Meet the defense giants that will rearm Europe as the EU eyes a massive military buil
Time to buy defense stock...
Meet the defense giants that will rearm Europe as the EU eyes a massive military buildup
The European Union announced plans to increase its defense spending by €800 billion ($867 billion), European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said this week, unveiling the ReArm Europe plan.
The plan includes €150 billion in loans to help member states buy air defenses, artillery, missiles, “ammunition drones,” and anti-drone systems as well as address other needs like cybersecurity and mobility.
“Europe is ready to massively boost its defense spending. Both, to respond to the short-term urgency to act and to support Ukraine but also to address the long-term need to take on much more responsibility for our own European security,” von der Leyen said in a statement.
The E.U. has felt added pressure from the Trump administration’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war. Last week, a conversation at the White House between President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky turned sour, and the White House has reportedly halted military aid.
As Europe plans to build up its military in preparation for a potential world without U.S. assistance, Fortune has compiled some of the largest European defense players that may take on a larger role to rearm Europe.
BAE Systems
Led by CEO Charles Woodburn, the Camberley, United Kingdom-based company’s revenue reached £26.3 billion in 2024. Its military sectors include air, land, cyber security and intelligence, electronics, and sea systems.
Within its air sector, BAE Systems is a partner in the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet consortium and the F-35 stealth fighter, whose prime contractor is Lockheed Martin.
BAE’s land division makes tracked, untracked, and amphibious combat vehicles. Additionally, the company produces ammunition, precision munitions, artillery systems, missile launchers, precision imaging, and targeting solutions.
In electronics, its repertoire includes flight and engine controls, electronic warfare, night-vision systems, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, mobile networked-communication equipment, systems integration, and environmentally-friendly energy management systems.
Thales
Helmed by CEO Patrice Caine in Meudon, France, Thales specializes in aerospace, defense, digital identity and ground transportation. In 2024, the company generated €20.58 billion in revenue.
While the company is famous for its space systems, Thales does a wide variety of military work, such as designing smart sensors and connecting soldiers on the digital battlefield.
In January, Thales announced its leadership in the SEACURE program to enhance Europe’s underwater warfare capabilities.
In a recent interview with CNBC, Caine said the flood of EU military spending should stay in Europe.
“If you want to be autonomous, if you want to give meaning to the word sovereignty, you need to be independent from third parties and be as self-sufficient as possible in this type of capability,” he said.
Rheinmetall
Headquartered in Düsseldorf, Germany, the automotive and arms manufacturer saw revenue of €8.83 billion under the guidance of CEO Armin Theodor Papperger.
Rheinmetall manufactures tanks, air defense systems, autonomous ground vehicles, guns, missiles, and bombs. Most notably, it produces the Panther KF51 main battle tank.
Rheinmetall also offers flight surveillance systems and aircraft cannons.
The company’s naval division supplies weapons, sensors, and air defense to ships, along with military simulation and training.
Leonardo
Led by CEO Roberto Cingolani, the Rome, Italy-based company generated more than €20.9 billion in sales last year.
The company is most famously known for its helicopter production, such as the TrekkerM multi-role platform.
The company is part of the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), which includes BAE Systems and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan. The GCAP is working to produce the next-generation of fighter aircraft.
On Thursday, Leonardo announced a joint partnership with Turkey’s Baykar to produce unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), in response to the European military spending spike.
The two companies estimate that the European UAV market will reach $100 billion over the next 10 years.
Aside from aviation, Leonardo also specializes in cyber security, electronics, space, and aerostructures.
Saab
Headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden, the company serves civilian and military markets. Under the guidance of CEO Micael Johansson, Saab’s revenue reached nearly $6 billion in 2024.
Saab makes missiles, submarines, sensors, electronics, the Gripen fighter jet, and is developing future unmanned systems.
Additionally, Saab has over 100-years of experience building submarines. In February, Saab announced its remodel of the HMS Halland submarine, adding upgraded sensors and command systems.
