Thread: Venezuela Crisis

Originally Posted by foobar

Its somehow ironic HawHaw mentions Orwell

As used in 1984, the concept of doublethink is the ability to hold two completely contradictory thoughts simultaneously while believing both of them to be true






Yes, that right folks, HawHaw pours scorn on socialism in Venezuela but happy to defend Sharia law...all on the same forum page without blinking

You've been reading your Tommy Robinson pamphlets again, haven't you, stupid little boy.

Originally Posted by qwerty

They tried to institute socialist measures at the same time their income dropped by about 50%. So, is it a failure of socialism or a failure of their government income.

Remember, Norway is basically a socialist country and a lot of their socialist policies were started when they were flush with North Sea Oil.

Have you ever heard of the concept of a "Sovereign Wealth Fund"?

Here are the top 5:

1. Norway
2. Abu Dhabi
3. China
4. Kuwait
5. Saudi Arabia


Can you see what most of them have in common?

We used to have one here in Oz, but some stupid politicians decided to spend it. Barely believable. I think it was called the Future Fund or similar...

The Oil Industry Won’t Save Venezuela
March 28, 2019


In the last three years—for a variety of reasons but originating from decades of mismanagement—Venezuelan oil production plummeted by over 50 percent from 2.3 million barrels per day (b/d) in January 2016 to 1.1 million b/d in January of this year. Production continues to collapse and is now well below the 1 million b/d mark following the implementation of U.S. sanctions on PDVSA, and more recently in the aftermath of widespread electrical blackouts. And while the political situation continues to evolve, recent developments including an intensification of U.S. and international pressure, appear to make a transition of power in the country increasingly likely though the timing and process remain uncertain.


Beyond making plans to deal with the utmost priority of stemming the humanitarian disaster ensuing in Venezuela and spilling over its borders, many analysts and various government entities are preparing for a transition by also developing strategies for economic reform and the restoration of key sectors, including the nation’s oil industry. In an attempt to address the oil sector challenges, the following analysis takes a deeper look at the Venezuelan oil industry, profiling the dire condition that the sector finds itself in today, and examining a range of possibilities for where production can realistically move towards in the short to medium term under various political scenarios. We also examine a variety of investment risks, and the significant challenges faced in restoring production levels over the longer run.


The collapse of Venezuela’s oil production and the general deterioration of its oil industry is not a recent development. While the precipitous decline of the past three years brought global attention to the state of the country’s oil patch, Hugo Chavez sowed the seeds of destruction nearly two decades ago shortly after he took the presidential office in 1999. The Chavez government inherited an oil industry in its prime, governed at the time by one of the most capable national oil companies globally.


Before Chavez took office, oil production rose through the 1990s and peaked at 3.5 million b/d towards the end of the decade. This production success was largely the consequence of enormous resource endowment and the decision to open up the oil sector to foreign investment (La Apertura Petrolera). Unfortunately, the oil price collapse in the late 1990s severely impacted both output and oil revenues and provided Chavez the political ammunition needed to reverse the policies of the past and assert greater control over PDVSA.


In 2002, Chavez fired PDVSA’s board, along with several top executives and replaced them with political allies. The unrest created by these actions coupled with widespread discontent with the poorly performing economy led to an attempted coup and eventually the general strike of 2002-2003 when PDVSA operations came to a near complete halt for nine weeks. The strike eventually faltered, and in response, Chavez moved more aggressively to reign in PDVSA, naming a personal ally, Rafael Ramirez as president.


In early 2003, the government shed more than 18,000 of PDVSA’s 33,000 employees many of whom were highly skilled and experienced.1 PDVSA subsequently went on a hiring spree, with total employment ballooning to 150,000 by 2014. The company took on expanded responsibilities, including the administering and funding of a variety of Chavez’s social programs, often used as political tools to maintain his popularity. The Chavez administration and PDVSA’s new management instituted other changes to the oil sector in the mid-2000s, including revising contract terms, increasing taxes and royalty rates, and requiring greater PDVSA ownership. Most of the international companies eventually agreed to the new terms. ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil were notable exceptions, and their assets were subsequently expropriated. Chavez seized other oil industry assets in 2009 after nationalizing the oil services sector.


