Smashed By Ukrainian Mines And Artillery, Russia’s Winter Offensive Just Ground To A
Smashed By Ukrainian Mines And Artillery, Russia’s Winter Offensive Just Ground To A Halt Outside Vuhledar
Russia’s widely-anticipated winter offensive has begun. Aiming to extend its control over eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, Russian troops are attacking north and south of Donetsk city.
In the northern sector, around the city of Bakhmut, the Russians slowly are advancing—albeit at staggering cost.
In the south, around Vuhledar, the Russians’ losses are just as steep—but they’ve made no clear gains that could justify the casualties. Vuhledar is turning into a meatgrinder for the Russian army, with enormous implications for the wider offensive.
The latest Russian attack on Vuhledar—a town with a pre-war population of just 14,000 that lies a mile north of Russian-held Pavlivka, 25 miles southwest of Donetsk—kicked off on Monday.
Seemingly a couple of battalions of Russian mechanized troops, together riding in a few dozen T-80 tanks and BMP-1 and BMP-2 fighting vehicles, advanced north.
The Ukrainian army’s elite 72nd Mechanized Brigade is entrenched around Vuhledar. It has laid minefields along the main approaches from Pavlivka. Its drones surveil the front. Its artillery is dialed in.
The Russians know this. And the assault force took rudimentary precautions. Tank crews injected fuel into their exhausts to produce smokescreens. At least one T-80 carried a mine-plow.
But leadership and intelligence failures—and Ukraine’s superior artillery fire-control—neutralized these measures. The Russian formation rolled into dense minefields. Destroyed tanks and BMPs blocked the advance. Vehicles attempting to skirt the ruined hulks themselves ran into mines.
Panicky vehicle commanders crowded so tightly behind the smoke-generating tanks that Ukrainian artillery, cued by drones, could score hits by firing at the head of the smoke. The Russians’ daylong attack ended in heavy losses and retreat. The survivors left behind around 30 wrecked tanks and BMPs.
Vuhledar is further evidence of the downward spiral in Russian military effectiveness. Armies that lack robust recruitment, training and industrial bases tend to become steadily less effective as losses deepen.
Desperate to maintain the pace of operations, the army replaces any well-trained, well-equipped troops who’ve been hurt or killed with an equal number of new recruits—but without taking the time, or expending the resources, to train and equip those new troops to the previous standard.
So the army gets less and less competent even as it inducts more and more new personnel. Incompetence leads to even greater losses, which prompts the army to double down: draft more green troops, train them even less and hurry them to the front even faster than it did the previous recruits.
Apply this tragic model to Vuhledar and the Russian army’s failures make more sense. For months, the Russian marine corps’s 155th and 40th Naval Infantry Brigades were responsible for the sector around Pavlivka. But the marines suffered devastating losses in repeated failed assaults starting last fall.
It’s possible both marine brigades now are combat-ineffective. Their replacement appears to be the 72nd Motor Rifle Brigade, a new and inexperienced formation that belongs to the ill-fated 3rd Army Corps. The 72nd MRB formed in Russian Tatarstan and, as such, includes a high proportion of ethnic minorities. Cannon fodder to the Kremlin.
Outside Vuhledar, the Russian 72nd Brigade met the Ukrainian 72nd Brigade—and got beaten at least as badly as the marine brigades did. If this is the best Russia can do after a year of wider fighting in Ukraine, its ballyhooed winter offensive could be costly ... and brief.
Outside Vuhledar, the Russian 72nd Brigade met the Ukrainian 72nd Brigade—and got beaten at least as badly as the marine brigades did. If this is the best Russia can do after a year of wider fighting in Ukraine, its ballyhooed winter offensive could be costly ... and brief.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=fe525c5558cd
Russia may have lost an entire elite brigade near a Donetsk coal-mining town
As Russia probes Ukraine’s defensive lines ahead of an expected offensive, it might have lost the entire elite 155th naval infantry brigade while storming Vuhledar, a coal-mining town in the Donetsk region. “A large number of enemy forces, including the command staff, were destroyed near Vuhledar and Mariinka in Donetsk Oblast,” Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, head of the united press center of the Tavriskiy District of Ukrainian defense forces, told POLITICO. “In addition, over the past week, the enemy lost about 130 units of equipment, including 36 units of tanks.”