“The launch of the HMS Halland is a testament to Saab’s ability to upgrade and deliver advanced submarines with the capabilities the Swedish Navy requires,” said Mats Wicksell, head of Saab’s Kockums business unit. ”With HMS Halland, the Swedish Navy, and by extension NATO, is given additional muscle to defend and monitor the Baltic Sea.”
Airbus
The company famous for its planes used in civilian air travel also serves the defense industry. Led by CEO Guillaume Faury, the aerospace giant generated €69.2 billion in revenue last year, €12.4 billion of which came from defense endeavors.
Within the defense unit, Airbus serves the land, air, sea, space, and cyber domains. Based in Toulouse, France, Airbus is a partner on the Eurofighter Typhoon while other planes in its portfolio include the A400M Atlas transport aircraft and the A330 MRTT refueling tanker.
It’s also developing advanced technologies in manned and unmanned platforms, such as Europe’s Future Combat Air System.
Safran
Helmed by CEO Olivier Andriès, the Paris-based company generated €27.3 billion in revenue in 2024.
Safran offers navigation technologies, electro-optical systems, targeting systems, parachutes, the Patroller tactical drone, and missile propulsion systems.
Fincantieri
Headquartered in Trieste, Italy, Fincantieri is a top shipbuilder under the leadership of CEO Pierroberto Folgiero. The company has yet to report full-year results but has estimated 2024 revenue will top €8 billion.
As European governments look to boost the defense industry, Fincantieri told Fortune it is poised to significantly expand its presence in naval defense, including submarine and underwater technology.
“We are investing in unmanned systems, AI-driven decision-making for autonomous underwater missions, and advanced communication networks to connect subsea assets with surface and space-based systems,” the company said in a statement.
Dassault Aviation
Led by Éric Trappier, Dassault Aviation makes military aircraft and business jets. Headquartered in Paris, France, it raked in €6.2 billion in revenue in 2024.
Dassault is most famous for its Mirage and Rafale fighter jets. In addition, Dassualt holds the prime contract under the French government for the nEUROn, an unmanned aircraft.
https://fortune.com/2025/03/09/defen...ieri-dassault/
Russia Is Losing the War of Attrition
Ukraine has no “cards” according to President Donald Trump, while Russia has many. Vice President J. D. Vance has asserted that superior Russian firepower and manpower mean that the war can end only in a Russian victory. Other supposedly realistic commentators agree, arguing that Russia’s advantages are insurmountable.
As military historians, we think this a misreading not only of what is happening on the ground, but of how wars unfold—and, in particular, of the difference between attritional campaigns and those built on maneuver. The Luftwaffe and the German submarine force during World War II, to take just two examples, were defeated not by a single blow, but by a technologically advanced, tactically and operationally sophisticated approach that rendered those organizations, large as they were, unable to function effectively. In the same vein, the advances of the German army in the spring of 1918 concealed the underlying weakness in that military produced by attrition, which ultimately doomed the Kaiser’s army and the regime for which it fought.
We have been here before. Prior to the war, the intelligence community, political leaders, and many students of the Russian military concluded that Russia would easily overrun Ukraine militarily—that Kyiv would fall in a few days and that Ukraine itself could be conquered in weeks. We should consider that failure as we assess the certainty of Vance and those who think like him.
Wars are rarely won so decisively, because attrition is not only a condition of war, but a strategic choice. Smaller powers can, through the intelligent application of attrition, succeed in advancing their own goals. This is particularly true if, like Ukraine, they can exploit technological change and get the most from outside support and allies. Vietnam was outgunned by the United States, as the American colonies were once outgunned by the British empire. Iranian forces outnumbered those of Iraq during a long and brutal war in the 1980s, and lost nonetheless.
