XENOPHOBIA, RACISMAND ANTISEMITISM PARAMETERSIN PRESENT-DAY RUSSIA
Analyzing the dynamics in public opinions (Tables 8-11), it may be said that the share of publicethnically conditioned ressentiment, the share of respondents feeling envious or prejudiced hasconsiderably decreased over 15-18 years, and on the contrary, the bulk of the people not inclinedto maintain xenophobic attitudes and positions (deny the habitual discriminatory stereotypes) hassomewhat increased. The opinions that “non-Russians” have a “better” life are clearly fading (from 38down to 25%, with the opinion that “non-Russians have a worse life than Russians” remaining verymuch at the same level of 17 -15%). The share of opinions that national “minorities” have “too muchpower” is shrinking (from 47 down to 34%).
The belief is maintained that social differences (as a basisfor mass envy and projection of own complexes and frustrations onto others) are not determined byaffiliation with a certain ethnic group. These shifts may be viewed as an erosion of social foundationsunderlying xenophobia. Besides, let us add that the categoric nature of all xenophobic opinions hasslightly worn off.However, over 20% of the surveyed are still ready to accuse the “foreigners” of being the reason ofRussia’s unsatisfactory situation, of Russia’s “current troubles”, shifting the responsibility from theirown social and political passive stance and the awareness of their own helplessness onto imaginaryenemies or strangers, traitors, etc.
This component of public consciousness is extremely important forunderstanding authoritarian tendencies in the Russian society and the grounds for potential aggressiveantisemitism and xenophobia.5.1 ANTISEMITIC COMPONENT OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISMCompared to the treatment of other ethnic groups, public opinion of the Jews in Russia remains fairlyfavourable, with no aggression or dislike.
This may be seen from the expressed minimum willingnessto set a social distance and resort to other restrictive measures and actions (Table 1, Fig.2). But the samemay be also said about the ideological component of antisemitism, being a basic element of Russianconspiratorial nationalism (if we take anti-Jewish views), and specifically, of the idea of the existence of aglobal Jewish conspiracy.
In recent 25 years (after coming out in the open during the perestroika and theweakening of censorship of the darkest blackhundredist prejudices of the Russian nationalism), abouta third of the population has been aware of this myth, with only the last measurement conducted thisyear showing a visible decrease in the awareness of this ideologeme. So far, it is hard to tell what exactlywe are dealing with in this case: random measurement fluctuation or an appearing tendency of thisidea being gradually wiped out from the public mind as it is disappearing from the information field.
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If we have a look at how the population understands the “Russia for Russians” motto, we can seethat each second person views it primarily as the state support of the Russian culture and traditions.Restrictive measures regarding the “non-Russian” ethnic groups are supported by a smaller number ofthe surveyed. At the same time, understanding of this motto is differentiated dependent on the ethnicaffiliation of the respondents. The sample of this research does not allow differentiating during theanalysis between the answers given by the people with a more or less fractional ethnic self-identification.Therefore, in this case, we divide the surveyed into “Russian” respondents and respondents belongingto other ethnic groups.