Thread: Divided Thailand seeks elusive 'normalcy'

^
A "Biblog"

A Moses Tweet: [at]Moses - Rain's coming. Follow me on ArkNow.

SD - would Re-Tweet

Originally Posted by Butterfly

StrontiumDog, why are you even trying ? you are arguing with a brain dead American who think he is a news bot (or should that be the other way around) and can't put an original thought together without doing a copy/paste and then you have TS, a Red blogger who think he is "Che Guevara"

I mean you couldn't make that shit up,

all we need now is a former IRA activist to chime in, and the picture will be complete

True. But it is funny...you have to admit that.

I love how TS doesn't recall reality accurately. I guess he must be an older guy, senile dementia creeping in.

I respect mid for his work here, but why he has such an issue with me escapes me. But nearly every time he jumps in. Nearly every time.

I'm pretty sure I know why DrB stopped posting......

The only thing I might have confused is someone else in your building asking for help (regarding trapped and asking for help) - I'll check that and if wrong will admit it. As for DrB - why do you think he stopped posting?

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Got shot at twice. Wasn't hysterical about it. Quite matter of fact about it actually. So much so that I didn't leave and went out on my balcony a second time (to be shot at again).

Just curious to know why someone would return to his own balcony where someone had shot at him, for a second time.

Originally Posted by pompeybloke

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Got shot at twice. Wasn't hysterical about it. Quite matter of fact about it actually. So much so that I didn't leave and went out on my balcony a second time (to be shot at again).

Just curious to know why someone would return to his own balcony where someone had shot at him, for a second time.

Different day. I smoke outside. Curiosity.

In retrospect it wasn't the wisest thing I've done.

http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/o...ured-movements

The implications of coloured movements

• Published: 23/09/2010 at 12:00 AM
• Newspaper section: News

One of the interpretations of the recent political conflict, which resulted in the red and yellow social movements, has been that this is a battle among the elite, essentially between former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his enemies, and that ordinary people are being used as paid pawns in the struggle.


Yellow shirt supporters of the People’s Alliance for Democracy rally for their cause.

This analysis argues that while this argument may not be totally wrong, it could be very misleading. The yellow and the red movements have turned out to be competitive mobilisations of supporters and ideological warfare. As such, they are completely different from the social movements of the 1990s, when groups or organisations of people got together to stage protests or sit-ins in order to air their grievances and bargain with government to advance their interests, mostly in cooperation with various NGOs. The results of these negotiations were not always successful, but one of the positive outcomes of these early social movements was the opening up of the political space for ordinary people within the framework of the parliamentary system.

The changed character of the present social movements, as exemplified by the red and yellow movements, reflects a major political shift which happened between 1997 and 2005, when the aggrieved began to seek redress through the electoral process rather than protest. So, in this talk we will focus on understanding why electoral politics became more important, and what implications the yellow and red social movements have for Thai politics. In so doing we have to look at the career of Thaksin, who broke the mould of Thai politics by making a direct deal with the voters.

Elite Conflict, Mass Mobilisations, Ideological Warfare

The key to understanding the present crisis is the fact that, in Thailand's modern political history, there has been no decisive break or disjuncture involving mass mobilisation. There was no nationalist movement against colonial rule, no war defeat discrediting the elite. The revolution against absolute monarchy in 1932 enjoyed wide support but required no mass mobilisation. The communist insurgency of the 1960s and 1970s was located deep in the forests and hills and never swelled into a mass uprising. Peasant movements and labour agitation have been localised.

The modern Thai political system is best viewed as an oligarchy which has never been radically threatened from below. This oligarchy has constantly evolved, incorporating new groups and power centres, and building internal bonds through networks, patronage ties and deals. Under absolute monarchy, a bureaucratic elite developed in the early 20th century, and has since been entrenched. From the 1930s to the 1980s, a military elite became absolutely dominant. As the urban economy grew in the post-war era of development, new business groups were accommodated. As prosperity spread upcountry, and better communications tied the provincial areas more tightly to the capital, a provincial business elite was also incorporated. More recently, the senior judiciary and parts of civil society have also been included.