The pessimistic analysis has not paid nearly enough attention to the weak underpinnings of Russian military power. Russia’s economy, as often noted, is struggling with interest rates that have topped 20 percent amid soaring inflation, and with manpower shortages made critical by the war. Its condition is dire, as one study noted, partly because the military budget amounts to 40 percent of all public spending, and partly because oil revenue is taking a hit from lower prices, Ukrainian attacks, and tightening sanctions.
Russian weakness is particularly visible in the army. One report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that in 2024 alone, the Russians lost 1,400 main battle tanks, and more than 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. At the same time, Russian production of such vehicles, including refurbished units, totaled just 4,300, not enough to make up for its losses. In desperation, Russia has turned to restoring its oldest and least effective combat vehicles, many of Soviet vintage. One recent study by Chatham House asserts that the Russian military-industrial complex is “ill adapted to deal with the effects of a prolonged war against Ukraine or to achieve a sustainable future in terms of production, innovation and development.”
The same holds true for Russian manpower. The number of soldiers that the Russians were able to maintain at the front seemed to peak in the spring and summer of 2024, above 650,000. By the end of the year, it had fallen closer to 600,000, despite the extraordinary bonuses that the Russian government offers new recruits, amounting to about two and a half times the average annual Russian salary in 2023.
Russian casualties have mounted steadily. According to the British Ministry of Defence, in December 2022, they stood at roughly 500 a day; in December 2023, at just under 1,000; and in December 2024, at more than 1,500. In 2024 alone, Russia suffered nearly 430,000 killed and wounded, compared with just over 250,000 in 2023.
North Korean reinforcements have attracted attention in the press, but these troops, numbering in the tens of thousands at most, cannot make up for the fundamental deficiencies in Russian manpower. Moreover, the high rates of attrition that the Russians have suffered—roughly the same as the number of personnel mobilized each year—mean that the Russian military has not been able to reconstitute. It is more and more a primitive force, poorly trained and led, driven forward by fear alone.
The pause in American aid last year hurt Ukraine. Now, however, the stockpiles seem to be in better shape for most types of weaponry. Ukraine’s own production has reached impressive levels in certain vital categories, particularly but not exclusively unmanned aerial vehicles. In 2024, the Ukrainian military received over 1.2 million different Ukrainian-produced UAVs—two orders of magnitude more than Ukraine possessed, let alone produced, at the beginning of the war. Ukrainian production rates are still rising; it aims to produce 4 million drones this year alone.
UAVs are crucial because they have replaced artillery as the most effective system on the field of battle. By one estimate, UAVs now cause 70 percent of Russian losses. Ukraine’s robust defense industry is innovating more quickly and effectively than that of Russia and its allies.
Attritional wars take place on many fronts. For example, it is true that Russia has increased its attacks on Ukrainian industry and civilian targets, as well as energy infrastructure. Ukrainian air defenses, however, have been remarkably successful in neutralizing the large majority of those attacks, which is why Ukrainian civilian casualties have been decreasing. Ukraine has, moreover, been on the offensive as well. It has produced some 6,000 longer-range heavy UAVs, which it has used to attack deep into Russia, decreasing Russian oil production. Remarkably, Ukraine appears to be matching the rate at which Russia is producing its own similar drone, the Shahed, which is being built on license from Iran.
Despite American reluctance to provide further aid, Ukraine’s European friends can make a significant difference even though they cannot simply replace what the U.S. has been providing. They do not, for instance, make the advanced Patriot anti-missile system, although they have other capable air-defense weapons. However, Europe can help Ukraine press ahead with more UAV production; Europeans have the capacity to manufacture engines for long-range UAVs, for example, at a far higher rate.
And some European systems not yet provided—such as the German Taurus cruise missile—could increase Ukraine’s advantages. Germany has so far denied Ukraine the Taurus, a far more effective system with greater range and a heavier payload than the Franco-British Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles. The new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has already said he would send Taurus missiles to Ukraine if the Russians did not relent. With these systems, Ukraine could add to the considerable damage it has already done within Russia.
