Would you be laughing if Xi said it? :chitown:
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Would you be laughing if Xi said it? :chitown:
Yep I would be, but that is just another of your off-topic whataboutisms.Quote:
Originally Posted by sabang
- A helicopter linked to a Russian oligarch's megayacht and 17 private jets have their registration struck off by low-tax haven favored by the superrich, a report says
A helicopter linked to a sanctioned Russian oligarch's yacht and 17 private jets with Russian ties had their registration removed by the Isle of Man, a tax haven for the super wealthy, The Guardian first reported.
Situated in the Irish Sea between Britain and Ireland, the island has an aircraft registry that includes high-quality private and corporate jets, as well as helicopters, the government website said.
The island's registry can allow the wealthy to avoid taxes liable in other countries, The Guardian reported. The Isle of Man is known as a low-tax economy.
The Isle of Man's measures bolster the UK's and European Union's ban on all Russian aircraft flying in their airspace as part of sanctions levied following President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
A total of 18 aircraft and two yachts were deregistered as of Wednesday because of their Russian connections, the Isle of Man said in a press release sent to Insider. It also issued notice on 39 ships with ties to Russia, it said.
Being deregistered means jets can't legally fly and ships can't legally sail, Alex Allinson, the Isle of Man's minister for enterprise, told the BBC.
An Airbus helicopter, which previously landed on Roman Abramovich's $600 million superyacht, Solaris, has been removed from the island's registry, The Guardian reported. A private jet owned by the Russian oligarch Dmitry Mazepin, a Gulfstream G650, was also among the 18 aircraft taken off the registry, the newspaper reported.
Oleg Tinkov, the founder of the Russian online bank Tinkoff, who hasn't been sanctioned, also had his Dassault Falcon business jet struck from the island's registry, The Guardian reported.
"The Air and Ship Registries have been acting proactively and rapidly to halt business with Russian connections above and beyond those already sanctioned on the UK's lists," Allinson said in statement sent to Insider. The government is looking to remove any aircraft, ships, and yachts that have Russian ties, he added.
Just for fun.
- Russia says it's sanctioning Hillary Clinton and other top U.S. officials
Mrs. Clinton’s response. https://twitter.com/HillaryClinton/s...52794158911493
Hillary Clinton thanks Russia for 'Lifetime Achievement Award' of sanctionsContinued :)
Russian oligarchs have been looking for ways to park their money outside Vladimir Putin’s control for a long time, and the tackiest method available to them is the megayacht — so obviously, there are a lot of them. It is remarkably satisfying to see the yachts get seized.
Sechin attempted to evade sanctions by ordering the Amore Vero to sail to Turkey. It was seized in France.
Former KGB officer Sergei Chemezov, who now leads Rostec, had his 279-foot $140 million megayacht seized in Spain. “There will be more,” promised Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez. Can’t wait, babe.
Not actually a seizure, but possibly funnier: former KGB agent Vladimir Strzhalkovsky has a yacht named Ragnar that’s stuck in Norway. Aboard Ragnar are lots of toys, such as “a BigBo amphibious ATV, heli-skiing equipment, four See-Doos, four ski scooters, six Seabobs, a multipurpose island and a giant slide.” It can’t go anywhere because no one will sell it fuel. The yacht’s captain finds this “extremely unjust,” according to NPR.
The $735 million superyacht Dilbar, named for Kremlin-tied oligarch Alisher Usmanov’s mother, was possibly seized in Germany, depending on your definition of “seized.” (Government officials say it’s not seized per se; it just can’t leave.) It has the dubious honor of sporting the largest indoor swimming pool ever installed on a private vehicle.
Sailing Yacht A, worth $578 million, was seized by Italy’s financial police. Its owner, sanctioned fertilizer mogul Andrey Melnichenko, told CNN through a spokesman that Melnichenko has “no political affiliations.” Yes, I’m sure he got one of the largest yachts in the world by being a normal businessman.
Italy has been quite busy, actually! Italian authorities have also seized Gennady Timchenko’s megayacht, Lena, which is worth either $8 million or $55 million, depending on who you’re asking.
Another one on the board for Italy: the Lady M, worth at least $27 million (though the Italian government thinks it is worth more). In addition to its pool and helicopter landing pad, the Lady M also has its own salon, so no one aboard will have to suffer the indignity of doing their own hair.
Want to thank Troy for finding this site (oldy but goody)
Misconceptions on Russia about the Putin System | Bundesakademie fur Sicherheitspolitik
Misconceptions on Russia about the Putin System
Autor/in:
Stefan Meister
In the context of the Ukraine crisis – which has escalated into a fundamental crisis between the West and Russia – hybrid warfare, propaganda, conspiracy theories and, above all, differing perceptions play a key role. Particularly in Western discourse, several misinterpretations with regard to power structures in Moscow colour the assessment of the crisis. Russia meanwhile feels threatened both by the military strength of a U.S.-dominated NATO and by the European Neighbourhood Policy. What is more, Moscow interprets Western interventions in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya as proof that the West will always construe the rules of international law to its own advantage.
In this paper, five main misconceptions concerning both the Western relationship with Russia and the country's internal development will be analysed and subjected to a reality check. This will involve providing answers to the following questions: Who is to blame for the conflict with Russia? Is there a political alternative to Putin? Do the oligarchs pose a threat to Putin? Is the Russian leadership really interested in a stable neighbourhood? Is China an alternative modernisation partner for Russia instead of the EU?
Misconception No. 1: The West is to blame for the conflict with Russia.
A central pattern of argument in the conflict between Russia and the West is that aggressive policies of NATO and EU expansion into Eastern Europe and increasingly into the post-Soviet area are what triggered this conflict. Russia felt surrounded and had to defend itself against an expansionist policy of the West.
This line of argument presupposes that NATO and the EU have a strategic plan to actively integrate the post-Soviet states and limit Russian power. In contrast to Russia's integration projects, primarily the Eurasian Economic Union, integration into NATO and the EU is, however, voluntary and not based on a system of pressure and incentives.
There may have been a U.S. interest in offering Georgia and Ukraine a perspective for accession to NATO, at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest, which the leaders of both countries have been seeking. Yet, this interest seems not to have been that great, as Washington gave in to pressure from other important member states of the Alliance, particularly Germany and France, to aim instead for a long-term alignment process with the involvement of Russia. A majority of Georgians, however, and for the first time, since the war in eastern Ukraine, a majority of Ukrainians too regard NATO membership as a guarantor of security in the face of an increasingly aggressive Russia.
The reluctance of a majority of EU member states to offer the countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) a perspective for accession also became apparent once more at the Riga Summit in May and is leading to a growing sense of disappointment in these countries. At the same time, association with the EU is regarded as an opportunity to undergo a process of modernisation.
