Thread: Afghanistan 2009 & 2010

A perspective worth consideration.

Michael Brenner

Senior Fellow, the Center for Transatlantic Relations
Posted: September 14, 2009 03:19 PM
9/11: Never Again?

This essay first appeared in the National Journal Security Expert Blog.

This is the most painful of anniversaries. Fear, anger, anxiety -- a cocktail of emotions. The images are still vivid. This year's commemoration is especially full of angst. Perhaps because torture, Afghanistan and failed wars are creeping back into the headlines. These reflections aim to disentangle fact from myth, emotion from reason, so as to better estimate what we really should worry about and whether our current policies actually raise the risk of something horrific occurring again.
9/11 was a unique event. The perpetrators were a transnational network without a national affiliation who used hijacked civilian aircraft to attack monumental buildings in the homeland of the world's greatest power located across an ocean -- and did so with devastating effect. To describe what happened is to evoke the audacity of the project and the intensity of the reaction. Any serious appraisal, therefore, must detach itself from the powerful emotions of fear and dread as well as the horrific imagery -- to separate actuality from legend.
The critical lesson to be drawn is that the operation did not depend critically on a fixed location although facilitated by a stable base in Afghanistan. It was multinational: conceived in Afghanistan, organized in Germany and the US, and executed here by Saudis and Egyptians. The plan's stunning success should not obscure its simplicity. No innovative technology was designed, no complicated logistics were entailed, no special opportunity available or created, no great amount of cash needed. Most impressive was the dedication and emotional resiliency of the hijackers who kept their sense of suicidal purpose despite living in an alien environment.
A key to success was the equally stunning incompetence (and, let's face it, sheer stupidity) of security agencies in the target country. The 9/11 Commission's conclusion that nothing reasonable could have been done to prevent it is utter nonsense: just scanning the transparent facts makes that embarrassingly obvious. The most egregious failure was the FBI's in not following through on the two agents' reports of Middle Easterners taking flying lessons without concern for take-off or landing.
We perhaps have to live with the possibility of a conspiracy by similar extremely motivated persons. We cannot accept similar self-created vulnerability.
As to future threats, let's keep in mind the following points. Freedom to use large swaths of territory is not an absolute precondition to doing something of the same order. Technological thresholds are low whether we think of airplanes, conventional explosives or chemicals. It is fairly easy to commit terrorist acts that kill at least hundreds.
Assuming the truth of the two previous statements, the question that stands out is why so little has happened over the last eight years. Superior intelligence/police work? In the United States, not one serious plot has been exposed. The few, over-publicized cases were embryonic schemes involving marginal persons lacking the mental and morale capacity to do much of anything. In Europe, there have been a number of instances (Germany, UK, France) where plots were disrupted at very early stages -- but none came approximately close to 9/11 in capability or organization. They, too, involved marginal young men of limited competence. Major successes were scored in Pakistan to diminish severely al Qaeda's original group.
We should also note that the superior recruiting and training facilities we provided in Iraq over the past six years (plus motivation given to potential bankrollers) has not had any demonstrable effect insofar as major threats outside the Greater Middle East are concerned.
Logically, it follows that we either have overstated the size and scope of the al-Qaeda network; mistakenly assumed that the prominence of the U.S. as a strategic target relative to Middle Eastern governments was a constant for the relevant persons or groups; and/or exaggerated the ease of marshaling persons with the requisite combination of emotional strength and discipline to even consider doing something like 9/11.
The implications in terms of American policy can be simply stated. Going after al-Qaeda in Afghanistan made sense. It was a partial success. Everything else that we have done in Afghanistan and Iraq (Somalia, too) has been an enormous waste of resources: human, financial, technical and political. Enhancing classic intelligence/police work in close cooperation with the services of other governments is far more valuable, far less costly -- and avoids the counter productive consequences of endless wars and occupations.
The negative effects of our policies are huge in well-known respects: motivating possible terrorists from across the region, providing the proving grounds for them to hone their skills, motivating potential funders, and alienating deeply the general population of the regime which not only favors terrorist groups but also endangers incalculably other vital interests of the United States.
Negative effects also register at home -- financial, constitutional, ethical and in feeding a dangerous mood of anger, fear and frustration.
The Real Worry
The exploiting of free floating feelings of dread among Americans for political and ideological purposes has both obscured real dangers and contributed to them. Let's drop the childish game of scaring ourselves with the likes of high school drop-out Jose Padilla and similarly I.Q. challenged riff-raff. In doing so, we are behaving like kids who conjure monsters lurking in the stairwell so as to get a thrill by toying with their self-generated fears.
The guy to think about is the reputable scientist/technician who visits the U.S. regularly, who may have an institutional tie there, who has a friend or relative in the shipping business, who has become deeply alienated and aggrieved by things we have done. He may have a close relative (direct or by marriage) who was a victim of some American atrocity in Iraq or Afghanistan or Palestine. He may have developed an overwhelming urge to act destructively -- even if it is in the form of a symbolic act punctuated by an exclamation point! None of our rampaging around Southwest Asia will protect us against that scenario becoming real. Indeed, the more rampaging we do the better the odds on it happening.
When it does, Richard Holbrooke, David Petraeus, Barack Obama et al will not need 50 performance measures to "know it when they see it."
Holbrooke, speaking at the Center for American Progress on August 13, summarized administration thinking this way:
"The specific goal.....is really hard for me to address in specific terms. But I would say this about defining success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test for another issue, we'll know it when we see it."