Although noble families and old money figure strongly in this oligarchy, this has never been a closed elite. Indeed its resilience has come partly from its openness and flexibility.

Until recently, the advent of parliament and electoral politics resulted in no major challenge. People invested heavily to ensure that money was critical to electoral success, excluding all those who did not have enough. In the 1990s, around 70% of MPs were drawn from the ranks of male business owners who make up less than 3% of the population. Parliament was a highly unrepresentative rich men's club, and one of the key institutions of oligarchic networking.

The financial crisis of 1997 created the conditions for a challenge to this oligarchic structure. Thailand had not experienced a shrinkage of the economy since GDP figures were first collected, and the savage downturn of almost 20% undermined the prestige and credibility of those in power. Against this background, a series of political reforms were pushed through, including a new constitution and decentralisation. And the economic distress intensified the upsurge of pressure from below.


A red shirt supporter of ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra attends a rally in the business district of Bangkok on May 1, 2010.

The full consequences of these developments, however, took time to emerge.

Thaksin Shinawatra positioned himself at the head of a challenge to the old system. But initially he challenged only the excessive power of the central bureaucracy and the old political guard of the Democrat Party, which he pictured as bureaucratic in style. Thaksin promised to rescue the economy from the crisis and take Thailand into the ranks of First World countries by shouldering aside the bureaucracy and running the country like a corporation.

At the start he was enthusiastically supported by the business community and most of the middle class. But a challenge to one part of the oligarchy gradually came to be seen as a threat to all of it. The bureaucrats resented and resisted Thaksin's efforts at reform. Because history showed that reformers in Thailand risked being ejected by a coup, Thaksin tried to exert control over the military, but his efforts were clumsy, and he ended up antagonising powerful factions within the military elite.

Business initially cheered Thaksin's efforts, but then turned sour when it became obvious that most of the benefits accrued to a small coterie of families clustered around Thaksin, and especially Thaksin's own family businesses.

This was shaping up as a classic inter-elite battle, of which there are many examples in Thailand's recent past. But the scene was totally changed by the new element in the political context _ the upsurge of a demand from below for better access to power, better treatment and more public goods.
Thaksin flirted with this new force from 2000 when his political organisers, recruited from among old student radicals, crafted an electoral platform that included a universal health scheme, agrarian debt relief and micro-finance. As the first signs of elite opposition to his project emerged, he implemented this programme rapidly, and was rewarded with an upsurge in popularity. He responded with more programmes, including a promise to end poverty, and generous agricultural subsidies.

Then in 2004-5, as opposition from the oligarchy and many of his early supporters swelled, he went much farther _ presenting himself as a classic populist who drew his authority directly from the popular vote, who was dedicated to working "for the people" and who was openly disdainful of the old guard including bureaucrats, bankers, academics, newspaper editors and judges.

Thaksin had shown no sign of such radicalism in his early career. He had been changed from below, by the upsurge of demand for a better deal. In 2005, he won a landslide victory at the polls, and promised his supporters he would rule for a quarter-century, rather in the model of Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew.

The old oligarchy now closed ranks against Thaksin. But something else happened which broadened this beyond a narrow elite struggle. Much of the Bangkok middle class, which had earlier been generally supportive of Thaksin's project, reacted fearfully against his lurch towards populism. Conscious of their minority status in the electorate, and of their privileged position, they felt especially vulnerable to Thaksin's new populist crusade. The yellow-shirt movement was launched in 2005 as an explicit campaign to defend the interests of the middle class.

To bind together the opponents to Thaksin and raise the emotional temperature, the yellow shirt leaders alleged that Thaksin was a threat to the monarchy. In fact, Thaksin had been careful not to attack the monarchy, or be seen as a threat. But the yellow shirts made up a story about Thaksin plotting the overthrow of the monarchy during an excursion to Finland. They dressed themselves in T-shirts announcing they were the monarchy's defenders.
In Thailand's old politics of oligarchy, the classic strategy at such times of conflict was a military coup. And indeed, that was what occurred on Sept 19, 2006. But the old politics no longer prevailed, so the coup did not really work. The army was out of practice at this manoeuvre, and the post-coup government was a disaster, quickly losing all popularity. Because Thailand with its globalised economy needed to be politically acceptable in the world, Parliament had to be restored quickly. Despite a massive attempt to rig the election using public funds and public servants, the pro-Thaksin forces won another victory, and could not be prevented from forming the government.