The main reason for the escalating conflict between Russia and the West is not Western aggression but the lack of legitimacy of the Putin system. The global financial crisis of 2008/2009 showed that Russia's economic growth from 2000 to 2008, which was based mainly on the export of raw materials, lacks any basis for sustainable economic development and modernisation. This crisis also meant that the social contract – growing prosperity in exchange for political inactivity – could no longer be maintained by the regime. The mass demonstrations that took place in Moscow and Saint Petersburg in 2011 and 2012 in connection with the parliamentary and presidential elections have shown the regime that it has lost the support of a growing section of society due to the lack of modernisation.
In response, when Vladimir Putin returned as president in 2012, he secured his domestic power by exerting pressure on the opposition, independent media and civil society and shored it up by means of extensive media propaganda against the West. The annexation of Crimea against the will of the West has restored Putin's legitimacy in the eyes of most Russians, with approval ratings of over 80 percent (in contrast to ratings of at times less than 40 percent in 2013). Mobilisation of a majority of society against enemies from within (NGOs financed by the West, the opposition, media) and without (the West and in particular the U.S.) has become the main source of legitimacy of the Putin system. The Russian leadership currently has no interest in renouncing this concept of the enemy and resolving the conflict over Ukraine because then the economic crisis and the lack of modernisation would once again become the focus of attention.
Misconception No. 2: Putin cannot be replaced and after him things will only get worse.
Since he was first elected president in 2000, Vladimir Putin has systematically strengthened his position of power and staffed key positions with persons loyal to him from the security apparatus, in particular the secret service, and from his time in Saint Petersburg's city administration in the 1990s. Putin is also a mediator between different groups that are not interest groups in the Western sense but are dependent on Putin in one way or another. Corruption is inherent in the system and loyalty at the highest levels of political leadership is based on the possibilities available to the President for distributing resources. Putin nevertheless has to strike a balance of interests between these groups and settle conflicts.
On account of the above-mentioned lack of legitimacy and the choice of repression over modernisation, since his re-election in 2012 Putin has shifted the balance that previously existed between the generally pro-business part of the elite class and the representatives of the security apparatus (referred to as the "siloviki" in Russian) with the goal of maintaining power in favour of the latter group. This has led to conflicts and the redistribution of resources within the elite class.
Putin is also a PR figure that meets the need felt by a large majority of the population for a strong national leadership figure. A key factor in generating high approval ratings is the picture that propaganda and the media paint of the persona of Putin. Part of this "Putin myth" is that he is irreplaceable (just as Boris Yeltsin was at times portrayed in public discourse) and that only he can guarantee stability and political predictability. But just as it was possible for Yeltsin to be replaced and for a relatively unknown secret service officer to become president of Russia, it would be possible to establish somebody new through media support – though only if there was a consensus among the elite.
It remains to be seen whether post-Putin Russia will become even more nationalistic or aggressive. The current government may be actively promoting resentment among Russian society, but intolerance, imperial nostalgia, a growing Russian ethnonationalism, paternalism and anti-Western thinking are part of the political culture in Russian society.
Misconception No. 3: The worse the economic situation in Russia gets, the more pressure the oligarchs will exert on the system.
There are various theories about the stability of the Putin system and the dangers of an economic collapse. They are, however, rooted more in Kremlinology than in reality. In 2015, fewer Russians than ever are willing to take to the streets to demonstrate and many of those who did so in 2011/2012 are now either patriots or have left the country.
One of Vladimir Putin's most significant successes in consolidating his position of power was the taming of the oligarchs. While some of the influential personalities behind Boris Yeltsin, such as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, emigrated, Putin made an example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in order to cement the dominance of the state over the economy. All the oligarchs that are successful under Putin are either connected to his background in the secret service and Saint Petersburg or they have adapted to the new rules. The President alone decides who gets to take over which major enterprises.
At the same time, the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 and Western sanctions in connection with the Ukraine crisis have made the oligarchs even more dependent upon the state. Since 2009, the only way for several oligarchs to refinance their foreign debts has been to obtain credits from the big state-owned banks. This tendency has increased since 2014 on account of the financial sanctions over the war in eastern Ukraine as many Russian enterprises are no longer able to obtain and refinance loans through the international financial market. The state and its banks must thus once again step in and the dependence increases; loyalty to Putin has become one of the most important preconditions for the financial survival of many Russian oligarchs.
Should political and economic pressure continue to grow, however, practically all oligarchs have real estate, bank accounts and investments in the EU or the U.S. and could easily leave the country for good.
Misconception No. 4: Both Russia and the EU have a common interest in a stable neighbourhood.
While, in addition to opening up new markets, the European Neighbourhood Policy primarily serves to stabilise the countries of the EaP by modernising political and economic structures, Russian policy in this region seems, above all, to have a destabilising and revisionist effect. The key objective of the Russian government is to ensure its own post-Soviet sphere of influence and to have it recognised by the West.
Stoking secession conflicts on the territories of post-Soviet neighbouring states has become an important instrument of control and influence over these countries. With the gradual incorporation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia into the Russian Federation since 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine, the Russian government is seeking to prevent integration of these states into the EU and NATO.
At the same time, Moscow would prefer "Bosnisation" (referred to in Russian as "Bosnisatsia") of Ukraine over Europeanisation; permanently unstable territories that can be directly or indirectly controlled over a loss of influence. Through hybrid warfare, states are thus destabilised and criminal structures are promoted within an opaque environment that cannot be controlled by these states themselves. As a result, weak states emerge and are further destabilised and, if necessary, turned into failed states. From Moscow's point of view, non-integration into the West has precedence over socioeconomic development. The North Caucasus and Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov in particular are prime examples of how Russia has failed in the political and economic development of its periphery and is ultimately financing mafia structures to maintain order and thus continues to foster terror and uncontrollable situations even on its own territory.
Misconception No. 5: In China and the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia has alternative options for development.
First of all, Russia's raw material exports are not sufficiently diversified. The entire pipeline infrastructure is geared towards the European market including Turkey and Ukraine. Russia thus generates a large part of its income from exports to the stagnant EU market. The country has virtually not tapped into the growth markets of Asia at all, first arrangements with China are only slowly being implemented and in the event of a conflict with the EU Moscow is placed in an unfavourable bargaining position vis-à-vis Beijing.
Unlike the EU, China does not provide a modernisation model for Russia. The objective of Chinese policy is to develop new markets for their own products and gain access to raw materials through lending and building infrastructure. Except for the limited development of necessary infrastructure, China's plans do not involve any modernisation of the target countries. With the recently announced orientation towards China, Russia would remain a provider of raw materials instead of becoming a manufacturer of high-quality products and would consequently be a mere junior partner to Beijing. The potential of both states to weaken international institutions dominated by the U.S. should nevertheless not be underestimated since there is an actual alignment of interests between them.
Cooperation with the EU has led to a modernisation in Russia in some areas, the effect of which, however, has limited effect on account of the obstacles to competition and investment posed by the dominance of the state. At the same time, the Eurasian Economic Union, with its objective of creating a common space of goods, services, capital and labour modelled after the EU, offers its member states only limited potential for development. This is due to the low innovation capability of the post-Soviet states involved, the relatively small population and the poor infrastructure.
