in the market price.
And that fall in the market price has been exaggerated, or so the argument runs, by the total evaporation of liquidity in these markets.
So in theory, the final losses suffered by banks could turn out to be much less than the losses they've announced, if the banks were to hold their subprime securities till all the borrowers of subprime money have either repaid or till those borrowers have defaulted and had their respective properties seized and sold.
That was, for example, the implication of a recent analysis by the Bank of England, which said that it thought subprime was being priced at a level that was surely lower than the underlying economic reality would justify.
So that's the context for assessing the significance of this morning's confirmation by UBS, the giant Swiss bank, that it has sold $22bn of subprime, Alt-A (a grade of US mortgage debt just a bit better than subprime) and prime mortgage-backed securities for $15bn.
It represents a loss for UBS of $7bn or 32% - not a notional accounting loss, but a real loss of hard cash.
And to add insult to very genuine self-inflicted harm, UBS is providing an $11.25bn loan to the buyer of all this stinky US mortgage debt, which is the fund management group BlackRock.
So UBS has suffered a genuine, eye-wateringly large loss on the sale of assets it should never have accumulated, but is remaining exposed to those assets to the tune of $11.25bn.
As I write, my brain can't quite come to terms with the extraordinary financial implications of all this, even though the terms of the deal have been known for some time.
Does it mean that the credit crunch must be nearing an end, when there is such an extraordinary example of what investors call "capitulation" by UBS?
Or does it mean that we're still at the end of the beginning, in that it's impossible to do an arms length deal even at a knockdown price?
The same question is posed by yesterday's deal that reopens the British mortgage-backed securities market, HBOS' piddling sale of £500m of securities backed by prime UK mortgages.
It's the first sale of mortgage-backed bonds by a British bank since last August.
But the amount is a fraction of what HBOS would typically have sold before the market shut down. And HBOS is paying an extraordinary amount for the money - 0.85 percentage points above LIBOR, even though the £500m is backed by mortgages worth about £800m.
It shows you how much international investors fear the prospects for the British housing market if they are only prepared to lend money to HBOS at more than 6.5%, even when the collateral is worth between 30 and 40% more than the loan.
That is scary.


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The Wall Street Journal noted that on Thursday, Greenlight Capital hedge fund manager David Einhorn spoke at the Ira Sohn Investment Research conference, questioning why the company only wrote down a $6.5 billion collateralized debt portfolio by just $200 million, and also taking issue with large, unrealized gains the firm booked in the first quarter. A known Lehman short seller, Einhorn is not the only one betting on further downside.