The attack on Thaksin and his populism now became a wider and deeper attack on electoral democracy. The post-coup government made a start with a new constitution which undid many of the gains of the 1990s reforms, diminished the power of Parliament and elevated the military and judiciary. The yellow shirts now became a military-godfathered mob that harassed ministers and besieged Parliament. The judiciary handed down a series of judgements that overthrew two governments, sacked several individual ministers, disbanded three political parties, and banned 220 MPs from politics for five years.

In parallel, the yellow shirts developed an ideological justification for this attack. They argued that most politicians were corrupt, and that elections were won with money, and hence the results held no legitimacy. They proposed moving away from one man-one vote by bringing back appointed MPs, basing representation on occupational groups, or transferring power away to the monarchy, bureaucracy and judiciary.

The movement using red as their symbol, which later became known as the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), first emerged as counter to the coup of 2006, and to the yellow shirts. Its core was among the supporters of Thaksin, largely in the far North, Northeast and the migrant population of the capital. The movement has since also gathered support from many in the intelligentsia and middle class who have no love for Thaksin but who believe democracy is under threat. An element of their supporters is drawn from a new generation of young "netizens" who learn by chatting on the internet, in particular the rachadamnoen chat room at the website panthip.com, groups like the student red shirts and the FARED (First Aid Red Shirts). They are not fighting for Thaksin, but want genuine democracy. Some of the supporters hold socialist or republican ideas, but probably these are the minority.

According to an analyst: "Perhaps they [the reds] are the first real 'mass' movement that Thailand has ever produced. The prolonged protests and demonstrations of the red shirts have exceeded all expectations and defied all the expressions of contempt against them by the Thai urban elite."
The red shirt movement is an attack on the power structure, and not an attack on business, or on the capitalist system. Although the support is largely class-based, it has no enemy class that it wants to tear down.

The movement is structured through media channels, with local groups clustered around community radio stations, and national communication achieved through a satellite TV channel. From late 2009, the leaders conducted political schools. Local groups regularly ran fund-raisers and campaign meetings.

From mid-2008, red and yellow groups have occasionally clashed. In a moment of terrible clarity, yellow shirts claiming to be defenders of the monarchy clashed with red shirts claiming to be defenders of democracy.

At the end of 2008, the pro-Thaksin government installed by the 2007 election was forced out of power by military pressure, judicial rulings and a parliamentary manoeuvre. Since then, the main demand of the red shirt movement has been for an election to reinstate the popular mandate. They also want to change the constitution, perhaps back to the 1997 version. In their rhetoric, they call themselves phrai, an old word for serf in Thailand's version of a feudal system; describe their enemies as amatya, an old word for a senior noble or official; and rail against "double standards". In this vocabulary, they clearly show the resentment against the inequities of wealth, power, and opportunity.

Since December 2008, the Democrat Party has headed a coalition government. The party has a royalist heritage and for the last two decades has positioned itself as the party of the urban middle class. The government relies heavily on military support. The prime minister has been living inside an army camp for much of this year. In April 2009 and again in May 2010, large military operations dispersed protests demanding a new election. The government is engaged in suppression of the media on a scale not seen since the military era, with pro-red papers closed, radio stations threatened, the red TV occasionally disrupted, thousands of websites blocked, and an unprecedented number of cases under the lese majeste law.

So, to sum up, there is an elite conflict in progress, but there is also a widening of the political nation which is challenging the political structure.

Thaksin and his coterie set out to displace the bureaucracy and the old political establishment, represented especially by the Democrat Party. At the beginning, this was an elite conflict, and it is still in progress. The Democrats now hold power, and are desperate to prevent Thaksin from returning.