The unwitting reference is to a comment by a Supreme Court Justice in an opinion on a landmark pornography case. How apropos.

Public supports is eroding. Objectives difficult to achieve. Afghanistan seems to be the smaller reminder of another foreign American intervention in the past. Seems like the momentem is changing, and I am sure the insurgents are monitoring the US and western media.

http://www.military.com/news/article...24&ESRC=dod.nl

Ambushed Marines' Aid Call 'Rejected'
September 10, 2009
Agence France-Presse

NATO-led forces are investigating the death of four Marines in eastern Afghanistan after their commanders reportedly rejected requests for artillery fire in a battle with insurgents, the Pentagon said on Wednesday.

Tuesday's incident was "under investigation" and details remained unclear, press secretary Geoff Morrell told a news conference.

A McClatchy newspapers' journalist who witnessed the battle reported that a team of Marine trainers made repeated appeals for air and artillery support after being pinned down by insurgents in the village of Ganjgal in eastern Kunar province.

The U.S. troops had to wait more than an hour for attack helicopters to come to their aid and their appeal for artillery fire was rejected, with commanders citing new rules designed to avoid civilian casualties, the report said.

Morrell said the helicopters were not hampered by any restrictions on air power but had to travel a long distance to reach the Marines at the remote location near the Pakistan border.

"I think that it did take some time for close air support to arrive in this case, but this is not a result of more restrictive conditions in which it can be used," he said.

"It was the result, as is often the case in Afghanistan, of the fact that there are great distances often between bases where such assets are located and where our troops are out operating."

Morrell could not confirm whether appeals for artillery fire were denied by commanders.

According to the McClatchy report by Jonathan Landay, the U.S. advisors assisting Afghan forces had been assured before the operation that "air cover would be five minutes away."

The incident comes after the top commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, issued new restrictions on the use of military force and air raids in a bid to prevent civilian deaths.

McChrystal has warned that civilian casualties caused by the NATO-led force risk alienating the Afghan population and jeopardizing the war effort.

But the general and other top military officials have insisted air support and fire power would not be restricted when U.S. troops were under direct threat.

Bombing runs by coalition forces have declined sharply since McChrystal took over command in June, U.S.A Today reported on Wednesday, citing military statistics.

Tuesday's firefight in eastern Afghanistan involved a 13-member team of U.S. Marine and Army trainers assigned to the Afghan national army, the report said.

Eight Afghan soldiers and police and an Afghan interpreter also died in the battle, which lasted for hours with insurgents unleashing a barrage of gunfire and rockets from mountain positions, the report said.

When an Afghan soldier demanded helicopter gunships, U.S. Major Kevin Williams replied through an interpreter: "We are pinned down. We are running low on ammo. We have no air. We've lost today."

The Americans were assisting Afghan forces in an operation that called for Afghans searching the hamlet for weapons and then meeting village elders to plan police patrols.

