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Attachment 103837Quote:
KAMIANSKE-ORIKHIV AXIS / 2000 UTC 20 JUN/ UKR repelled a RU attack at Piatykhatky. RU losses in the engagement included main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and numerous pieces of artillery. The UKR MoD reported Russian losses in the last 24 hrs numbered 1,110 KIA.
Wonder if and when UKR MoD will publish Ukrainian losses?Quote:
Originally Posted by bsnub
Why should they? Plenty of other evidence of this routing on twitter. Much of it is the ruzzian mil-bloggers whining about losing territories. Girkin-Strelkov whining...Quote:
Originally Posted by Norton
https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/...00203083329541
Not questioning the accuracy of Russian losses as per UKR MoD just seems to put it in perspective they should state Ukrainian losses as well.Quote:
Originally Posted by bsnub
Oryx keeps record of equipment losses here...Quote:
Originally Posted by Norton
Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine - Oryx
Attack On Europe: Documenting Ukrainian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine - Oryx
Those just show equipment, not body counts, and actual losses are most likely higher on both sides because oryx only counts equipment that is visually confirmed. Far higher loses for the ruzzians over the entire course of the war.
At least one Ukrainian MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter is flying with what appears to be a new and previously unseen kind of underwing pylon system. While we currently don’t know the exact purpose of this pylon, it raises some very interesting questions, especially bearing in mind the previous adaptations that have been made to the MiG-29 (and other Soviet-era combat aircraft) to allow them to carry new weapons of Western origin.
Attachment 103841
Especially intriguing is the origin of this photo. It was posted today to the official Twitter account of the Ukrainian Air Force, together with the caption “New day — new challenges!” That phrase could well suggest that some new kind of capability is being used. Either way, the fact that the Ukrainian Air Force chose to publicize this particular photo also indicates they are happy to show something of that new capability, whatever it might be.
The photo in question depicts the underside of an airborne MiG-29 with the full complement of six underwing pylons, but no armament attached to them. An external fuel tank is carried on the centerline. The jet has a distinctive off-white nose radome, suggesting the MiG is probably not one of those provided to Ukraine from Polish or Slovakian Air Force stocks.
Regardless of the origin of this particular MiG-29, the intriguing aspect of the photo is the appearance of the two extended inner underwing pylons, closest to the engine nacelles. Normally, these would be used for the AKU-470 launch rails that each accommodate a single R-27R (AA-10 Alamo) air-to-air missile (AAM), with semi-active radar guidance. Infrared-guided R-27Ts can also be carried but are rarely seen.
For close to a year, Ukrainian MiG-29s have also been using an ad-hoc pylon for the carriage of the U.S.-supplied AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM).
However, the pylons seen in this photo are not like either of those options. Key features are their length, or more particularly the degree to which they project out ahead of the wing leading edge.
The color is also unusual, either a light gray or even white on the main part of the launch rail itself. There appear to be quadruple shackles on each pylon, of the kind normally associated with securing a heavier piece of ordnance. Finally, the pylon has a long shape with a rounded end cap that could be somewhat similar to something that would contain an electronic warfare emitter or passive radio frequency detector.
All in all, the photo suggests we are looking at a pylon that’s either associated with a new type of air-launched weapon that’s been introduced on the Ukrainian MiG-29 or that the pylon itself is of a new type that incorporates some kind of combat-related subsystem. Another very real possibility is that it packs both functions. Integrating electronic warfare and defensive countermeasures onto weapons pylons is a widely used concept.
In the first case, we know that Ukraine has received Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range precision-guided bombs, or JDAM-ERs, with a small stockpile of these bombs kits that can hit targets up to 45 miles away thanks to their pop-out wing kits. So far, we don’t know what aircraft types have been adapted to launch these weapons, but the MiG-29 could be an option. In this case, a new type of pylon may have been provided. The heavy-duty bomb shackles could also point to a larger weapon like JDAM-ER, and one that falls away, rather than being fired or ejected from the pylon.