But the conflict then flowed beyond the elite. Thaksin, despite everything in his background, became the instrument of a demand, bubbling up from below, for a fairer society. Thaksin was transformed by this force into a kind of politician common in most countries, but very new in Thailand _ a stump populist who claims the direct support of the people. He thus became a trigger for the mass of people to find meaning in the vote as a means to better themselves.

Thaksin's lurch to populism, combined with his extraordinary wealth, then made many in the middle class feel insecure. They looked to the old institutions, the military and the monarchy, to make up for their weakness in numbers. Many were mobilised to join the yellow shirt movement of sustained street protests. The conflict within the elite had thus broadened into two antagonistic mass mobilisations.

These two movements have then sparked a fierce ideological debate over how Thailand's democracy should develop. The red side wants to restore the electoral system to something like the 1997 constitution as a precondition for reducing the "double standards" which of course means the entrenched power of the old oligarchy.

In response, the yellow side argues that a democracy without checks and balances will be dangerous and unstable. They want a stronger framework of law, and a higher sense of morality, to restrain the patent corruption and rent-seeking by politicians.

The elite conflict and the social movement are joined through the person of Thaksin. This adds complication because he is a paradoxical figure _ a modernist and business advocate who became a populist; a man with contempt for democracy who became its defendant; a corrupt moneybags who profited from the "double standards" and then railed against them.
But history is strewn with such complications.

In Perspective

The turmoil in Bangkok earlier this year needs to be placed in some perspective. It was dramatic, but not so very different from events in many other cities. During the same months, there were riots in Greece, battles with the police in Turkey, an occupation of the capital by the dispossessed in Egypt, Maoist demonstrations in Nepal, and a riot in the capital of Kyrgyzstan that physically drove the president out of his house and job. Many of these outbreaks, like those in Thailand, were revolts of the dispossessed against an old political establishment.

The widening of the political nation, and challenge to old oligarchy, are processes which most countries experience, especially as they become more prosperous. Thailand's transition is especially turbulent because, for certain historical reasons, it has come rather late and faces fierce opposition, strengthened by old institutions.

Over the past year, a handful of reliable surveys have asked a representative sample of the Thai population about political matters. The overwhelming majority state that they have faith in electoral democracy, are happy with constitutional monarchy, have no problem with peaceful demonstrations, and would like the army and privy councillors to keep out of politics.

At the same time, the most recent of these surveys shows that both red and yellow have significant bases of support. The challenge lies in getting these movements off the streets and into representative institutions so that their clashing views on reform can be debated with words and ideas, not crude weaponry.

Inaugural speech at the "Review of Thai Social Movement" seminar held on Friday Sept 17, 2010 at Chulalongkorn University.

All a waste of time because they're divided and that's normalcy.

It's an excellent perpsective (retrospective). Was that Pasuk's speech? I don't see a name attached.

Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker I believe.

It is a good one...posted for your reading pleasure.

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

I respect mid for his work here, but why he has such an issue with me escapes me. But nearly every time he jumps in. Nearly every time.

i thought that was obvious?
mid wants to be the only news-bot cutting and pasting. You are infringing on his means of self-identity by also being a "news hound".

"I'm the only gayer in the village" etc

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Thaksin promised to rescue the economy from the crisis and take Thailand into the ranks of First World countries by shouldering aside the bureaucracy and running the country like a corporation.

At the start he was enthusiastically supported by the business community and most of the middle class. But a challenge to one part of the oligarchy gradually came to be seen as a threat to all of it. The bureaucrats resented and resisted Thaksin's efforts at reform. Because history showed that reformers in Thailand risked being ejected by a coup, Thaksin tried to exert control over the military, but his efforts were clumsy, and he ended up antagonising powerful factions within the military elite.

Business initially cheered Thaksin's efforts, but then turned sour when it became obvious that most of the benefits accrued to a small coterie of families clustered around Thaksin, and especially Thaksin's own family businesses.

This was shaping up as a classic inter-elite battle, of which there are many examples in Thailand's recent past. But the scene was totally changed by the new element in the political context _ the upsurge of a demand from below for better access to power, better treatment and more public goods.
Thaksin flirted with this new force from 2000 when his political organisers, recruited from among old student radicals, crafted an electoral platform that included a universal health scheme, agrarian debt relief and micro-finance. As the first signs of elite opposition to his project emerged, he implemented this programme rapidly, and was rewarded with an upsurge in popularity. He responded with more programmes, including a promise to end poverty, and generous agricultural subsidies.