When it comes to the founding states, the economies of Russia and Kazakhstan complement each other only to a very limited extent since both are first and foremost based on the export of raw materials. Belarus and Russia were already well-integrated within the context of the Union State – an arrangement that, owing to subsidies in the oil and gas sectors, has so far resulted in financial losses for Moscow. Countries such as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan also promise more costs than benefits on account of their structural deficits and dependence on the Russian market. Russia funds and promotes integration into the Eurasian Economic Union through a predominantly bilateral system of incentives and pressure and thus only increases existing modernisation deficits in these countries.
Moscow has largely ignored the concept of an EU-Russia free trade area "from Lisbon to Vladivostok", which has repeatedly been proposed, most recently by the German Chancellor. The idea of a common free trade area was first suggested to the EU by Russian President Putin in 2011 but EU politicians at the time considered the concept unrealistic. During the Ukraine conflict, Russia then further developed the Eurasian Economic Union in order to use it as an instrument against the influence of European Neighbourhood Policy measures in the post-Soviet region.
Dr Stefan Meister is Head of Programme on Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia at the Robert Bosch Centre of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). This article reflects the personal opinion of the author.
UK military intelligence says Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has largely stalled
LONDON, March 17 (Reuters) – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has largely stalled on all fronts, with Russian forces suffering heavy losses and making minimal progress on land, sea or air in recent days, British military intelligence said on Thursday.
“Ukrainian resistance remains staunch and well-coordinated,” The Ministry of Defence said. “The vast majority of Ukrainian territory, including all major cities, remains in Ukrainian hands.”
UK military intelligence says Russia's invasion of Ukraine has largely stalled | Thai PBS World : The latest Thai news in English, News Headlines, World News and News Broadcasts in both Thai and English. We bring Thailand to the world
Melitopol mayor freed after kidnapping by Russian forces
Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov, who was abducted by Russian forces last week, has been freed, Ukrainian diplomat Olexander Scherba confirmed via Twitter on Wednesday.
Driving the news: The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs decried Fedorov's kidnapping as a war crime and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that his capture could signal "a new stage of terror" in the war.
Days after Fedorov, a second Ukrainian mayor, Yevhen Matveyev, from the southern city of Dniprorudne, was also kidnapped.
What they're saying: "Ukraine conducted a 'special operation' and rescued Melitopol mayor Ivan Fedorov from captivity in the occupied Luhansk! Melitopol is Ukraine!" Scherba tweeted.
Kyrylo Tymoshenko, the deputy head of Zelensky’s office, confirmed on Telegram that "Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov is already safe!" Tymoshenko then posted a video of Zelensky speaking by phone with Fedorov.
Melitopol mayor kidnapped by Russian forces freed
Central Asians in Russia Pressured to Join Moscow's Fight in Ukraine
Central Asian nationals residing in Russia are being pressured to fight in Ukraine as Moscow's military incurs heavier-than-expected losses, evidence suggests and migrants' rights activists say.
Russia’s three-week war in Ukraine has had a shockingly high death toll, although Russian and Ukrainian authorities dispute the number of troops killed on both sides. The fog of war makes it difficult to discern not only how many soldiers have died, but also who those soldiers are and where they came from.
On March 1, the Ukrainska Pravda newspaper leaked what appears to be the personal data of 120,000 Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. While coming from a reputable outlet, the independently unverified 6,616-page list of military personnel names, registration numbers and places of service contains multiple ethnically Central Asian names.
Valentina Chupik, a civil rights advocate famous for her work defending migrant’s rights in Russia, confirmed that more than a dozen Central Asians have sought her legal advice following pressure to sign up for contract service in the Russian army since Feb. 26.
In a conversation over the Telegram messaging app, she told The Moscow Times that she noticed two patterns by which migrants are being targeted.
Chupik said she received calls from 10 Tajikistan and Uzbekistan citizens who reside in Russia, saying they had received phone calls from people who claimed to represent immigration law firms and could expedite the process of receiving Russian citizenship if they signed up for contract service.
“This is a complete lie, the law does not allow this,” Chupik said. “I told these guys that [the callers] are scammers.”
Another tactic involves army tents in several Moscow metro stations, where Chupik says recruiters try to get commuters to enlist with the “Volunteer Army of the Donetsk People’s Republic.” They target migrants, Chupik said, promising that they can obtain Russian citizenship in just six months.
“I think the Russian government is using labor migrants as cannon fodder in Ukraine,” Chupik alleged in a recent interview. “These migrants are probably being signed up by the Defense Ministry and by private military companies.”
In a comment on Facebook, Chupik — who in September 2021 was stripped of her asylum status by Russian authorities for her staunch work protecting migrants — urged male Central Asians between the ages of 18 and 60 to leave Russia as soon as possible.
Social media posts and media reports appear to corroborate Chupik’s assertions that Central Asians are being pressured to fight for Russian forces in Ukraine.
A video of an Uzbek man allegedly driving a Russian military truck into Ukraine was widely shared via the Telegram messaging app. The man, who appeared to be in his 50s and was dressed in camouflage fatigues, said on camera that he was recruited because of his experience serving in Afghanistan and that he was given no choice but to sign up.
“There are many Uzbeks here who have come to take part in the war. There are people from Tajikistan too. We have a contract,” said the man.
After an RFE/RL investigation tracked him down, the man confirmed that he had been offered a three-month contract earning a monthly salary of 50,000 rubles ($475) and a promise of Russian citizenship.
The job offer came from an employment listing website called UzMigrant.
Bakhrom Ismailov, the director of the company behind UzMigrant, bragged in a Feb. 20 Uzbek-language video that “contract service in the Russian army will allow one to obtain Russian citizenship in three months.”
In a TikTok video uploaded in early March by the account @kyrgyznation, a man warns of the possibility that Kyrgyz migrants could be called up to fight.
“If you have a Russian passport and get a summons [to the military enlistment station], try to come back to Kyrgyzstan,” he says.
Before @kyrgyznation turned off comments, the post was flooded with biting criticism of Kyrgyz men with Russian citizenship who would flee the draft.
“If your passport is from the Russian Federation, then you’ll give your life to the Russian Federation,” one commenter wrote.
“Shame on those who write such comments,” Chupik told The Moscow Times. “[These naturalized Central Asians] are intimidated with possible deprivation of [Russian] citizenship and forced to sign a contract. They must refuse. It is better to lose citizenship than to die in an unjust war or become a mercenary assassin.”
Russian citizenship is a prized possession for migrants from economically stagnant Central Asia. Unable to make their ends meet at home, Central Asians go to Russia in search of work and income. Remittances from work abroad, mostly from Russia, account for 30% of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product and 28% of Kyrgyzstan’s.
According to Russian government statistics, 4.5 million workers from Uzbekistan, 2.4 million from Tajikistan, and 920,000 from Kyrgyzstan were working in Russia in 2021. These migrants face daily abuse, discrimination, and even death threats from law enforcement and deal with wage theft and ruthless bureaucracy.