But U.S. officers suspected insurgents were tipped off about the operation beforehand, as the coalition and Afghan forces were ambushed as they approached the outskirts of the hamlet at dawn, the report said.

Here's another report:

So, perhaps the question is: should more troops be sent in to a growingly unpopular conflict, or not do so, and risk "failure."

What is succes? What is failure.

Can this top military report be believed? I assume it can be:

Report: Without more forces U.S. will fail in Afghanistan

The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan warns in a confidential assessment of the war there that he needs additional troops within...
By Seattle Times news services

Hal Bernton's Afghanistan Journal

Related developments


Americans die: Military officials say three U.S. troops have died in Afghanistan, including one killed Saturday in combat in the country's east. Two of the Americans died Sunday in a noncombat-related incident. Aid from Japan: Japan is considering sending more financial aid to Afghanistan after its naval refueling mission ends in January, but has no intention of sending ground troops, Japan's new foreign minister said Sunday.

Iraq crash: A Black Hawk helicopter crashed at a major U.S. air base in Iraq, killing one U.S. service member and injuring 12 others, the military said Sunday.

Taliban leader dies: Sher Muhammad Qasab, a feared Taliban commander known for beheading foes, died in custody Sunday from wounds sustained during a firefight with Pakistani security forces in the Swat Valley last week, the military said.
Seattle Times news services

WASHINGTON — The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan warns in a confidential assessment of the war there that he needs additional troops within the next year or else the conflict "will likely result in failure."

The grim assessment is contained in a 66-page report the commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, submitted to Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Aug. 30, and which is under review by President Obama and his top national-security advisers.

Link & Entire: Politics | Report: Without more forces U.S. will fail in Afghanistan | Seattle Times Newspaper

Originally Posted by Milkman

The U.S. troops had to wait more than an hour for attack helicopters to come to their aid and their appeal for artillery fire was rejected, with commanders citing new rules designed to avoid civilian casualties, the report said.

As the boys say, as soon as Tango has fallen and his pals take his/her guns, the c^nt is a fekin civilian. Thanks, Obama, for protecting the troops.

Originally Posted by Jet Gorgon

Originally Posted by Milkman

The U.S. troops had to wait more than an hour for attack helicopters to come to their aid and their appeal for artillery fire was rejected, with commanders citing new rules designed to avoid civilian casualties, the report said.

As the boys say, as soon as Tango has fallen and his pals take his/her guns, the c^nt is a fekin civilian. Thanks, Obama, for protecting the troops.

This has nothing to do with Obama.

The logisitics are local, and int he military.

Originally Posted by Milkman

This has nothing to do with Obama.

The logisitics are local, and int he military.

Excuse me, who is the Commander in Chief?

Originally Posted by Jet Gorgon

Originally Posted by Milkman

This has nothing to do with Obama.

The logisitics are local, and int he military.

Excuse me, who is the Commander in Chief?

Apparently, you didn't understand my post.

The CinC title relates to the military. I just said it was NOT related to the military.

"commanders citing new rules designed to avoid civilian casualties"

That's the reason, Milkie. Not the logistics. And that is military command.

Originally Posted by Jet Gorgon

"commanders citing new rules designed to avoid civilian casualties"

That's the reason, Milkie. Not the logistics. And that is military command.

Bad as civilian casualties are, it's a sign the corner has been turned.

Diplomatic, public support eroding, and even the small number of casualties leading the public and pundits to ask, "why are we there?"

Not the first time with the Americans.

They go to foreign nations but don't want casualties.

^ FFS, Milkie, civilian casualties are part of every war. Today, the Mid-Easters bank on milking these deaths with the libbie press who report it back home to the sobbing libbie mass. Couple of good photos of a woman or kid killed (who were probably carrying bombs anyway) and wham, the whole libbie front goes berserk.

Originally Posted by Norton

Reading your last few posts on this issue you would favor a screw the civilians kill everyone within a 10 km radius of a bad guy policy.

Not all all, but when I see troops left for toast coz there might be civilians nearby, then I do get angry.

Interesting intro on an upcoming documentary about Afghanistan on PBS (Frontline) to be aired, starting October 13,…………

If you've got 24 minutes, watch this sobering preview for the coming Frontline documentary on Afghanistan.

'Obama's War' - Ben Smith - POLITICO.com#