Then in 2004-5, as opposition from the oligarchy and many of his early supporters swelled, he went much farther _ presenting himself as a classic populist who drew his authority directly from the popular vote, who was dedicated to working "for the people" and who was openly disdainful of the old guard including bureaucrats, bankers, academics, newspaper editors and judges.

Thaksin had shown no sign of such radicalism in his early career. He had been changed from below, by the upsurge of demand for a better deal. In 2005, he won a landslide victory at the polls, and promised his supporters he would rule for a quarter-century, rather in the model of Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew.

this is quite an accurate description of what happened, funny how the reds have short memories about the true situation,

thanks great article,

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

The widening of the political nation, and challenge to old oligarchy, are processes which most countries experience, especially as they become more prosperous. Thailand's transition is especially turbulent because, for certain historical reasons, it has come rather late and faces fierce opposition, strengthened by old institutions.

fuck, that's what I have been saying all along

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

But the scene was totally changed by the new element in the political context _ the upsurge of a demand from below for better access to power, better treatment and more public goods.
...

Perhaps the authors could explain that if the UDD is truly a “revolt of the dispossessed against an old political establishment” why is there no UDD movement in Burriam or Suphanburi or even in the poorer southern provinces or other areas where the factions are not supporting the TRT/PTP/PPP? Why are the local level leaders of the UDD also the Phuyai Bans and kamnan who also double as the canvassers for the local faction and how they fit into the rise of the UDD only in specfic areas? They might also explain where in the UDD agenda there is any economic platform or where it wants to breakdown the classic patron-client system that dominates rural life.

I agree this is a battle between elites, but the authors are engaging in wishful thinking to portray the UDD as some sort of real populist social movement. There is certainly that feeling among many of the regular members, but the leadership is just as cynical and corrupt as the people the purport to oppose.
TH

Originally Posted by Thaihome

I agree this is a battle between elites, but the authors are engaging in wishful thinking to portray the UDD as some sort of real populist social movement.

I did noted that bias too in the article. I think they meant that their numbers was caused for concern as a large crowd and not under any control.

They also forgot to mention that the large crowd was only possible because of money exchanged.

TH, I agree, I think the movement was hijacked a while back by Thaksin's cronies. However, I do see some really genuine, well intentioned people amongst the reds, but sadly they aren't the ones calling the shots....

Funny how everyone reads into it 'what they've been saying all along'.

But it is an excellent piece. Pasuk is great.

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

TH, I agree, I think the movement was hijacked a while back by Thaksin's cronies. However, I do see some really genuine, well intentioned people amongst the reds, but sadly they aren't the ones calling the shots....

I think the the hijacking is going on now trying to turn it into a real grassroots movement. They will have problems if they succeed (which I wish the best) with the funding though.
TH

Originally Posted by Tom Sawyer

Funny how everyone reads into it 'what they've been saying all along'.

But it is an excellent piece. Pasuk is great.

Some of us have been saying these things for a very long time TS. Nothing new here for me.

Originally Posted by Butterfly

this is quite an accurate description of what happened, funny how the reds have short memories about the true situation, thanks great article,

This is what everyone has been saying all along, Papillion.

The difference of opinion comes from people who accept army coups and what they bring against people who do not. Also, an acknowledgement by some that the majority should have a say, and other posters such as yourself who do not agree with this ideology.

Originally Posted by Tom Sawyer

Originally Posted by StrontiumDog

Originally Posted by Tom Sawyer

Funny how everyone reads into it 'what they've been saying all along'.

But it is an excellent piece. Pasuk is great.

Some of us have been saying these things for a very long time TS. Nothing new here for me.

I've been saying a lot of what's here too SD. That's the point - it covers a lot of ground quite comprehensively - covering both viewpoints. "Nothing new here for me" - what a prat

Why did you feel the need to resort to an insult? Had I written something that deserved such a response?

Oh dear - please don't tell JJ

Who is JJ?