Russian citizenship offers some protection against these daily frictions. In 2020 alone, 63,389 Tajiks, 43,404 Kazakhs, 23,131 Uzbeks, and 11,865 Kyrgyz acquired citizenship, often through third parties who forge documents and bribe officials on behalf of the applicants without their knowledge, making the applicants vulnerable to denaturalization threats.
Whether pressured or enticed, this is not the first instance of Central Asians enlisting in the Russian army.
Russia in 2003 codified the right of foreigners aged 18 to 30 to serve under a contract in the Russian army. Between 2008-2014, the number of foreigners serving under a contract — mostly Uzbeks and Tajiks — hovered between 200 and 350.
In 2015 — the year that Russia responded to the Syrian government’s request for military aid against rebel groups — Putin signed a decree specifying that foreign contractors can be involved in the Russian army’s combat operations.
Even if it is legal for foreign contractors to participate in Russia’s combat operations, Central Asian governments look down on their citizens serving abroad. In Tajikistan, citizens found guilty of mercenary activity are punished with up to 20 years in prison.
In response to proliferating reports about Uzbeks serving in the Russian army in Ukraine, the Uzbek Justice Ministry said in a statement that any Uzbek national found to have enlisted in the service of a foreign army or police service could face up to five years in prison.
Again, the way around these legal complications is for Central Asians to pursue Russian citizenship. In late December 2021 — less than two months before the invasion of Ukraine — Putin proposed to amend the law again to shorten the process of obtaining Russian citizenship for contract soldiers from former Soviet countries.
At least three Tajikistan-born contractors in the Russian army have reportedly been killed in Ukraine so far.
While it is difficult to get an accurate sense of public opinion across Central Asia on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, reports of young men from Bishkek or Badakhshan fighting in Ukraine could further complicate Russia’s image in a region already wary of Putin’s ambitions for it.
Despite their close economic ties with Russia, Central Asian leaders have avoided outright endorsement or criticism of Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
During the March 2 special emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan did not vote at all.
On Thursday, however, Uzbekistan took a stronger stance, with Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov telling parliament that although Tashkent wanted to keep good relations with both Moscow and Kyiv, it opposed the war.
"First, Uzbekistan is seriously concerned by the situation around Ukraine," he said. "Second, we are the proponents of finding a peaceful solution to this situation and resolving the conflict through political and diplomatic means. But in order to do that, first of all, hostilities and violence must stop immediately."
Central Asians in Russia Pressured to Join Moscow's Fight in Ukraine - The Moscow Times
Kremlin Rejects Top UN Court's Order to Halt Ukraine Invasion
The Kremlin rejected on Thursday a top UN court’s order to halt its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.
The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to “immediately suspend” its offensive that President Vladimir Putin ordered on Feb. 24. Kyiv hailed the ruling — which is binding but lacks any real means to enforce it — as a “complete victory.”
“We can’t take that decision into account,” the state-run TASS news agency quoted Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov as saying.
Peskov echoed Moscow’s stance during hearings earlier this month that the ICJ has no jurisdiction because Kyiv’s request fell outside the 1948 Genocide Convention on which it based the case.
“There’s such a thing as consent of the parties in an international court. There can be no consent here,” he told reporters.
But the ICJ ruled Wednesday that it had jurisdiction in the case.
Ukraine asked the ICJ to intervene, arguing that Moscow was falsely alleging genocide in Ukraine's separatist-held Donetsk and Luhansk regions to justify its attack.
Presiding judge Joan Donoghue said the ICJ lacked evidence of genocide being committed in Ukraine. She expressed doubt that the Genocide Convention authorized military action “for the purpose of preventing or punishing an alleged genocide.”
No Russian representatives attended the hearing at The Hague.
Experts say a full hearing into Ukraine’s case could take years.
Kremlin Rejects Top UN Court's Order to Halt Ukraine Invasion - The Moscow Times
‘Miraculous’ Survivors Made It Into Destroyed Mariupol Drama Theater’s Bomb Shelter Before Russian Strike Hit
People started miraculously staggering out of a makeshift bomb shelter Thursday morning under a theater in the southeastern Ukrainian city of Mariupol, where hundreds of Ukrainian citizens had been sheltering when it was reportedly struck by Russian forces on Wednesday.
The spokesperson for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tweeted the good news Thursday morning. “The bomb shelter in Mariupol Drama Theatre has survived the brutal Russian missile,” Iuliia Mendel posted Thursday. “At least, majority stayed alive after bombing. People are getting out from the rubble.”
MORE ‘Miraculous’ Survivors Made It Into Destroyed Mariupol Drama Theater’s Bomb Shelter Before Russian Strike Hit
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has blamed NATO for the war in Ukraine and says he will resist calls to condemn Russia, in comments that cast doubt over whether he would be accepted by Ukraine as a mediator.
"The war could have been avoided if NATO had heeded the warnings from amongst its own leaders and officials over the years that its eastward expansion would lead to greater, not less, instability in the region," Ramaphosa said, a view also maintained by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Ramaphosa did, however, say South Africa "cannot condone the use of force and violation of international law" in an apparent reference to the February 24 invasion of Ukraine, which Russia calls a "special operation" to disarm and "denazify" Ukraine.
Ukraine and its allies believe Russia launched the unprovoked war to subjugate a neighbour Putin calls an artificial state.
Ramaphosa also revealed that Putin had assured him personally that negotiations were making progress.
The South African leader said he had not yet talked with Ukraine's president Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
On Friday, Ramaphosa's office said South Africa had been asked to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and that he had told Putin it should be settled through negotiations.
He did not say who had asked him to intervene.
"There are those who are insisting that we should take a very adversarial stance against Russia. The approach we are going to take (instead) is... insisting that there should be dialogue," Ramaphosa added.
"Screaming and shouting is not going to bring an end to this conflict."
NATO could have avoided war: South Africa
Russian fast-food chain backed by parliament to replace McDonald’s reveals near-identical branding
https://pbs.twimg.com/card_img/15041...jpg&name=small
A Russian restaurant chain billed as a replacement for McDonald’s has reportedly revealed a logo that is extremely similar to the fast-food giant’s famous gold arches.
A trademark registration for the Uncle Vanya franchise was filed last week with Russian authorities, according to media reports.
McDonald’s last week said it would temporarily close all 847 of its restaurants in Russia as global brands face consumer pressure to oppose Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russian fast-food chain backed by parliament to replace McDonald’s reveals near-identical branding
Koch Industries won’t join the more than 400 companies who have left Russia
Koch Industries says it will not pull its business out of Russia, defying the trend set by other corporations of suspending their in-country operations to protest the invasion of Ukraine.
According to the Washington Post, the company, one of the largest privately-owned businesses in the US, employs 122,000 people around the world, with just over 600 working at a subsidiary, Guardian Industries, inside Russia.
The company said it would continue its operations in Russia because to do otherwise would put its "employees there at greater risk and do more harm than good."