While Ukraine has also received other weapons that could possibly be integrated on fighter jets, namely the AIM-7 Sparrow semi-active radar homing air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and the AIM-9 Sidewinder infrared-guided AAM, these are understood to be earmarked for launch from ground-based air defense systems, not fighters. At the same time, the appearance of the pylons does not immediately suggest an interface for the AIM-7 or AIM-9, let alone the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). The latter is an AAM with active radar guidance and something the Ukrainian Air Force has long prized. However, so far, there’s only confirmation that AMRAAMs have been provided for ground-launched NASAMS air defense systems, not for aircraft.
In terms of basic appearance, the new MiG-29 pylon perhaps looks most similar to the launch rail used for the air-launched version of the German-designed IRIS-T infrared-guided AAM, although the shackles remain an anomaly. Examples of the IRIS-T have been supplied to Ukraine for use by their small number of IRIS-T SLM air defense systems. Again, there is no evidence that these missiles have also been integrated on any Ukrainian aircraft.
A number of other Western missiles have also been supplied to Ukraine, including the Brimstone anti-armor missile, Harpoon anti-ship missile, and Hellfire air-to-ground missile. Again, we have no evidence of air-launched applications, and the pylon doesn’t immediately suggest any of these candidates, although it’s by no means impossible.
The possibility that this pylon includes some sort of electronic warfare or sensor capability is also highly relevant. As noted earlier, the dimensions, shape, and, to some degree, the color of the new pylon could suggest the possibility that some kind of sensor or emitter has been integrated into it.
One possibility could be some kind of electronic support measures (ESM) or some kind of radar homing and warning receiver (RHWR). This is essentially a passive sensor suite that can gather intelligence through the detection of certain types of electromagnetic radiation — those used by radars on air defense systems, in particular. Flying with two sensors spaced equally far apart would allow for some level of triangulation of potentially hostile emitters.
As such, ESM/RHWR would be of particular relevance for the defense-suppression mission, already flown by Ukrainian MiG-29s armed with HARMs. It could potentially be able to provide cues for employment of these missiles against emitting Russian air defense systems.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5nWxN1ymW4
While it’s not totally clear exactly how Ukraine employs the HARM, from what we understand they are generally launched in a pre-programmed mode, in which the missile is programmed to fly to the area of a specific threat area before the jet leaves the ground. In this scenario, the missile is launched ‘blind,’ typically at a longer range, using a highly lofted trajectory to maximize its ‘hang time,’ with the aim of acquiring a target during its flight. This type of shot is often paired with other aerial operations in an attempt to protect other aircraft from being engaged for a short period of time.
But having some kind of ESM sensor on the launch aircraft could open up new modes of employment, especially if interfaces in the cockpit allow for more dynamic use of the HARMs. Under such an arrangement, targeting data could be handed over to the AGM-88 in real-time, before being fired and a proper mode selected. This would allow for HARMs to be launched against targets of opportunity. Typically, this would be a previously unknown or ‘pop-up’ threat that goes active. Even a basic ESM/RHWS system could offer greater sensitivity than what the HARM can provide itself, including possibly providing ranging information, and thus yield better results.
Finally, this could be a pylon that features electronic warfare jammers, adding a modular layer of protection for Ukrainian MiG-29s that are operating in an extremely high-threat combat environment. The dense Russian anti-air overlay reaches deep into Ukrainian-controlled territory, especially at altitude. Some sort of electronic warfare self-protection would be highly welcome and bolting it on makes a lot of sense.
The need for a new dedicated pylon could have presented an opportunity to introduce multi-function capabilities to it, especially now that the United States, its allies, and Ukraine have more extensive knowledge on integrating Western weapons onto the MiG-29 and exactly what Ukraine could most use. By integrating another function onto a new pylon, it means that a stores station is not lost by having to mount a dedicated pod or pods. Also, rushing these capabilities to Ukraine’s aging tactical jet fleet is especially relevant as Western fourth-generation fighters are still many months out from arriving, at best.