Russian forces also were losing 150-300 marines a day near Vuhledar, Dmytrashkivskyi said.
Russian tactical failures around Vuhledar have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Moscow’s forces are able to launch a decisive offensive operation, the Institute for the Study of War reported in its latest update. Pro-Kremlin military bloggers have been mourning huge losses and criticizing the Russian command for sending the elite troops in frontal attacks.
The Ukrainian marines also published a video of Russian troops panicking and piling up on a battlefield near Vuhledar. “Go make a cemetery! Gosh, the first column went there and blew up, and then the second one went exactly the same route,” Ukrainian artillerymen can be heard saying while watching Russians approaching Vuhledar.
“The 155th brigade already had to be restaffed three times. The first time after Irpin and Bucha; the second time they were defeated near Donetsk — they recovered again. And now almost the entire brigade has already been destroyed near Vuhledar,” Dmytrashkivskyi said.
Russian military and nationalist community met the defeat near Vuhledar painfully. The Institute for the Study of War reported that recent footage of failed Russian assaults near Vuhledar has pushed some Russian military bloggers to call for public trials against the high-ranking officers as they continue to repeat the same mistakes.
The defeat happened only a few days after Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported about a “successful offensive near Vuhledar.” The Ukrainian Defense Ministry trolled the Russians by posting a video of a Russian military column being destroyed in the area.
Russian former paramilitary commander Igor Girkin, sentenced to life in prison in absentia for the downing of MH17 passenger flight in 2014, has called Russian generals “complete morons, who don’t learn from their own mistakes.”
In his Telegram military blog, Girkin, who uses the pseudonym Igor Strelkov, echoed the ongoing criticism of the Russian military community toward the commanders. He confirmed that Russian forces near Vuhledar had to advance in motorized and tank columns along narrow roads and ended up piling up.
“Ukrainian artillery shoots exceptionally accurately. More than 30 units of armored vehicles were lost. Dozens of tankmen were killed. Even more marines, special forces, and motorized riflemen died,” Girkin said. “All these losses turned out to be ‘one-sided’ — the Ukrainians shot the attackers like in a shooting gallery.”
Girkin pessimistically described the defeat near Vuhledar as the end of the offensive of the Russian army on the entire Donetsk front.
Ukrainians are not rushing to celebrate victory, though, as Russian forces continue to storm Ukrainian positions near Vuhledar, Avdiivka and Bakhmut, where Ukrainians are preparing for street fighting.
“I wish weapons from our partners would come more quickly, as that would give us the opportunity not only to protect ourselves and hold the attacks but also finally push them out of our territory,” Dmytrashkivskyi said.
Russia may have lost an entire elite brigade near a Donetsk coal-mining town – POLITICO
‘Our Losses Were Gigantic’: Life in a Sacrificial Russian Assault Wave
LVIV, Ukraine — Creeping forward along a tree line late at night toward an entrenched Ukrainian position, the Russian soldier watched in horror as his comrades were mowed down by enemy fire.
His squad of 10 ex-convicts advanced only a few dozen yards before being decimated. “We were hit by machine-gun fire,” said the soldier, a private named Sergei.
One soldier was wounded and screamed, “Help me! Help me, please!” the private said, though no help arrived. Eight soldiers were killed, one escaped back to Russian lines and Sergei was captured by Ukrainians.
The soldiers were sitting ducks, sent forth by Russian commanders to act essentially as human cannon fodder in an assault.
And they have become an integral component of Russia’s military strategy as it presses a new offensive in Ukraine’s east: relying on overwhelming manpower, much of it comprising inexperienced, poorly trained conscripts, regardless of the high rate of casualties.
There are two main uses of the conscripts in these assaults: as “storm troops” who move in waves, followed by more experienced Russian fighters; and as intentional targets, to draw fire and thus identify Ukrainian positions to hit with artillery.