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, more than 400 companies have pulled their operations out of Russia. Some firms pulled out shortly after the war began, while others - like McDonald's and Coca-Cola - did so after public pressure intensified.
However, Koch Industries has bucked that trend, as have around 30 other companies, according to a list compiled by Yale management professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his research team.
The other companies include the likes of Reebok, Cargill, Halliburton, LG Electronics, Cinnabon and Subway.
Full Article- Koch Industries won’t join the more than 400 companies who have left Russia
JPMorgan Chase & Co. has processed funds that were earmarked for interest payments due on dollar bonds issued by the Russian government and sent the money on to Citigroup Inc., according to people familiar with the matter.
JPMorgan was the correspondent bank Russia used to send the payment to Citigroup, which is acting as payment agent on the bonds, the people said, asking not to be identified discussing a private matter. JPMorgan sent the money to Citigroup after it sought and received the required approvals from U.S. authorities on Wednesday, one of the people said.
Representatives for JPMorgan and Citigroup declined to comment.
While European bondholders of Russia’s sovereign debt have received no sign of the funds, the move spurred optimism that the bonds may be settled, sending prices higher across maturities. The implied probability of a default by Russia within the year inched lower to 57%, down from 59%, according to credit default swap pricing. Last week it was as high as 80%.
“This seems to take a technical default off the table for now,” Kaan Nazli, a money manager at Neuberger Berman in The Hague, Netherlands. “However, there is still some uncertainty over corporate debt as only a number of companies have been given leeway.”
Citigroup is the payment agent for about four dozen bonds tied to Russian companies, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Some of those companies -- including MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC and Gazprom PJSC -- have successfully made coupon payments in recent days.
JPMorgan Processed Russia Bond Payments, Sent Money to Citi
Top Russian general reportedly detained as Putin targets 'traitors' amid Ukraine invasion
The deputy chief of Russian’s National Guard was reportedly detained Thursday amid news that Russian President Vladimir Putin is cracking down on disloyalty within his ranks following the invasion of Ukraine.
Russian Gen. Roman Gavrilov, of Rosgvardia, the internal military force of the Russian Federation that reports directly to the president of the Russian Federation, was detained by the Russian security and counterintelligence agency, Federal Security Service (FSB), according to Christo Grozev, CEO of the Netherlands-based investigative journalism group Bellingcat.
The reason for Gavrilov's detention wasn’t immediately clear. Grozev said one of his sources told him that Gavrilov was detained by the FSB's military counter-intelligence department over "leaks of military info that led to loss of life," while two other sources said the reason was for "wasteful squandering of fuel."
MORE Top Russian general reportedly detained as Putin targets '''traitors''' amid Ukraine invasion | Fox News
Journalist who protested war on Russian TV remains defiant after arrest: ‘It was impossible to stay silent’
A Russian broadcast journalist arrested for her anti-war protests on live state television says “it was simply impossible to stay silent”.
Marina Ovsyannikova, an editor for Russia’s Channel One, was found guilty for an “unauthorized public event” after holding up a “NO WAR” sign and releasing a public statement blaming Vladimir Putin for the invasion of Ukraine.
Ms Ovsyannikova says many of her colleagues see the distortion between what is happening in Ukraine and the state propaganda being broadcast in Russia in an information war, adding even her elderly mother has been “brainwashed”.
“I can’t talk to her for five minutes because these phrases she keeps repeating, the phrases she keeps hearing on TV, the phrases that our propagandists created, and I think that 50 per cent of our society are like my mum,” Ms Ovsyannikova told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour.
She added the decision to protest live on air had been brewing for a while and grew with her feeling of cognitive dissonance
Between her personal beliefs and the official government narrative being broadcast.
“It was a growing sense of dissatisfaction that had been increasing every year, and the war was the point of no return, when it was simply impossible to stay silent,” she said.
Ms Ovsyannikova, a mother of two, was compelled to speak out given her memories of growing up as a 12-year-old girl in Chechnya, where Russia also conducted airstrikes during its war in 1991.
Full Article- Journalist who protested war on Russian TV remains defiant after arrest: ‘It was impossible to stay silent’ (msn.com)
Could be good news.Quote:
Originally Posted by sabang
Hope it continues.
That will be an op that will be written about for sure. No doubt it was these guys...Quote:
Originally Posted by misskit
After two weeks of war, one of the most puzzling features is the clumsy and largely inefficient logistics that has so far dogged Russian offensive operations.
The infamous kilometers-long Russian convoy stuck northwest of Kyiv being only one of many cases of bumbling behavior. While many Russian military affairs experts have rightly attributed these shortcomings to poor battle planning, troops’ unpreparedness, and technical breakdowns, the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces should also be noted — they have mounted a stiff and clever resistance aimed at disrupting Russian logistics and lines of communication, with notable results.
Against this backdrop, Ukrainian special operations forces (SOF) are emerging as a pivotal component of the Kyiv government’s strategy to erode the sustainability of the Russian invasion by raising its human and materiel costs through a combination of guerrilla tactics, mobile defense, and ad-hoc counterattacks.
The Ukrainian special operations forces at a glance
Ukraine’s decision to establish a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a separate service branch came at the end of 2015 following a string of military setbacks in the south-eastern region of Donbas, where Russian-backed separatists exploited the structural deficiencies and unpreparedness of the Ukrainian military and took control of large swathes of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, which were proclaimed the “People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk” (DPR and LPR) in the spring of 2014.
This painful experience and the continuing Russian threat pushed the political leadership in Kyiv to launch an ambitious restructuring of the national armed forces. The 100% increase in Ukraine’s defense budget between 2015 and 2020, from $2.96bn to $5.92bn (about 4.1% of GDP), provides an idea of the urgency of these reforms, which aimed to modernize the Ukrainian military and improve their capabilities by prioritizing key areas such as command and control, maintenance, training and professionalization, operations planning, and investments in new weaponry.
This effort was complemented by the substantial support of Western countries, including the US, UK, Canada, and several European nations in the form of financial assistance, security sector reform (SSR) programs, and multiple defense cooperation initiatives within the framework of the 2016 NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Special Operations Command, which includes approximately 2,000 personnel enlisted in seven special operations regiments split between the army and navy (this does not include the country’s main intelligence service, the SBU), has been amongst the main beneficiaries of Western support. Ukrainian special operators regularly participate in NATO military exercises, including all recent editions of the Combined Resolve Exercise, and bilateral as well as multinational training schemes involving NATO and non-NATO partner countries. A secretive US-led training program for Ukrainian special forces units was also launched by the CIA in the US in 2015. The goal was the creation of a highly professional force radically different from its Soviet-trained predecessor and which was designed to sharpen insurgency tactics and “kill Russians”, as one trainer put it.