So those, at least, are some of the options that could help explain the MiG’s new mystery pylon.
So far, the war in Ukraine has thrown up some surprising examples of novel weapons employment and, in particular, adaptations of new weapons aboard Soviet-era Ukrainian Air Force aircraft. Today’s photo teaser from that service might just be our first glimpse of the next such example of air warfare innovation.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-weapon-pylons
Ukrainian troops—if sufficiently supported with expanded Western military aid—can break through Russian lines and reach the occupied Crimean Peninsula by the end of the summer, the former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe Ben Hodges has told Newsweek.
Amid concerns about the slow pace and mounting losses of Ukraine's nascent counteroffensive in the south and east of the country launched early in June, Hodges called on President Joe Biden's administration to underscore its commitment to Ukrainian victory by providing advanced weapons like the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System—colloquially known as the ATACMS—so far denied Kyiv for fear of provoking Russian retaliation.
"My principal caveat still remains that if the United States were to provide what Ukraine needs, then Ukraine could actually still liberate Crimea by the end of this summer," Hodges said in an interview about the progress and prospects of Ukraine's long-awaited push.
Kyiv has reported significant progress in multiple directions since switching to offensive operations earlier this month. The most intense fighting has so far been in eastern Donetsk Oblast around the devastated city of Bakhmut and on the southern Zaporizhzhia front. Other battles are continuing along the 800-mile contact line, with Russian forces reportedly on the offensive in northeastern Luhansk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials say the initial probing attacks involve hard but productive fighting as Kyiv's troops progress into long-prepared Russian defensive lines. Moscow, meanwhile, has repeatedly claimed to have defeated Ukrainian counterattacks saying massive personnel and equipment losses have been inflicted on Ukrainian troops. Russian propagandists—and alleged "useful idiots" in the West—have amplified such reports.
Hodges said it is too early to evaluate any success or failure in the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive, though he stressed he remained optimistic about Kyiv's prospects.
"This is not going to be 'Pac Man'; this is going to be, at some point, a breakthrough," Hodges said, noting that most of Ukraine's heavy armor formations have not yet jointed the fight. "I'm not sure when or where, but at some point, you get through these defenses and then the whole momentum and nature of things can change."
"But for them to do that, they need long-range precision weapons," Hodges added, listing ATACMS, Gray Eagle drones, "or other weapons systems that can reach further than they can reach right now."
Hodges added: "That would enable them to make Crimea untenable. And that's the key: make the Black Sea Fleet have to move out of Sevastopol, which would happen if Ukraine was able to put ATACMS inside that harbor. Those ships couldn't just sit there, all the facilities would be destroyed. Same for the airbase in Saki and other facilities."
"If Ukraine has to settle, because of pressure from us, for some sort of outcome where Russia retains Crimea, in two years now you and I will be having the same conversation," Hodges continued.
"The Russians will wait for us to lose interest. They'll be able to launch attacks from Crimea, Ukraine will never be able to rebuild its economy because the Russian navy will be blocking the Azov Sea as well as Odesa and Mykolaiv," he said. "How's Ukraine going to have an economy? It's not good for anybody in Europe."
Waiting for ATACMS
The White House has been hesitant to provide Kyiv with its longest-range munitions, fearing that Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russian territory may provoke a Kremlin escalation, perhaps even a nuclear one.
One of Kyiv's most desired weapons is the ATACMS, a 190-mile range missile fired from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). The ATACMS far outranges any MLRS so far provided to Ukraine and would put Russian positions across occupied Ukraine and Crimea within Kyiv's sights.
Biden administration officials have disputed Ukraine's claimed need for the ATACMS, simultaneously warning that providing the munitions could escalate the conflict and leave America's own ATACMS stocks dangerously low.
However, Biden said this month that the prospect of ATACMS for Ukraine is "still in play," and Kyiv's envoy to the U.S. has said that the White House's tone on the matter is changing and that there are no obstacles to the weapon's eventual provision. But as Ukraine's high-stakes offensive begins, Kyiv is still waiting for the green light.