In interviews last week, half a dozen prisoners of war provided rare firsthand accounts of what it is like to be part of a sacrificial Russian assault.
“These orders were common, so our losses were gigantic,” Sergei said. “The next group would follow after a pause of 15 or 20 minutes, then another, then another.”
Of his combat experience, he said, “It was the first and last wave for me.”
By luck, the bullets missed him, he said. He lay in the dark until he was captured by Ukrainians who slipped into the buffer area between the two trench lines.
The New York Times interviewed the Russians at a detention center near Lviv in Ukraine’s west, where many captured enemy soldiers are sent. From there, some are returned to Russia in prisoner exchanges. The Times also viewed videos of interrogations by the Ukrainian authorities. The prisoners are identified only by first name and rank for security reasons, because of the possibility of retribution once they are returned.
Though they are prisoners of war overseen by Ukrainians, the Russians said they spoke freely. Their accounts could not be independently corroborated but conformed with assessments of the fighting around the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut by Western governments and military analysts.
The soldiers in Sergei’s squad were recruited from penal colonies by the private military company known as Wagner, whose forces have mostly been deployed in the Bakhmut area. There, they have enabled Russian lines to move forward slowly, cutting key resupply roads for the Ukrainian Army.
Russia’s deployment of former convicts is a dark chapter in a vicious war. Russia Behind Bars, a prison rights group, has estimated that as many as 50,000 Russian prisoners have been recruited since last summer, with most sent to the battle for Bakhmut.
In the early phases of the war, the Russian Army had copious armored vehicles, artillery and other heavy weaponry but relatively few soldiers on the battlefield. Now, the tables have turned: Russia has deployed about 320,000 soldiers in Ukraine, according to Ukraine’s military intelligence agency. An additional 150,000 are in training camps, officials said, meaning there is the potential for half a million soldiers to join the offensive.
But using infantry to storm trenches, redolent of World War I, brings high casualties. So far, the tactic has been used primarily by Wagner in the push for Bakhmut. Last week, the head of Wagner, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, said he would end the practice of recruiting convicts. But Russia’s regular army this month began recruiting convicts in exchange for pardons, shifting the practice on the Russian side in the war from the Wagner private army to the military.
Some military analysts and Western governments have questioned Russia’s strategy, citing rates of wounded and killed at around 70 percent in battalions featuring former convicts. On Sunday, the British defense intelligence agency said that over the past two weeks, Russia had probably suffered its highest rate of casualties since the first week of the invasion.
Interviews with former Wagner soldiers at the Ukrainian detention center aligned with these descriptions of the fighting — and shed light on a violent, harrowing experience for Russian soldiers.
“Nobody could ever believe such a thing could exist,” Sergei said of Wagner tactics.
Sergei, sat, shoulders slumped, on the sofa in the warden’s office of the Ukrainian detention center. He was balding and wore shoes without laces.
The soldiers arrived at the front straight from Russia’s penal colony system, which is rife with abuse and where obedience to harsh codes of conduct in a violent setting is enforced by prison gangs and guards alike. The same sense of beaten subjugation persists at the front, Sergei said, enabling commanders to send soldiers forward on hopeless, human wave attacks.
“We are prisoners, even if former prisoners,” he said. “We are nobody and have no rights.”
Sergei said he had worked as a cellphone tower technician in a far-northern Siberian city, living with his wife and three children. In the interview, he admitted to dealing marijuana and meth, for which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2020.
In October, he accepted an offer to fight in exchange for a pardon. The arrangement, he said, was not offered to rapists and drug addicts, but murderers, burglars and other prisoners were welcome.
“Of course, any normal person fears death,” he said. “But a pardon for eight years is valuable.”
The fighting would turn out to be far more dangerous than he had imagined.
In three days at the front south of Bakhmut, Private Sergei first served as a stretcher bearer, carrying out mangled, bloody former prisoners who had been killed or wounded in an omen of what awaited him when ordered to join an assault.