This extensive cooperation is said to have tremendously improved Ukrainian SOF’s interoperability and capabilities, and in 2019 Ukraine’s 140th SOF Center became the first-ever non-NATO unit to obtain NATO’s SOF certification, becoming eligible to deploy under the NATO Response Force’s umbrella, with additional units expected to join the club soon. Training at alliance standards has also granted privileged access to state-of-the-art equipment, including advanced night-vision goggles, portable real-time intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and communication devices, which greatly enhances the effectiveness of Ukraine’s SOF in highly contested areas. Since 2016, Ukrainian SOF have improved to become the tip of a reforged national military that, just two years earlier, was described as “an army in ruins” by its chief of staff and was barely able to deploy 1,000 fully trained and equipped personnel out of 200,000 on the books.
The Russian invasion: Ukrainian SOF’s litmus test
While Ukrainian SOF was established in the context of the operation against irregular separatist units and hybrid threats emanating from Russia, over the years their role has inevitably evolved as part of the country’s preparation for a conventional conflict with the Russian army. Given the prolonged and well-documented military build-up around Ukraine, an all-out Russian offensive was expected, although it has clearly proved incredibly challenging. Still, the available evidence suggests that the Ukrainian SOF are performing remarkably well against an opponent that – at least on paper – enjoys both superior capabilities and overwhelming firepower.
The reasons lie not only in superior tactical skills compared to most Russian troops that have so far taken part in the invasion, but also in the ability to operate at night and in Russia’s poor tactics, as corroborated by the latter’s substantial lack of coordination — even at the platoon level — and combined arms maneuver capabilities.
Ukrainian SOF has repelled advancing Russian mechanized forces in Kyiv’s suburbs, especially Bucha, Irpin, and Hostomel, causing heavy losses. In other areas, they have maintained a “lower” profile and engaged in irregular warfare and operations behind enemy lines to attack the logistical tail, including supply convoys and Russian outposts such as the Chornobaivka airfield, near the Russian-occupied city of Kherson.
SOF units represent a force multiplier and offer Ukraine special skills that are meant to bridge critical gaps in key military domains, while personnel- and equipment-heavy frontline units should remain the preserve of the regular army. But as Russia adjusts its approach and pours new men and equipment into Ukraine, Ukrainian SOF may be forced to engage in more conventional and high-intensity combat against a heavily armed and less-restrained rival.
Although there are no available reports on SOF casualties (it’s unlikely there ever will be), attrition will exact its toll as the conflict continues, with serious consequences in terms of replacements and unit rotation given the force’s highly selective recruitment standards. Notwithstanding their adaptability, should the conflict continue at its current intensity, the Ukrainian SOF risk being stretched dangerously thin within a few weeks.
In anticipation of this and the need to continue a longer-term war of resistance against an occupying force, Ukrainian special forces are likely to use strategies that focus on active/mobile defense to buy time – as they are currently doing – especially if integrated within a nationwide irregular struggle aimed at exhausting the enemy’s human and material resources. This entails a smart relocation of SOF units across Ukraine, embedding them with local resistance, and ensuring they have continuous access to Western supplies and intelligence.
What lessons for NATO and Western militaries?
Although the invasion is not yet three weeks old, Russia’s aggression already holds lessons for military planners and offers lessons to Western, and especially European countries, regarding the need to relaunch defense as an integral and essential component of foreign policy.
When it comes to special operations forces, this development makes it necessary to reassess – and possibly recalibrate — their role, taking into account their potential use against peer-adversaries in highly contested as well as hybrid environments, but also ensuring these forces preserve their distinctive nature.
Despite clear evidence regarding the poor performance of Russian troops in Ukraine, conventional war with NATO would certainly be different in terms of Russian military commitment, with key confrontations likely taking place in high-intensity scenarios where SOF must be ready to use traditional techniques, but also hybrid approaches based on advanced technologies and cyber warfare aimed at disabling an opponent before they can react.
https://cepa.org/hunting-the-invader...ations-troops/
Bullshit.Quote:
Originally Posted by sabang
But since you are intent to drive this thread off-topic to hide the fact that the war is going bad for your Holiness, I will post something that actually is about Russia and Ukraine...
China is quietly distancing itself from Russia's sanction-hit economy.The two states proclaimed last month that their friendship had "no limits." That was before Russia launched its war in Ukraine.
Now, with Russia's economy being slammed with sanctions from all over the world, there is growing evidence that China's willingness and ability to aid its northern neighbor may be limited.
Beijing has refused to condemn Russia's attack on Ukraine but wants to avoid being impacted by the sanctions it has repeatedly denounced as an ineffective way of resolving the crisis.
"China is not a party to the [Ukraine] crisis, and doesn't want the sanctions to affect China," Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Tuesday during a phone call with his Spanish counterpart.
Beijing also gave its full backing Wednesday to comments made earlier this week by China's ambassador to Ukraine. "China will never attack Ukraine. We will help, especially economically," Fan Xianrong was quoted as saying in a press release from the Lviv regional government.
Fears that Chinese companies could face US sanctions over ties with Russia had contributed to an epic sell-off in Chinese stocksrecent days. That slump was reversed Wednesday when Beijing promised it would pursue policies to boost its sputtering economy and keep financial markets stable.
US officials told CNN on Monday that they have information suggesting China has expressed some openness to providing Russia with requested military and financial assistance. China dismissed that as "disinformation."
Analysts saythat China is attempting to strike "a delicate balance" between supporting Russia rhetorically but without further antagonizing the United States.
Beijing and Moscow share a strategic interest in challenging the West. However, Chinese banks cannot afford to lose access to US dollars, and many Chinese industries cannot afford tobe deprived of US technology.
While China is Russia's No. 1 trading partner, Beijing has other priorities.Trade between the two countries made up just 2% of China's total trade volume. The European Union and the United States have much larger shares, according to Chinese customs statistics from last year.
Here are some measures Beijing has taken in the last few weeks to distance itselffrom theisolated andcrumblingRussian economy.
Letting the ruble drop
China's currency, the yuan, doesn't trade completely freely, moving instead within bands set by officials at the People's Bank of China (PBOC). Last week, they doubled the size of the ruble trading range, allowing the Russian currency to fall faster.
The ruble has already lost more than 20%of its value against both the dollar and euro since the start of the war in Ukraine. By allowing the Russian currency to fall against the yuan, Beijing isn't doing Moscow any favors.
Russians will have to pay more in rubles for Chinese imports such as smartphones and cars. Chinese phone brands like Xiaomi and Huawei are hugely popular in Russia, and were vying with Apple (AAPL) and Samsung (SSNLF) for market leadership before the war.
Chinese car makers, such as Great Wall Motor and Geely Auto, occupy 7% of Russia's market, selling more than 115,000 vehicles last year. Great Wall Motor has stopped supplying new cars to dealers in Russia because of the exchange rate fluctuations.
Expanding the trading band would allow the yuan to keep up with the ruble's wild swings, so that Chinese companies can "better grasp the magnitude or trend of future exchange rate fluctuations and reduce exchange risks by using hedging methods, such as derivatives," state-owned China Business Network reported last week.
Currently, about $25 billion of China-Russia trade is conducted in yuan, Chinese state media reported.