Attritional campaigns depend on an industrial base. The European Union alone has a GDP about 10 times that of Russia, and if you add the U.K. and Norway to that calculation, the imbalance in favor of Ukraine grows even larger. As it is, Europe and the United States have provided Ukraine with roughly equal amounts of its military resources (30 percent each), while Ukraine has produced 40 percent on its own.
The U.S. has provided more than just military material—it has also furnished intelligence and access to Starlink internet services. None of this can quickly be made up, although again, one should not underestimate the depth of technological and intelligence resources available from Europe and sympathetic Asian countries, should they mobilize. The United States has stinted its aid until now, but Ukraine itself and its European allies are filling the gaps.
Ukraine is not on the verge of collapse, and it is Russia, not Ukraine, that is losing the attritional war, which makes the Trump administration’s decisions particularly shortsighted and tragic. Ukraine has plenty of cards, even if Trump and Vance cannot see them. If America’s leaders could only bring themselves to put pressure on Russia comparable to what they put on Ukraine, they could help Ukraine achieve something much more like a win.
https://www.theatlantic.com/internat...e7140001fe0692
If Ukraine-Russia Negotiations Fail, Victory Remains an Option
ON FRIDAY, SECRETARY OF STATE MARCO RUBIO announced that “in a matter of days,” the administration would decide whether negotiating an end to the Russia-Ukraine War is “doable.” It’s unclear what the administration would do if it determined that negotiations had failed—in that case, Rubio said, “We’ll do what we can on the margins.” But Rubio’s clear frustration contrasts markedly with the testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this month of Gen. Christopher Cavoli, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the soldier most knowledgeable about the current situation in Europe and Ukraine. That testimony mostly went unnoticed by the media.
Cavoli’s message was clear and precise: Ukraine is fighting with incredible resolve, Russia is not adapting quickly enough even after three years of fighting, and both sides are running dangerously low on the means to continue their fight without outside support. His testimony punctured the false narrative being spread by President Trump and members of his national security team—that Russia is winning, Ukraine is doomed, and future U.S. support would be wasted. That view, repeated by President Trump on multiple occasions, is more than misinformation. It is a view that distorts the battlefield reality and the critical strategic interests of the United States and our allies.
Cavoli didn’t mince words. His assessment was that “Despite extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine, the Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated,” with significant numbers of artillery shells, drones, and long-range fires being produced and sourced from abroad. Their military is battered, but not yet broken—and their will to press troops—including North Korean troops and Chinese “volunteers”—into a meat grinder remains intact.
The Supreme Allied Commander didn’t say explicitly that Ukraine is running out of ammunition, but he did stress that “the Ukrainians depend on us . . . uniquely . . . for their high-end anti-aircraft systems.” And reading between the lines, demand for artillery ammunition continues to exceed supply. He praised the Czech Republic for delivering 70,000 rounds to Ukraine this month but also noted that the Russians are expected to produce 250,000 shells per month. (The Russian’s shells aren’t as accurate, so they take more shells to hit each target; still, no military commander wants to be the one with less ammunition.) He stressed that delays in American aid “have a rapid and deleterious on [the Ukrainians’] ability to fight.”
But despite all that, Cavoli’s overall estimate wasn’t bleak. He observed that the Russian economy features a dangerous combination of high inflation, high interest rates, and dramatic dependence on war production at the expense of everything else. According to a recent report from the Institute for the Study of War, Russia’s financial capacity to incentivize new recruits, pay those currently in the force, and provide bonuses to those wounded or the families of those killed is under incredible strain. This looming collapse of pay and benefits increasingly threatens morale and cohesion, two things that have never been the strengths of the Russian army. (The ISW report also gives a bleaker outlook on Russan industrial production than Cavoli provided.)
On the other side, “the Ukrainians . . . have assumed very strong defensive positions—positions well dug-in. And [they] appear to have solved some of their manpower problems that were so acute last autumn. They’ve evolved and developed very, very quickly.”