These actions along with the hydrocarbons law that Chavez introduced in 2001 severely restricted investment in the country over the past two decades, a period during which oil prices were at historical highs. The consequent underinvestment in and mismanagement of the sector led to the more recent production collapse. The dramatic fall in the oil price in 2014 simply exposed the damage inflicted on PDVSA and the nation’s oil industry by Chavez and then Maduro over the course of nearly 20 years. The problem now is a lack of revenues to keep the basics running, problems that are compounded by corruption and a lack of security in the country. Oil fields across the country suffer from a lack of everything—from operational rigs and equipment, to spare parts and experienced personnel for drilling operations. At Lake Maracaibo, an unreliable electric power grid regularly disrupts production; at challenging fields in the Maturin Sub-basin in the east, the absence of oil service providers (due to non-payment issues) is resulting in precipitous declines. More recently, the inability to keep upgraders running and secure adequate levels of diluents (to blend with heavy oils) is leading to large losses in the Orinoco.


Venezuela produces the majority of its oil from two basins, Maracaibo in the west and the Eastern basin, which includes the Maturin sub-basin and the Orinoco heavy oil belt. The heavy oil reserves of the Orinoco are vast and not technically complicated to produce but are energy intensive and require a large amount of processing. Most of the production here is controlled by “empresas mixtas” or mixed companies, made up of international oil companies and PDVSA. The conventional reserves in and around Lake Maracaibo also contain several mixed companies but the majority of production here is produced by PDVSA on its own, which is the same for much of the light and medium oil produced in the Maturin sub-basin.


To effectively understand what can happen in Venezuela in terms of oil production in the short to medium term, it’s first useful to identify where the country currently produces its oil and who produces it (e.g., by PDVSA alone, or through mixed companies). Until recently, most of the production losses in Venezuela came from Maracaibo and Maturin, while Orinoco output remained relatively flat until 2017. In addition, most declines centered at PDVSA-operated assets. As a result, at the beginning of 2019, Orinoco mixed company production accounted for more than 40 percent of total output. That picture continues to evolve, however, and under the current political situation, Orinoco production is beginning to collapse as well. Problems range from shortages in diluent used to make the heavy oil exportable, operational issues at upgraders and processing facilities (exacerbated by recent power outages), and a once again disrupted export picture, impacted by the latest round of sanctions. Absent of major investment and operational improvements (all tied to political change), things will likely deteriorate further.


Not surprisingly, the production outlook in Venezuela is highly dependent upon the political outlook. The political situation is fluid and evolving rapidly. Juan Guaidó’s declaration brings unity to a previously fractured opposition, garnering significant international support. However, for the moment at least, Maduro continues to cling to power with limited defections from senior military officials in his camp. While Russia and China still support Maduro, the latest actions by the Trump administration suggest U.S. pressure will intensify. These dynamics bring a sense of inevitably that a transition of power will happen, but it remains highly uncertain as to when and how this process might unfold.


Based on these dynamics, as depicted in the chart above, we have developed three illustrative scenarios for Venezuelan oil production. The first scenario (“Current Deadlock”) assumes that Maduro clings to power and sanctions continue in their current form. This case assumes that the massive decline rates seen at Maracaibo and Maturin over 2017 and 2018 continue, while the rate of losses at the five main projects in the Orinoco increase due to issues regarding sourcing of diluents and keeping upgraders operational. The next scenario (“Successful Transition”) assumes a quick and clean transition of power toward the end of this quarter. Production rebounds particularly at mixed company projects in the Orinoco, while decline rates elsewhere slowly arrest. This will require sanctions to be lifted immediately and some form of debt alleviation and funding support to help get service providers back into the country. The final scenario (“Double Down”) is based on the assumption that all parties double down as Maduro struggles to retain control. This scenario envisions the United States transitioning to full secondary sanctions; this severely constrains exports and rapidly pushes production down toward 400 thousand b/d. Assuming a political transition in Q4 2019 and an immediate lifting of sanctions following the transition, Orinoco production can rebound strongly, but it will take time to rebuild from a much lower base.