Sitting on reserves
The most significant help China could offer Russia is through the $90 billion worth of reserves Moscow holds in yuan, wrote Alicia García-Herrero, chief economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis, in a research report on Tuesday.
Sanctions have frozen about $315 billion worth of Russia's reserves — or roughly half the total — as Western countries have banned dealing with the Russian central bank.
Russia's finance minister Anton Siluanov said this week that the country wanted to use yuan reserves after Moscow was blocked from accessing US dollars and euros, according to Russia's state media.
The PBOC has so far not made any comment about its position regarding these reserves.
If China allowed Moscow to convert its yuan reserves into US dollars or euros, "that would clearly help Russia's current impasse," García-Herrero noted. However, "the reputational risk of potentially breaching Western sanctions would be a huge step for the PBOC to take and therefore makes it highly unlikely," she said.
"The long-term gains of moving closer to Russia might not match the impact of Western investors suddenly losing interest in China," she added.
Withholding aircraft parts
Sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union mean that the world's two major aircraft makers, Boeing (BA) and Airbus (EADSF), are no longer able to supply spare parts or provide maintenance support for Russian airlines. The same is true of jet engine makers.
That means Russian airlines could run out of parts within a matter of weeks, or fly planes without having equipment replaced as frequently as recommended to operate safely.
Earlier this month, a top Russian official said that China has refused to send aircraft parts to Russia as Moscow looks for alternative supplies.
Valery Kudinov, head of aircraft airworthiness at Russia's air transport agency, was quoted by Russian state news agency Tass as saying that Russia would look for opportunities to source parts from countries including Turkey and India after a failed attempt to obtain them from China.
"As far as I know ... China refused," Kudinov was quoted as saying.
In response to CNN's request for comment, China's foreign ministry reiterated Beijing'sopposition to sanctions adding that China and Russia will maintain "normal economic and trade cooperation."
China and Russia set up a civil aviation joint venture in 2017 to build a new long-haul, widebody passenger plane, seeking to rival the duopoly of Boeing and Airbus. Production of the CR929 has begun, but disagreements over suppliers have caused delays. The plane was initially expected to be offered to customers in 2024. But Russia postponed the timeline to 2028 to 2029.
Freezing infrastructure investment
The World Bank has halted all its programs in Russia and Belarus following the invasion of Ukraine. It hadn't approved any new loans or investments to Russia since 2014, and none to Belarus since 2020.
More surprisingly, perhaps, is the decision by the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to do the same. In a statement earlier this month, it said it was suspending all its activities related to Russia and Belarus "as the war in Ukraine unfolds." The move was "in the best interests" of the bank, it added.
Frustrated by a relative lack of influence at the World Bank (based in Washington, D.C.) and the Asian Development Bank (where Japan is a major force), China launched the AIIB in 2016. In addition to hosting the headquarters, China provides the president of the bank and has 26.5% of the votes. India and Russia have 7.6% and 6% respectively.
The AIIB's decision to suspend activities in Russia means $1.1 billion of approved or proposed lending aimed at improving the country's road and rail networks is now on hold.
https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/17/busin...ction-intl-hnk
Russia Strikes Near Lviv Airport as Bombardment Expands Across Ukraine
Russian missiles struck near Lviv's airport in the far west of Ukraine early Friday, as Moscow expanded a countrywide aerial bombardment campaign that has intensified allegations of war crimes and deliberate targeting of civilians.
Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi said Russian forces had destroyed an aircraft repair plant — which sits near the Polish border.
Ambulance and police vehicles raced to the scene, while motorists were turned away at checkpoints. An AFP reporter saw a thick pall of smoke billowing over the airport.
"Several missiles hit an aircraft repair plant," the mayor said on the messaging app Telegram, adding that the plant had been destroyed.
Located 70 kilometers from the border, Lviv had until now largely escaped military strikes from Russian forces.
MORE Russia Strikes Near Lviv Airport as Bombardment Expands Across Ukraine - The Moscow Times
Six cruise missiles fired at Lviv from submarine in Black Sea - West air command
Six cruise missiles were fired at Lviv from a submarine located in the Black Sea, the West air command reports on its Facebook page.
"According to preliminary data, six cruise missiles, possibly X-555, were fired from a submarine in the Black Sea," the report says.
"Two missiles were destroyed in the air by the anti-aircraft missile forces of the West air command," the report says.
As reported, Russian missiles hit Lviv near the airport.
Six cruise missiles fired at Lviv from submarine in Black Sea - West air command
I am still trying to identify what long range anti-aircraft missile systems will be provided, as they were written into the bill but not mentioned yet by the press. Looks like more SA-8's and S-300's. They will stop the air campaign over Kyiv and help the counter offensive that is underway to retake the suburbs.Quote:
The U.S. will directly transfer the following equipment to the Ukrainian military as part of the latest package, according to a White House fact sheet:
- 800 Stinger anti-aircraft systems
- 2,000 Javelin anti-armor missiles
- 1,000 light anti-armor weapons
- 6,000 AT-4 anti-armor systems
- 100 Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (armed drones)
- 7,000 small arms for both military and civilian use (100 grenade launchers, 5,000 rifles, 1,000 pistols, 400 machine guns and 400 shotguns)
- Over 20 million rounds of ammunition
- 25,000 sets of body armor
- 25,000 helmets
YES!!!! These things are wicked as they are operated from the ground by special forces and Ukraine spec ops are having a big effect on the ground. Slava Ukraini!
The U.S. will send 100 Switchblade drones to Ukraine as part of the Biden administration’s new $800 million weapons package, Texas Rep. Mike McCaul, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told POLITICO.
The inclusion of the “tactical” drones, which crash into their targets, represents a new phase of weaponry being sent to Ukraine by the U.S., which so far has shipped mostly anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. An administration official confirmed McCaul’s account that the U.S. is sending the Switchblade.
The Switchblade is a small, light drone that can loiter in the air for up to 30 minutes before being directed to its target by an operator on the ground, dozens of miles away. The drone is launched from a tube, like a mortar shell. Its real-time GPS guidance allows a service member in the field to fly it until the moment it crashes and explodes into whatever the target might be.
The weapon was first fielded in Afghanistan by U.S. special operations forces, but quickly was picked up by the Army and Marine Corps, who saw value in the light, accurate munition that can help thwart ambushes or take out vehicles. NBC News first reported that Switchblade was under consideration by the White House.
McCaul also said that the U.S. was “working with allies” to send more S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Ukraine. The country has had the S-300 for years, so troops should require little-to-no training on how to operate the Soviet-era anti-aircraft equipment. CNN reported that Slovakia had preliminarily agreed to transfer their S-300s to Ukraine.
The revelations come shortly after President Joe Biden announced the new $800 million in military assistance to Ukraine, which also includes 800 more Stinger anti-aircraft systems, 2,000 anti-armor Javelins, 1,000 light anti-armor weapons and 6,000 AT-4 anti-armor systems. The AT-4 is a lightweight recoilless rifle already used by American special operations forces.