"I think the administration has not been honest," Hodges said of the ATACMS debate. "They didn't want to do it, so they continuously came up with excuses like we don't have enough. That's not true. On ATACMS, we're selling them to Poland. The defense industry is not a charity."
The U.S. and its NATO allies are rushing to expand military production capabilities that atrophied—particularly in Europe—through the post-Cold War era, with recent decades dominated by low-intensity counter-insurgency interventions abroad. This effort includes American expansion of Lockheed Martin's ATACMS production line.
But Hodges said hesitation about sending Ukraine the West's most powerful weapons speaks to a political problem.
"Political will is expressed in the form of money, in orders to build and deliver capability," he explained. "Whenever somebody from the administration says, 'Well, we don't have enough ATACMS.' I say yes, if you don't tell industry to make more.
"Whenever I hear someone from the administration say, 'Well, they don't really need F-16s'; what military professional would say they don't really need a quality aircraft to support an offensive, with all the different things that an F-16 can do, whether it was ground support, or air interdiction, or to counter Russian aircraft?"
"How in the world could anybody with more than a week's worth of military education think they don't need ATACMS? And then the months of, 'Well, the Abrams tank, it burns too much fuel' and this and that. Then why do we have Abrams if it's such a terrible tank?"
Ukraine has steadily won over its foreign partners on the need for the most advanced Western technology, from shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons all the way up to fighter jets. Officials in Kyiv, though, have been open in their frustration at the slow political dance required before each new system can be approved. Hodges, too, said the West is still too hesitant.
"The announcement that it's going to be months before F-16 pilots might be ready—I don't understand this," he said. "I don't understand why the administration can't say we want Ukraine to win, and we're going to help them win because this is good for the United States, it's good for Europe, it's good for all of us, for all the reasons we've talked about."
"If they can't be clear about the objective, then the result is incremental decision making. And I think if it's not dishonest, it's an incoherent description of policy."
Russia's Nuclear Option
Moscow's repeated nuclear threats—which have become less and less veiled as the war in Ukraine drags on and Western support for Kyiv expands—still loom over the wider confrontation with Ukraine and its Western partners.
Observers are particularly worried that a Ukrainian advance into Crimea might trigger an extreme Russian response, given that losing control of the peninsula could prove so destabilizing for Putin's Kremlin kleptocracy.
Biden and other Western leaders have been clear in their priority to prevent any direct NATO-Russia conflict and subsequent nuclear exchange. Hodges is among those who believe President Vladimir Putin is bluffing.
"We continue to deter ourselves," he said. "Russia knows that all they have to do is mention nuclear once a week or so, and it causes us to stop. We're being blackmailed. And I think this is a terrible precedent for the future."
"This constant narrative that we don't want to escalate. The Russians are castrating prisoners. Where is our red line?
"My optimism is tied to the caveat of American leadership and support. The United States needs to be much more direct and clear about what our objective is. And it should be that we want Ukraine to win, not this: 'We're with you for as long as it takes,' which is about as empty a statement as you could possibly create."
National Security Council spokesperson Adam Hodge told Newsweek in a statement: "Over the past year and a half, President Biden has rallied the world to respond to Russia's war in Ukraine.
"We have worked with Congress and our allies and partners to provide a historic and unprecedented amount of security assistance, and Ukraine is effectively using those weapons and equipment to defend its territory and democracy. That aid has evolved as battlefield conditions have changed.
"We will continue to help Ukraine meet its immediate battlefield needs and strengthen its long-term defenses so that they are able to defend against and deter future attacks."
https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-fre...atacms-1808088
You sure? This 2008 pic is amazingly similar.Quote:
Originally Posted by bsnub
File:Hungarian Air Force Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29B (9-12A) Lofting-2.jpg
File:Hungarian Air Force Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29B (9-12A) Lofting-2.jpg - Wikimedia Commons
There is a difference.https://www.thedrive.com/uploads/202...=70&width=1440Quote:
Originally Posted by Norton
Yes. See that but except for that everything else identical. Pic looks fishy to me. Could be a very simple photo shopped thing.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pragmatic
I can't think of any A-S or A-A weapon that might need the extra long pylon. I've seen pictures of HARM, Stormshadow, JDAM, Paveway, Sparrow, AIM-120 on their pylons and none require this.