On the night of Jan. 1, they were commanded to advance 500 yards along the tree line, then dig in and wait for a subsequent wave to arrive. One soldier carried a light machine gun. The others were armed with only assault rifles and hand grenades.
The sequential assaults on Ukrainian lines by small units of former Russian prisoners have become a signature Russian tactic in the effort to capture Bakhmut.
“We see them crawl for a kilometer or more,” toward Ukrainian trenches, then open fire at close range and try to capture positions, Col. Roman Kostenko, the chairman of the defense and intelligence committee in Ukraine’s Parliament, said in an interview. “It’s effective. Yes, they have heavy losses. But with these heavy losses, they sometimes advance.”
It could be, Colonel Kostenko said, that such infantry assaults on entrenched defenses will remain mostly confined to the fight for Bakhmut and that they are being used to conserve tanks and armored personnel carriers for the expected offensive. But they could also serve as a template for wider fighting.
The former convicts, Colonel Kostenko said, are herded into the battlefield by harsh discipline: “They have orders, and they cannot disobey orders, especially in Wagner.”
A private named Aleksandr, 44, who shaved three years off a sentence for illegal logging by enlisting with Wagner, said that before deploying to the front he was told he would be shot if he disobeyed orders to advance.
“They brought us to a basement, divided us into five-person groups and, though we hadn’t been trained, told us to run ahead, as far as we could go,” he said of his commanders.
His dash toward Ukrainian lines in a group of five soldiers ended with three dead and two captured.
Another captured Russian, Eduard, 22, enlisted to get four years cut from a sentence for car theft. He spent three months at the front as a stretcher bearer before being ordered forward. He was captured on his first human wave assault. From his time as a stretcher bearer, he said, he estimated that half of the men in each assault were wounded or killed, with shrapnel and bullet wounds the most common injuries.
Private Sergei said he had initially been pleased with the offer of a pardon in exchange for service in Wagner. “When I came to this war, I thought it was worth it,” he said.
But after his one experience in an assault, he changed his mind. “I started to think things over in a big way,’’ he said. “Of course it wasn’t worth it.”
nytimes.com
Stoltenberg Says Ukraine Using Way More Munitions Than NATO Can Produce
The NATO chief says the war is depleting the alliance's stockpiles
by Dave DeCamp Posted onFebruary 13, 2023CategoriesNewsTagsNATO, Ukraine
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Monday that Ukrainian forces are using significantly more ammunition than the alliance’s members can produce, putting a strain on Western stockpiles.
“The war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions, and depleting allied stockpiles,” Stoltenberg told reporters ahead of a NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels.
“The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production, and this puts our defense industries under strain,” he added.
Stoltenberg said that NATO needs to “ramp up production” and that the defense ministers meeting will focus on “ways to increase our defense industrial capacity and replenish stockpiles.”
The US has sent an enormous number of artillery shells to Ukraine since the Russian invasion. The US has provided Ukraine with over one million 155mm shells and is working to increase its production of ammunition by 500% over the next two years to meet Ukraine’s demand and also maintain Pentagon stockpiles.
But even with the US and NATO’s plans to increase production, it’s not clear if the policy of flooding Ukraine with weapons is sustainable. To offset the strain on NATO stockpiles and to make more money from the war, British and other Western arms makers want to start manufacturing weapons inside Ukraine. But a production line could take years to establish, and the factories could be targeted by Russia.
Stoltenberg said NATO is in a “race of logistics” to deliver equipment to Ukraine as Russia is making more gains in the Donbas. “Key capabilities like ammunition, fuel, and spare parts must reach Ukraine before Russia can seize the initiative on the battlefield,” he said.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov will join the NATO defense ministers in Brussels on Tuesday, where he will likely push for fighter jets. Stoltenberg said providing Ukraine with aircraft would be discussed at the meeting but that he preferred to focus on weapons Ukraine could use immediately as training on fighter jets would take time.
While there have been no pledges of Western jets to Ukraine, the UK said it will start training Ukrainians on how to fly NATO aircraft this spring. The discussion of jets comes after a series of escalations in Western military support for Ukraine, including the provision of heavy tanks and armored fighting vehicles.