Restoring Venezuelan production to levels seen before the most recent designation of PDVSA in a reasonable period may be possible but will require a quick and clean transition of power and the lifting of all sanctions. However, even in the most optimistic of scenarios, Venezuela will struggle to recover to 1.3 million b/d by the end of 2020. Under that scenario, effectively addressing the dire security situation in the country will be crucial to create the conditions necessary for mixed company partners to reestablish in the country and restore production at shared projects, along with the reentry of oil service providers to help arrest declines at PDVSA projects.


History provides useful examples of attempts to restore a country’s production profile in the wake of war, political strife, and years of underinvestment and neglect (Iraq, Libya, Iran, Azerbaijan, Mexico, etc.). All exhibit varying degrees of success. Restoring Venezuela’s production will likely involve a multi-stage process of arresting current declines, building off a restored base, and attracting investment to add incremental new volumes. Under almost any scenario, however, restoring production to 2016 levels and beyond will take years, not months.


While the short- to medium-term production picture is very much centered on what can be restored, arrested, and brought back online immediately when sanctions are lifted, the long-term outlook in any “day after” scenario is highly dependent on investment prospects. The question is, who are the likely candidates to take on these investments?


With regard to Venezuela’s investment climate, it is useful to identify classes of likely investors. First, there are those with existing assets in the country, those companies who have experience with the geology and operations and established links to downstream operations and trading. These companies have a vested interest to get things back up and running since they are legacy stakeholders with substantial balance sheet investments, and in many cases, have an experienced and skilled labor pool to draw from. A significant subset of this legacy investor class includes national champions, notably from Russia and China—entities whose investment motivation may not solely reflect project economics. Finally, there is the class of potential new investors, some with prior history in Venezuela (including expropriation) and others looking for exploration opportunities. Given the risks involved, it will likely be much harder to attract these companies into the country.


When it comes to assessing risk and selecting investment prospects, operating companies universally share a variation of risk criteria. These include both below and above ground issues and can be categorized under four main headers: geologic, technology, commercial, and political risks.2 The geologic and technical considerations are low hurdles for Venezuela. The resource base is enormous and extraction techniques well known. For the commercial and political issues, however, the risks are substantial.


From a commercial or financial standpoint, several considerations will impact both the timing and pace of (re)investment in the country. This includes issues related to project awards, contract terms, royalty rates, partnership restrictions (if any), operatorship, the role of PDVSA as well as the treatment of existing agreements. For example, will Maduro-era contracts not previously approved by the National Assembly be honored, rejected, or modified? Since Venezuela will seek to maximize revenues to fund its new government, there will be a natural tension between ensuring a sufficient revenue stream for the country and allowing investors to recoup sunk costs in a timely manner.


On a positive note, President Guaidó and more recently Ricardo Hausmann, Venezuela’s new representative to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), have expressed support in honoring existing contracts (including those with Russian and Chinese companies) and welcoming foreign investment—both from legacy companies and new investors. Left open, at least for the time being, is the question regarding the role of PDVSA. Some maintain that in light of its history and expertise, the company will need to play a central, albeit more targeted role in managing current and future production while others convincingly argue that its recent history of corruption and mismanagement now make it ineffective and ill-suited for that task. Proposals from this latter group include auctioning or leasing Venezuelan oil tracts to outside investors through the management of a new government entity or ministry.


Everyone seems to agree that international institutions and donor nations will need to provide massive assistance to get Venezuela back on its feet and help restore critical infrastructure and capacity. Debt alleviation—through deferments, forgiveness, or renegotiation of obligations—will also surely be a priority. As the new government rebuilds, there will be pressure to recruit, retrain, and retain skilled workers, so paying the workforce will also be a near-term requirement.