Inboard pylon suggests something heavy. I've read different ideas, but none that sound definite, just guesses.
I would suggest looking at the actual website, there are more pics there.Quote:
Originally Posted by Norton
Oh dear snubby's not going to like this one.
Quote:
In its early phases, Ukraine’s counteroffensive is having less success and Russian forces are showing more competence than western assessments expected, two western officials and a senior US military official tell CNN.
The counteroffensive is “not meeting expectations on any front,” one of the officials said.
According to the Western assessments, Russian lines of defense have been proving well-fortified, making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to breach them. In addition, Russian forces have had success bogging down Ukrainian armor with missile attacks and mines and have been deploying air power more effectively.
Ukrainian forces are proving “vulnerable” to minefields and Russian forces “competent” in their defense, one of the Western officials said.
Early stages of Ukrainian counteroffensive "not meeting expectations," western officials tell CNN | CNN Politics
^ Fake news. Clearly CNN had been hacked by the Russians. Snubby will have a youtube video or Twitter comment to prove the opposite.
Not going so well, ok. They haven't even committed most of their brigades to the fight yet. It just one article! Oh noes, the war is lost.
:rofl:
I did. Found another identical on wiki. Another 2008 photo by same guy.Quote:
Originally Posted by bsnub
Done checking. Post away Snubs. :)
Senators Graham and Blumenthal News Conference on Russian Nuclear Threats | C-SPAN.orgQuote:
VITAL UPDATE: This is the most important statement by the USA to date. Congress puts forth a new resolution: If Russia uses tactical nukes OR damages Nuclear plants, that will trigger NATO article 5. Blumenthal states: If Russia does the above-mentioned acts, their military will be “eviscerated”.
Senator Graham echoed his colleagues points, and both made clear that this was not a cause for panic, but a strong warning to Russians military, as to what would happen should they cause a nuclear incident. Poland was referenced as most likely being effected by fallout.
Moscow Warns West Against Leveraging Insurrection For 'Anti-Russian' Goals
Russia warned the West on Saturday against taking advantage of an armed insurrection carried out by the Wagner mercenary group in Russia to achieve what Moscow said were their "anti-Russian" goals.
"We warn the Western countries against any hint of possible use of the domestic Russian situation to achieve their Russophobic goals," the foreign ministry said in a statement.
"All goals and objectives of the special military operation will be fulfilled," it added, using the Kremlin-preferred term for Moscow's large-scale military intervention in Ukraine.
Iran's Oil Supplies Are One More Challenge for OPEC and the U.S. | Barron's
Making yourself look like a prize dick - Check.Quote:
Originally Posted by misskit
Ukraine has for the first time liberated territory which has been under Russian control since 2014, British intelligence officials said.
The small patch of land is in an area near Krasnohorivka, some 10 miles south west of the city of Donetsk.
The capture marks the first time since Russia’s invasion in February last year that Ukraine’s forces have been able to retake land seized in the initial Donbas invasion eight years prior.
Ukrainian troops were said to have liberated the lands last week, but news of the victory has been kept secret until now for tactical reasons.
“Ukrainian Airborne forces have made small advances east from the village of Krasnohorivka, near Donetsk city, which sits on the old Line of Control,” Britain’s MoD said on Tuesday in its daily intelligence update.
“This is one of the first instances since Russia’s February 2022 invasion that Ukrainian forces have highly likely recaptured an area of territory occupied by Russia since 2014.”
A spokesman for the Ukrainian military said the land was recaptured in a “well-prepared assault”.
“There were initiations of actions, and support from artillery and heavy equipment. They also cleared certain areas of mines,” Valerii Shershen, a spokesman for the Tavria Defence Force, said.