Sansern: 91 deaths are being exploited and distorted
Thu, 30/09/2010

A Sub-Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has met with senior security officers to gather information on the April-May crackdowns on the red shirts. More meetings will be held next month. The CRES spokesperson insists that the security forces adhered to the law and international practice during the crackdowns, and says that the 91 deaths are being exploited and distorted.

According to Khaosod newspaper, on 27 Sept, Somchai Homla-or, Chair of a Sub-Committee of the government-appointed Truth and Reconciliation Commission led by former Attorney-General Kanit Na Nakhon, and other members including Lt Gen Pheerapong Manakij, met with the army’s Deputy Chief of Staff Lt Gen Dapong Rattanasuwan, Deputy National Police Chief Pol Lt Gen Worapong Chewpreecha, Deputy Commander of Metropolitan Police Pol Maj Gen Amnuay Nimmano and Deputy Director-General of the Department of Special Investigation Pol Col Narat Savetanant at the army headquarters to gather information on the crackdowns.

Lt Gen Dapong Rattanasuwan was assigned to meet with the Sub-Committee on behalf of Army Chief Gen Anupong Paojinda who had been scheduled to visit and bid farewell to Army Region 4 in the southern border area before his retirement, together with the incoming Army Chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha.

After the meeting, Somchai, also Chair of the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the Law Society of Thailand, said that the result of the meeting was satisfactory, but the time was too short. The Centre for the Resolution of Emergency Situation explained how the security officers worked, and shared information it received during the red shirts’ protests. The information had already been available in the media, but it was organized for clarity. More meetings will be held in mid October. Next time, the Sub-Committee will ask for more time, because the CRES has yet to answer questions, and there is huge mass of complicated information. So no conclusion can be reached as of now. More meetings are needed, and information from other security agencies is also necessary.

According to Somchai, Lt Gen Dapong gave explanations on the mobilization of troops during the crackdowns and the violent incidents at Khok Wua and Ratchaprasong intersections. The Sub-Committee had sent its staff to interview other security officers involved in the incidents.

He said that this was important, and we could not listen to only one side. The Sub-Committee has invited leaders of the red shirts to provide information on 30 Sept at the Chalermprakiat Government Complex on Chaeng Wattana Rd. And it will submit a progress report to the Prime Minister in January. There should be no problem with gathering information, he said.

Sub-Committee member Lt Gen Pheerapong said that this was the Sub-Committee’s first hearing of the CRES. Lt Gen Dapong gave the overall picture, and the atmosphere was good. He focused on hearing the CRES’ thinking, assessment and analysis of the situation, leading to its resolution. The CRES explained its practice from normal situations to the crackdowns, readily answering any questions and doubts without concealment. So the Sub-Committee was aware that the CRES had worked in accordance with the law, and with the intent to solve the situation.

One Sub-Committee member said that the CRES had a great deal of information, and the Sub-Committee was contacting other agencies for additional information, including the DSI and the police. They have scheduled meetings on 14-15 Oct. The meeting with the CRES today took 2 and a half hours. Next time the Sub-Committee will ask the CRES more questions, based on information provided today. It will seek information from other parties, including the red shirts and the media as well.

CRES spokesperson Col Sansern Kaewkamnerd said that the CRES had explained to the Sub-Committee all that had happened, including details it had checked with the security forces about the operations.

However, some people have tried to convince the public that 91 people had been killed during the security forces’ operations, particularly on 19 May which was claimed to take most of the 91 lives. That was not true. During the operation on 19 May, not many people were killed. The distorted claim that 91 people were killed is not true. Those who died were killed on different places and times. Currently, there is an attempt to gloss it over to attract attention, he said.

The colonel went on to dismiss the claim that the military deployed sniper units on high buildings to shoot the red shirts. The CRES has explained the details of each case. Almost all the deaths occurred in areas ‘under the influence’ of the protesters. He insisted that the CRES had adhered to the law, international practice, and court orders, and tried to avoid violence, taking into account the fact that the protesters were all Thais, only with differing political views. No soldiers would think of harming the people.

Source:

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prachatai.com