Lifting sanctions to allow for aid and financial flows into and out of the country and for procurement and purchase of needed items, goods, and services will be a political and economic imperative. At present, however, it is unclear how soon such restrictions and under what conditions those sanctions might be removed. Will the U.S. government, for example, be prepared to lift all sanctions concurrent with the transfer of power from Maduro to Guaidó? Or will sanctions be removed following national elections—which could take months? Will sanctions removal be provisional like international funding agreements, conditioned on the country following a certain set of criteria and contain “snap-back” provisions (like in the Iran deal) in the event such conditions are not fulfilled?—both of which have significant implications for investments. Will Venezuelan debt and claims be held in abeyance until the new government can be established?


Politically speaking, the country’s history of nationalization activity, corruption, and abrupt changes in government present significant hurdles in attracting new, large scale investments. Not surprisingly, Chavez’s past practice of reneging on contract terms and expropriating assets will likely haunt the Venezuelan industry for years to come. Even under a new government, these past events may deter some investors from ever getting involved again, while requiring a much greater risk appetite and therefore higher hurdle rate on investment for others. And while the opposition parties are united in the quest to replace Maduro, their views on a wide range of other issues are far from uniform.


There are at least five major opposition parties, but more than a score of others with representation in the National Assembly. Each has its own leadership and priorities. In addition, Chavista supporters make up almost 20 percent of the legislature. Changes in leadership and governance can provide a breath of fresh air and rekindle interest in foreign investment to be sure. But administrations are often given short grace periods to demonstrate their ability to administer governmental functions and improve conditions for the populous effectively. And frequent change presents investment risk. Recent examples of Iraq, Libya, and the Caspian provide evidence of the major challenges governments face in restoring and reforming their economies and how sudden changes can make investors nervous.


An overhaul of the hydrocarbons law may be required to accommodate contract changes to offer more attractive fiscal terms. This will take time. Furthermore, depending on the level of degradation of oil fields and related infrastructure, remediation, rehabilitation, and restoration costs in areas besieged by decades of neglect and deterioration can often exceed start-up costs at green fields. Security, safety (personal and operational), and liability issues can also be consequential. That said, there are remedies, workarounds, and offsets to deal with certain deficiencies, but not ones all companies are willing to accept.


One final factor that clouds investment prospects with respect to Venezuela is that the global oil market has changed significantly since previous successful investment rounds in the country. Oil is in a perceived age of abundance with opportunities a plenty, including a raft of new, short cycle prospects. Additionally, concerns surrounding the issues of peak oil demand and climate change relative to fossil fuel extraction and use further reduce Venezuela’s attractiveness based on resource size alone.


Under almost any scenario one can imagine, rejuvenating Venezuela’s oil industry will be a high priority for a new government. But for all the reasons identified, doing so will not be easy, fast or cheap—and not without setbacks along the way.


https://www.csis.org/analysis/oil-in...save-venezuela

Yes, it must be terrible difficult having the largest lake of oil on the planet

Originally Posted by harrybarracuda

Have you ever heard of the concept of a "Sovereign Wealth Fund"?

Here are the top 5:

1. Norway
2. Abu Dhabi
3. China
4. Kuwait
5. Saudi Arabia


Can you see what most of them have in common?

Based on raw head count, ...socialist communism is the dominant political system.

Originally Posted by foobar

Yes, it must be terrible difficult having the largest lake of oil on the planet

rather "terrible dangerous and vulnerable"...

Originally Posted by foobar

Yes, it must be terrible difficult having the largest lake of oil on the planet

I think what you mean is it must take an inexplicable amount of corruption and stupidity to put a country with the largest lake of oil on the planet into a financial death spiral.

Stupid little boy.

Originally Posted by foobar

Based on raw head count, ...socialist communism is the dominant political system.

Do you actually read this garbage before you post it?

^Are you disagreeing? ...no, thought so

Or did your pea sized brain not understand my post?

Originally Posted by foobar

^Are you disagreeing? ...no, thought so

Or did your pea sized brain not understand my post?

If you're going to post nonsense, I'd recommend you do it in the silly speakers thread.

You're clearly out of your league here.

^Got it, you completely agree with me ....if you change your mind can you post the hard numbers saying otherwise

Originally Posted by foobar

^Got it, you completely agree with me ....if you change your mind can you post the hard numbers saying otherwise

You make even less sense than Klondyke.

What an imbecile.