‘This has a symbolic meaning for us’
He described the advance by Ukrainian troops as “unexpected”, and said Russia had been fighting hard to drive Kyiv’s forces out of the newly captured positions with daily assaults and heavy shelling.
“This has a symbolic meaning for us, a moment of principle, and a certain improvement in the tactical situation,” the spokesman added.
In his overnight address on Monday, President Volodymyr Zelensky said it was a “happy day” for Ukraine but did not reveal specific details of Kyiv’s advances.
“Our warriors have advanced in all directions, and this is a happy day. I wished the guys more days like this,” he said.
In 2014, Russia illegally annexed the Crimean peninsula, while forces backed by Moscow seized control of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions neighbouring the Russian mainland.
Mr Zelensky has vowed to end the war with Russia by reclaiming those territories, restoring Ukraine’s borders as recognised at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-ne...y-from-russia/
Amid the bombast of Russia’s one-year celebration of its war in Ukraine, a 15-year-old with thick, black hair and a gray hooded jacket was handed a microphone. In front of thousands of cheering people, Anya Naumenko thanked “Uncle Yuri”—a Russian soldier known as Yuri Gagarin—for saving her, her sister, and “hundreds of thousands of children in Mariupol,” the Ukrainian city that fell under heavy attack from the first day of Russia’s cross-border invasion, in February 2022.
Having recited words she’d clearly been told to memorize, Anya sheepishly turned to the adults next to her and said, “I forgot a little.”
“Anya,” said a woman in a stop-sign-red coat, quickly covering for the slipup, “don’t be shy! Go hug Uncle Yuri!”
Anya gave the soldier a one-armed side hug as the woman said to a handful of younger children onstage: “Everyone give a hug. Look! It’s the man who saved you all!”
Aired on CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360, the video was followed by an interview with Nathaniel Raymond, the executive director of Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab.
How children from Ukraine are being used for Pro-Russian propaganda - YouTube
“It’s absolutely stomach-churning,” Raymond told the CNN host. “That, for me, Anderson, that’s a hostage video.”
Forcibly removed from Ukraine, used as leverage, “reeducated,” and “Russified,” the children at the center of Russia’s agitprop are the potential victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
They are, Raymond told me in a recent interview, “pawns in a hostile situation,” and Russia’s treatment of them, far from that of a kind savior, violates the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, among other instruments of international humanitarian law.
Russian authorities have gone so far as to make what appears to be an official, concerted effort to cover the tracks that may lead to the Ukrainian children’s eventual recovery. Processed into the Russian system, the children no longer go by their given names, practice the religions they were raised in, or communicate with their families. They are entered into an adoption system that takes pains to cover up their provenance, an effort that Ukrainian advocates say not only makes the children untraceable, but forms part of a larger project of cultural erasure.
“Hiding that they are Ukrainian in the system shows that the Russians have no intention to ever give them back,” says Onysia Syniuk, a legal analyst at ZMINA, a human-rights organization in Ukraine. “They will make them Russian whatever it takes, even if the children have to stay in orphanages.”
For months, forcibly transferred children, ages four months to 18 years, were listed in a public Russian adoption database without mention of their Ukrainian origin. That they were in the database at all was not widely known until May 31, when the Russian dissident outlet iStories exposed its use in an article alleging that the children were being made to sew camouflage nets for the Russian military, which some were even forced to join.
The iStories revelations prompted Russia to scrub the database of all information about the Ukrainian children. Fortunately, much of it had been scraped by at least one group of open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigators who asked not to be named in order to continue their sensitive work. Such groups are scouring publicly available databases, social media, precision satellite imagery showing the locations of camps, and other sources to track the disappearing Ukrainian children.
The Ukrainian government officially estimates that about 19,500 Ukrainian children have been taken to Russia since the start of the war. The exact number is unknowable, and keeping track of all of the children is nearly impossible—some of the parents have been killed or lost touch with their children as Russia shifts them from place to place.