Each new weapon brings NATO and Russia closer to a direct clash, something Stoltenberg has previously warned could happen. In December, Stoltenberg warned that a full-blown war with Russia was a “real possibility.”
https://news.antiwar.com/2023/02/13/...o-can-produce/
Pentagon Will Increase Artillery Production Sixfold for Ukraine
Quote:
Originally Posted by
sabang
Quite some more.
As usual, you are pushing nonsense. The Arsenal of Democracy will provide.
WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is racing to boost its production of artillery shells by 500 percent within two years, pushing conventional ammunition production to levels not seen since the Korean War as it invests billions of dollars to make up for shortfalls caused by the war in Ukraine and to build up stockpiles for future conflicts.
The effort, which will involve expanding factories and bringing in new producers, is part of “the most aggressive modernization effort in nearly 40 years” for the U.S. defense industrial base, according to an Army report.
The new investment in artillery production is in part a concession to reality: While the Pentagon has focused on fighting wars with small numbers of more expensive precision-guided weapons, Ukraine is largely relying on howitzers firing unguided shells.
Before Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, the U.S. Army’s production of 14,400 unguided shells a month had been sufficient for the American military’s way of war. But the need to supply Kyiv’s armed forces prompted Pentagon leaders to triple production goals in September, and then double them again in January so that they could eventually make 90,000 or more shells a month.
Unguided artillery shells have become the cornerstone of the 11-month-old conflict, with both Ukrainian and Russian troops firing thousands of howitzer rounds at each other every day, along a front line more than 600 miles long. These weapons are most likely responsible for the greatest percentage of war casualties, which U.S. officials have estimated at more than 100,000 on each side.
The Army’s decision to expand its artillery production is the clearest sign yet that the United States plans to back Ukraine no matter how long the war continues.
The ammunition the United States has sent to Ukraine includes not just the 155-millimeter shells for howitzers, but also guided rockets for HIMARS launchers, thousands of antiaircraft and anti-tank missiles and more than 100 million rounds for small arms.
The howitzer shells currently in production — essentially large steel bullets filled with explosives — cannot be made as quickly as many consumer goods. Although the way they are built is slowly changing with increasing automation and newer technologies, the heart of the process — cutting, heating, forging and bending steel into shape — remains largely unchanged.
The Defense Department will fund new facilities to make artillery ammunition and is spending roughly $1 billion a year over the next 15 years to modernize government-owned ordnance production facilities in an effort to increase automation, improve worker safety and ultimately make munitions more quickly. Just since August, Congress has allocated $1.9 billion to the Army for the effort.
“We are really working closely with industry to both increase their capacity and also the speed at which they’re able to produce,” Christine Wormuth, the secretary of the Army, said last month, adding that this includes identifying “particular components that are sort of choke points” and “sourcing those to try to be able to move things more quickly.”
Douglas R. Bush, an assistant secretary of the Army who is the service’s top acquisition official, said the United States is one of just a handful of countries that maintains significant reserves of such weapons in times of war and peace alike.
“In previous conflicts, we had stockpiles that were sufficient for the conflict,” Mr. Bush said in an interview. “In this case, we’re seeking to increase production to both maintain our stockpile for some other contingency but also supply an ally.”
“So it’s a bit of a new situation,” he added.
The unguided shells currently in production are just under three feet long, weigh roughly 100 pounds and are filled with 24 pounds of explosives — enough to kill people within 150 feet of impact and injure exposed soldiers more than 400 feet away.
So far the United States has sent more than one million of the explosive projectiles to Ukraine, while other NATO countries and major non-NATO allies of the United States have also contributed shells, largely without disclosing how many.
The Pentagon has declined to comment on the size of its reserves of 155-millimeter shells, but Mr. Bush said the planned increases in production would support Ukraine’s needs in real time and replenish the amount drawn down from existing stocks.
“We’re going to start seeing this summer our first significant step up in terms of rounds per month,” he said of the shell production goals. “The ramp really hits its stride in fiscal year 2024.”