“The United States and our allies and partners are fully committed to surging weapons of assistance to the Ukrainians, and more will be coming as we source additional stocks of equipment that we’re ready to transfer,” Biden said.
Hours earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy delivered a virtual speech to members of Congress, imploring the president and lawmakers to implement a no-fly zone over Ukraine and provide his country with more materiel.
A Western diplomat familiar with Ukraine’s requests said Kyiv specifically has asked the U.S. and allies for more Stingers and Starstreak man-portable air-defense systems, Javelins and other anti-tank weapons, ground-based mobile air-defense systems, armed drones, long-range anti-ship missiles, “off-the-shelf” electronic warfare capabilities, and satellite navigation and communications jamming equipment.
“I have a dream. These words are known to each of you today,” Zelenskyy said. “I can say, I have a need. I need to protect our sky. I need your help.”
“We need to give him more defense mechanisms. He kept saying no-fly zone. I think that’s probably still a non-starter,” Sen. Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) told POLITICO. “That doesn’t mean we can’t up the amount, do more with equipment and drones and other things that would be just as helpful.”
Ukraine has succeeded in defending Kyiv, the capital, and stalling Russia’s advances three weeks after the invasion started. The U.S.-led Western push to put advanced, lethal weaponry in Ukrainian hands boosted the resistance, which to date has met a shambolic Russian advance lacking in strategy and logistics.
To further help, there is a push to get Eastern European allies to send new air defense systems to Ukraine that the U.S. doesn’t have. At the top of the list are mobile, Russian-made missile systems such as the SA-8 and S-300. Like the S-300, Ukraine also possesses SA-8s.
The SA-8 is a mobile, short-range air defense system still in the warehouses of Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. The larger, long-range S-300 is still in use by Bulgaria, Greece and Slovakia.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s trip to Europe this week will include not only NATO headquarters in Brussels, but also stops in Bulgaria and Slovakia — countries that own S-300s and SA-8s — before heading back to Washington, D.C.
U.S. sending Switchblade drones to Ukraine in $800 million package - POLITICO
Russian Warships Shelling Towns Near Odesa as Naval Activity Increasers in Northern Black Sea
Russian ships are shelling targets in the suburbs of Odesa as naval activity ticks up in the Black Sea, the Pentagon said on Wednesday.
“We do see increased naval activity in the northern Black Sea,” a senior defense official told reporters on Wednesday.
We also have observed on our own the shelling of some town outside of Odessa near Odessa, but not in Odessa. We believe these are… from Russian warships in the Black Sea.
The official did not say if the shelling was a precursor to an amphibious landing near the port city.
“It could be that they are preparing the way for some sort of ground assault on Odesa,” the official said.
“We would not see them surprised in taking Odesa given its strategic location.”
The shelling follows a Tuesday mobilization of Russian amphibious warships off the coast of Odesa in the Black Sea that ultimately turned back to their staging area near Crimea.
Fourteen Russian ships were seen operating in off the southern coast of Ukraine, according to open-source analysts H I Sutton and Damien Symon earlier tracked a Russian amphibious assault group and two surface combatants operating near the coast of Odesa in the Black Sea.
“Two [groups] are made up of combatants, and one has several landing ships. The landing ships appear to have sailed directly from their staging position off the Crimean coast,” they wrote in Naval News.
In total, the pair saw 14 ships, led by a Russian minesweeper, approach the coast off Odesa and then turn back toward Crimea. Pentagon officials confirmed the basic details on Wednesday.
In late February, thousands of Russian troops landed on the Sea of Azov coast without resistance as part of the ongoing Mariupol siege. They have not yet made an amphibious landing in the Black Sea.
The Kremlin has moved six amphibious landing ships into the Black Sea since the start of the year to join landing ships that were already part of the Black Sea fleet.
These include three Ropucha-class tank landing ships, which are capable of landing 10 main battle tanks and 350 troops ashore. The larger Ivan Gren-class, also in the Black Sea, can move 13 main battle tanks and 300 troops while also fielding two attack helicopters.
According to notices to mariners, the sea approaches to Odessa and surrounding beaches are heavily mined, which would complicate a landing.
Russian amphibious forces aren’t skilled at contested amphibious landings and would need an uncontested beach to deploy vehicles and naval infantry.
The total of Russia’s amphibious forces in the Pacific could be heading to support the war effort in Ukraine, Japanese officials said on Wednesday.
All of Russia’s amphibious forces in the Pacific are on the move, possibly on their way to support Russian forces in Ukraine, Japanese officials said on Wednesday.
Japanese officials say four Russian Navy amphibious warfare ships transited the Tsugaru Strait on Tuesday and Wednesday, and the Japan Ministry of Defense posted on social media on Wednesday that they might be transporting troops and vehicles for operations in Ukraine.
The first two ships were sighted Tuesday traveling westward about 44 miles east-northeast of Shiriyazaki. The release identified the ships by pennant numbers and class as Landing Ship Tanks (LST) RFS Nikolay Vilkov (081) and RFS Oslyabya (066), with photos showing Nikolay Vilkov’s open vehicle deck carrying a number of Russian trucks. Two more ships – LSTs RFS Admiral Nevelskoy (055) and RFS Peresvet (077) – were sighted on Wednesday morning 135 miles east-northeast of Shiriyazaki. On both occasions, the ships subsequently sailed west through the Tsugaru Strait and into the Sea of Japan. They were surveilled by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer JS Shiranui (DD-120) and JMSDF P-3C Orions of Fleet Air Wing based at Hachinohe Air Base, Honshu, according to the release.
The four ships represent the entire complement of the Russian Navy Pacific Fleet’s amphibious ships. Japan tracked the Nikolay Vilkov, Admiral Nevelskoy and Oslyabya operating in the Sea of Japan and the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk in February as part of the Russian Navy’s global fleet-wide exercises held in January and February. The photo release then by Japan of Nikolay Vilkov showed it traveling with an empty deck, making it likely that Nikolay Vilkov is now transporting vehicles from the Russian garrison in the Kuril Islands to Vladivostok where they will be transported by rail as replacements for losses in Ukraine.
The Tsugaru Strait divides Honshu and Hokkaido. Japan’s territorial waters extend only three nautical miles in the strait, allowing foreign warships to transit it without violating Japan’s sovereignty. However, Japan has expressed concerns about transits by Russian and Chinese naval vessels and regularly tasks JMSDF ships and aircraft to shadow vessels from the two nations in the strait. A Russian Navy 10-ship group transited Tsugaru Strait on March 10.
PICS Russian Warships Shelling Towns Near Odesa as Naval Activity Increasers in Northern Black Sea - USNI News
A couple of these ships are rust buckets. The Russians don’t maintain thier equipment very well!
Odessa is ready for this scum.Quote:
Originally Posted by misskit
Odessa would be a bloodbath- I pray it never happens. But I also know Putin & Co have a major hard-on about the Odessa massacre.