At the beginning of the war, some parents in eastern Ukraine sent their children to what the Russians told them were summer camps. The parents believed that the camps would keep their children safe, or provide them with enough food to eat, Syniuk says. Reports have since alleged severe abuse at the camps. No matter the conditions, the camps now appear to have been a pretext for luring the children away from their parents and into Russia. As Raymond said: “They can be given caviar every day, riding horsies and having the best day ever, and it’s still a war crime.”
Dozens of these camps are scattered across Russia, according to a report by the Yale School of Public Health's Humanitarian Research Lab. The camp farthest from Ukraine is 3,900 miles from the border, in Russia’s Magadan Oblast. The facilities apparently specialize in political reeducation; some reports suggest that military training is also part of their program.
When Ukrainian parents are ready to bring their children home from camp, many are told that the children will remain in Russia, or that there is a “delay.” Some families have managed to recover their children, but only with great difficulty; others report that their children are not allowed to leave, have been transferred to different camps, or have become unreachable. Now, says Veronika Bilkova, an author of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe report about the forcible transfer of children published in May, “it seems that really the Russian Federation is getting ready, legally speaking, to be able to adopt these [camp] children as well.”
Not all of the Ukrainian children in Russia came by way of the camps. Others are evacuees, removed by Russian soldiers from areas of Ukraine that Russia’s shelling had made perilous. Anya belonged to this group. Still others were transferred through a process of filtration, in which they were separated from their parents at camps like Bezimenne, in Donetsk, where Russian forces detain and interrogate Ukrainian citizens in Russian-held territories. And then there are the children from Ukrainian orphanages raided by Russian troops, taken across the border to orphanages in Russia.
Many of these supposed orphans actually have parents: In both Ukraine and Russia, families who fall on hard times commonly send their children temporarily to orphanages, experts told me, expecting to later recover them. But once the children are in Russia, according to the OSCE report, “the Russian Federation does not take any steps to actively promote the return of Ukrainian children. Rather, it creates various obstacles for families seeking to get their children back.”
At the moment, the younger the child is, the bleaker the prospects of a return to Ukraine. The only children to have made it home so far, according to legal and human-rights advocates I spoke with, are those old enough to have called their parents or guardians—provided that they have any. Some of those who have made it home reported seeing younger children they knew in Russia—but with the carousel of stolen children still spinning, those sighted likely won’t stay in the same place for long.
Children separated from their parents during wartime have rights under international law, and the warring parties have responsibilities to protect them. Ukrainian children evacuated to Russia, under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, should be allowed to call home, but that’s not always permitted. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should, under law, have access to all prisoners of war, including children, but little access has been granted.
Moscow ostensibly allows Ukrainian parents to come collect their children from Russia, but the trip is one that few Ukrainians are in a position to afford or attempt. According to a spokesperson at SOS Children’s Villages International, a nonprofit child-advocacy organization, parents—usually mothers or grandmothers, because men who undertake the trip risk being detained at filtration camps—have to travel through third countries, such as Poland or Belarus, bringing with them extensive documentation proving that the child is theirs. They must secure passports and undergo interviews with the Russian security services. Fewer than 400 children have made it home, according to the Ukrainian government.
Ukrainian NGOs assisting families of missing children face immense obstacles too. “We have some families from the part of the Kherson region that is under occupation now, and we know that they are searching for their children, who were kidnapped, probably,” Anastasiia Pantielieieva, the head of documentation for the Kyiv-based Media Initiative for Human Rights, told me. “But the parents don’t want to speak to us, because they are afraid; there are a great number of Russians on the left bank of the Dnipro River. They refuse to give us any information, because they are afraid for their lives.” Meanwhile, many of the parents who willingly sent their children to Russian “summer camps” are reluctant to come forward in Ukraine, because they fear retribution from compatriots who may see them as traitors.
Ukraine recently announced the creation of a DNA database for the missing children, documenting their disappearance and the existence of their relatives in Ukraine. For the database to yield matches in Russia, however, a parallel effort will have to take place on the other side of the border, something the ICRC could theoretically assist Ukraine with in POW or displaced-persons camps, but which will prove far more difficult for children who have been laundered into the Russian adoption system.