While the new investment in the nation’s ammunition plants will offer a significant boost in production, it is still just a fraction of the manufacturing capacity that the military mustered in the 1940s.
By the end of World War II, the United States had about 85 ammunition plants, according to a congressional report from late last year. Today, the Pentagon relies on six government-owned, contractor-operated Army ammunition plants to do most of this work.
The military’s ammunition infrastructure “is comprised of installations with an average age of more than 80 years,” and much of it still operates in “World War II-era buildings, and in some cases, with equipment from the same period,” according to the Army’s report on modernizing those facilities, which was drafted in 2021.
Representative Rob Wittman, Republican of Virginia and a member of the House Armed Services Committee, said the invasion of Ukraine was a “Sputnik” moment — referring to the 1957 Soviet launch of the first satellite into space — that made clear the need for this rapid expansion in ammunition manufacturing capacity in the United States.
“The Russian invasion of Ukraine has really exposed how brittle and fragile our supply chain is, particularly as it relates to munitions, which is now clearly kind of an emergency in terms of trying to replenish,” Mr. Wittman said this month, during remarks before a group of top Pentagon officials.
The production of artillery ammunition in the United States is a complicated process that primarily takes place in four government-owned facilities run by private defense contractors. The empty steel bodies are forged in factories in Pennsylvania run by General Dynamics, the explosives for those shells are mixed together by BAE Systems workers in Tennessee and then poured into the shells at a plant run by American Ordnance in rural Iowa, while the propellant charges to shoot them out of howitzer barrels are made by BAE in southwest Virginia.
The fuzes screwed into the nose of these shells, which are required to make the projectiles explode, are produced by contractors in other locations.
In November, the Army announced a $391 million contract with the Ontario-based company IMT Defense to make shell bodies and issued an order to General Dynamics to build a new production line for 155-millimeter shells at a factory in Garland, Texas.
A fourth domestic producer of 155-millimeter shell bodies will probably be announced soon, Mr. Bush said.
All of this increased production is likely to be used as quickly as it can be shipped to Ukraine’s border by U.S. Transportation Command.
The Ukrainians have been firing so many artillery barrages that about a third of the 155-millimeter howitzers provided by the United States and other Western nations are out of commission for repairs.
The Pentagon has also bought ammunition for the Soviet-era weapons that Ukraine had before the invasion and that still make up a large part of its arsenal: 100,000 rounds of ammunition for Russian-made tanks, 65,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and 50,000 Grad artillery rockets.
Those munitions are still being produced in limited numbers in some of the former satellite nations of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe.
“We’re not talking numbers that would dramatically move the dial,” Mr. Bush said. “Those kinds of options have been and are being evaluated.”
“The priority has been on providing NATO’s standard ammunition,” he said. “A lot of it, though, depends on what Ukraine wants.”
As the war dragged on, Russian forces found that they could not sustain the high levels of artillery fire they used to overmatch Ukrainian gun crews over the summer. By September, according to U.S. intelligence services, Russia was seeking to purchase artillery shells from North Korea, which still uses Soviet-caliber weapons. The next month, Ukrainian troops near the city of Kherson said Russia’s rate of fire had fallen to roughly the same as theirs.
In December, a U.S. defense intelligence analyst who was not authorized to speak publicly said reports from Russia indicated that the government in Moscow had ordered employees at munition plants to work additional hours in an effort to produce more ordnance for Russian forces to use in Ukraine, including artillery ammunition.
The experience in Ukraine has broadly reminded the Pentagon and military contractors that the United States needs to focus more on both basic artillery and missiles — not just the expensive equipment needed to fire these weapons.
Most militaries are focused on buying just enough weapons for short-term conflicts, Gregory Hayes, the chief executive of Raytheon Technologies, said last month at a conference in California with Pentagon leaders, referring to the stealthy F-35 fighters that his company helps build and that have been sold to the United States and many of its allies. “I think, if anything, what the Ukraine situation has taught us is that we need depth in our supply chain, depth in our war reserves, much more than we had ever expected.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/24/u...mmunition.html