On the ground, Russian forces have made marginal advances in recent weeks—particularly in areas along the Donetsk front. But those gains have failed to achieve their aims and come at a high cost: Since the war began, Russia has suffered nearly 800,000 dead or wounded, about four times the size of its initial invasion force, and more than the 600,000 it now has deployed in Ukraine. For that cost, progress has been measured in meters, not miles. The Russian tactics continue to rely heavily on human wave assaults, with poorly trained conscripts often used as cannon fodder.
Russia’s use of glide bombs, loitering munitions, and massive artillery barrages continue with the standoff tactics designed to inflict maximum damage (especially on civilians) with minimal risk. Civilian infrastructure, energy plants, and hospitals remain deliberate targets. This has never been a war of maneuver for the Russians—it is a war of terror. Since the beginning, Putin’s strategic objective has been to gain territory and break Ukraine’s will. That has not changed, but it now appears only the will of the United States is being broken.
Perhaps Cavoli’s most important message was this:
There’s nothing inevitable in war, and the Ukrainians are in very strong defensive positions right now, and are improving weekly, their ability to generate force and to reinforce those positions. It is hard sitting here right now to envision a major Ukrainian offensive that clears everybody you know out of every square inch of Ukraine. But likewise, it’s very hard to envision Ukraine collapsing and losing that conflict. I do not think there is inevitability to a Ukrainian loss.
That’s the essence of this moment: Russia is still dysfunctional and increasingly broken and Ukraine are still fighting for their people, their territorial integrity, their sovereignty. But they can only continue with that fight if the United States shows the strategic patience and political will to provide what’s needed.
During the campaign, Trump claimed that he could “end the war in 24 hours.” It was obvious then and it’s even more obvious now that there’s only one way to guarantee a war ends in 24 hours: surrender. Trump signaled a willingness to hand Ukraine over to Moscow in exchange for quiet on the European front—a trade he realistically can’t make, because the Europeans and especially the Ukrainians have a say.
Even more troubling is the recent suggestion by Retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, the administration’s Envoy to Ukraine, who floated the idea of dividing Ukraine into “zones of responsibility.” This is not just naïve—it is offensive to the Ukrainian people, who have fought and died for every inch of their territory. It ignores Ukraine’s sovereign right to define its borders and future. And it reinforces a “frozen conflict” model that Putin has used for the last twenty years and benefits only Moscow. A frozen conflict—where the front line becomes an accepted de facto border—hands Putin a victory without a formal treaty, giving him time to rearm, regroup, and resume his assault at a time when he is ready. We’ve seen this before in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, the Donbas, and Crimea. Partition isn’t peace. It’s a time bomb.
Gen. Cavoli stated it plainly: “Russia’s war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year has revealed Russia to be a chronic threat . . . it will be a growing threat, one that is willing to use military force to achieve its geopolitical goals.” And the man responsible—Vladimir Putin—must remain an international outcast. The ICC’s arrest warrant for the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children is just one of many war crimes under review, and the attacks on civilians over the last few weeks—as Russia claimed to be negotiating a ceasefire—provides overwhelming evidence of Russian intent: to continue targeting civilians, maintain filtration camps, and increase systemic torture. President Trump’s rhetoric, Steve Witkoff’s sycophancy toward Putin, and Gen. Kellogg’s proposed partition scheme play right into that plan.
The window for Ukraine to regain momentum is narrowing—but not closed. Maintenance of sanctions, critical deliveries of air defense systems, artillery, and precision munitions, and reaffirmation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty could begin restoring battlefield balance within weeks. With better protection from Russian airstrikes and renewed long-range fires, and proper treatment of Putin’s aggression, Ukraine could stabilize its lines and set conditions for limited offensive actions by late summer or early fall.
Ukraine can persevere. With steady Western support, they can hold the line—and push it forward. They don’t need our soldiers. They need our resolve. We are at the inflection point. History will remember what we chose to do next.
https://www.thebulwark.com/p/if-ukra...nsky-putin-war