In the topsy-turvy world that is today’s Russia, Ukraine is the party guilty of using Ukrainian children as instruments of war. Maria Lvova-Belova, Vladimir Putin’s commissioner for children’s rights, told Vice News that in the display with Anya, “there is no question of any propaganda.”
“We don’t use children for politics,” she said. “There [in Ukraine], unfortunately, it happens.”
Yet on June 14, Lvova-Belova appeared on Russian TV with her teenage “son,” Philip, who had escaped Mariupol during the invasion. He’d told Russian guards at a checkpoint that he had no parents. They sent him to Donetsk. He later ended up in Moscow, where Lvova-Belova “adopted” him (recently, perhaps for legal reasons, she has switched to saying that she is “fostering” him). The day after the TV show, Lvova-Belova wrote on a Russian social-media platform about Philip: “Our history with him is not simple, but it’s very sincere, it’s very true. We were talking about our difficulties, which we overcame, and our small victories. We said that love overcomes everything.”
During the TV appearance, the host said to Philip, as tragic music played: “I recently visited your city. I wanted to tell you honestly that the city I saw is sad and scary.” In the hall of mirrors that is Russian propaganda, Mariupol was destroyed by Ukrainians, despite its being their own city.
Philip told the host about hiding in a Mariupol basement with his guardian—an uncle—who drank more each day. He decided he couldn’t deal with his alcoholic uncle anymore, and so he fled. Looking relaxed in a white T-shirt that read get off, he told the interviewer about his present life with Lvova-Belova: “I think, more or less, now I’m part of the family.”
In March, the International Criminal Court issued its first arrest warrants in relation to the war. They were for Putin and Lvova-Belova, for the war crime of “unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.”
The Russian government seems to be trying to stay ahead of its potential legal problems by shifting its laws on citizenship and adoption. A May 2022 presidential decree allows Russians who currently claim guardianship of Ukrainian children to secure Russian citizenship for those children upon request. The effect could be to attenuate the future claims of Ukraine or Ukrainians on children absorbed into Russia and made into Russians without their consent.
Russia’s legal tricks have played out before the eyes of some Ukrainian parents. Elina Steinerte, an author of the OSCE report, told me about the case of a father who was separated from three of his children during filtration. “He later learned that the day he was detained, the children were put on a plane to Moscow,” Steinerte said. One of them managed to call their father and tell him that they were about to be put in an institution for adoption. Because their father was in detention, the Russians considered the children to be without parents—which made them “most certainly eligible, very much in inverted commas,” Steinerte said, “to be put in an institution, which can be thousands of kilometers away.”
Moscow is apparently working quickly and cleverly to make the deported Ukrainian children disappear into Russia. But lawyers, child advocates, parents, and OSINT groups around the world are laboring just as feverishly to track the children down before doing so becomes impossible.
“They have a gun to the head of these kids,” Raymond said of the Russians. “We’re the SWAT team outside the bank.”
https://www.theatlantic.com/internat...source=twitter
It could be in order to use a Harpoon. That would be an interesting development.Quote:
Originally Posted by Troy
Storm shadow?Quote:
Originally Posted by Troy
Attachment 104236Quote:
2nd ORDER EFFECTS: Russia’s sabotage of the Kakhovka dam has almost completely drained the Dnipro reservoir. As the exposed riparian terrain is baked by the sun, it will provide a multitude of crossing points for Ukrainian forces. This unintended consequence will make it difficult for RU to defend the occupied south bank.
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/stat...18906736353280Quote:
Colleges in the southern Russian republic of Ingushetia are issuing diplomas only if the students accept a mobilisation order at the same time. If they refuse, they face being imprisoned for up to two years. The Ingush news website Fortanga reports that students are being forced to go in person to receive their diplomas. They are immediately being handed a summons for mobilisation, in front of witnesses, and have to decide whether to accept it. Their decision is recorded.