Originally Posted by harrybarracuda

You make even less sense than Klondyke.

A perfect argument from one who always has a clue...

So Russia aren't "interfering in Venezuela's domestic affairs" and their troops must have "accidentally" landed in Caracas then.

MOSCOW, March 30 (Xinhua) -- The Russian Foreign Ministry on Saturday warned the United States against further interfering in Venezuela's domestic affairs and stirring up speculations about Russia conducting military operations in the South American country.


"We recommend that the United States stop threatening Venezuela, strangling its economy and pushing it towards civil war, which is in open violation of international law," the ministry's spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said in a statement.
She reiterated that Russia is not intentionally building up its military presence in Venezuela, despite such accusations by the West including Washington.

Russia urges U.S. to stop interfering in Venezuela - Xinhua | English.news.cn

^
Zakharova Fires Back at Trump! US Is Arrogant and in COMPLETE Violation of Intl Law in Venezuela!

Maria Zakharova, Spokesperson for the MFA: "On March 27th, during a meeting with the spouse of the Venezuelan opposition member Guaido, US president Donald Trump stated that the US will consider all possible options to force Russian servicemen to leave Venezuela.

First of all, I'd like to ask all of the aforementioned people a question: on what legal grounds were those statements made?"

Originally Posted by harrybarracuda

So Russia aren't "interfering in Venezuela's domestic affairs" and their troops must have "accidentally" landed in Caracas then.

Are you now claiming Russia has invaded Venezuela?

Originally Posted by foobar

Are you now claiming Russia has invaded Venezuela?

Did no-one notice the umbilical cord was round your neck?

Originally Posted by OhOh

A word in your ear, SA overproduction causes what? Of course they needed the extra income to pay their credit card bill.

If you wish to make a point, make it, rather than asking dumb, vague questions in an attempt to deviate from the topic at hand.

I hope you are eventually able share with us, numskulls here on TD, how the Russian "troops" are "interfering", in a sovereign countries "domestic affairs". You main gain some followers or reinforce your "ignorance" on the matter to us all, once again.

I would have thought it's blatantly fucking obvious.

But then again, as you say, you are numbskulls.

Are you suggesting that a power as suggested by no other person than Roosevelt in his State of the Union address in 1904, not utilise the suggested method, intervention, to assist any country the same. Creating a stable, orderly and prosperous neighbour for all?

Roosevelt Corollary

"All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roosevelt_Corollary

Originally Posted by harrybarracuda

it's blatantly fucking obvious.

Possibly, clarity is required to the TD "numskulls", assisting them in understanding your unproven allegation. Possibly you have nothing to share. I suggest lack of provision indicates the latter.

But I may be wrong, again. C'est La Vie.

WTF are you waffling on about now.

i.e. how the fuck does any of that bollocks contradict that:

it must take an inexplicable amount of corruption and stupidity to put a country with the largest lake of oil on the planet into a financial death spiral.

Nicolas Maduro's useful idiots Posted : 2019-03-31 16:52Updated : 2019-03-31 16:52

By Shlomo Ben-Ami


LOS ANGELES ― In his 1982 Nobel lecture, the Colombian novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez condemned the West's insistence on "measuring us with the yardstick that they use for themselves" and "forgetting that the ravages of life are not the same for all."


That is, in a sense, what the West's progressive left is doing when, caught up in an outdated narrative about Latin American revolutions, it fails to recognize the associated devastation.


It is because of this failure that, until fairly recently, the most heinous ― and long-lasting ― insurgency in Latin America's history, waged by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), had advocates in the European parliament. Now, the story is repeating itself, with many Western leftists rejecting any international effort to push back against President Nicolas Maduro's disastrous leadership.


The scale of the disaster should not be underestimated. Severe food and medication shortages are the new normal. The International Monetary Fund estimates that inflation will reach 10 million percent this year. The result is a desperate people, 10 percent of whom have already fled the country. Among those who remain, 90 percent live below the poverty line.


A revolutionary delusion has collapsed, leaving behind only the tyrannical rule of a class of corrupt tycoons ― effectively a mafia ― that has purchased the military's loyalty with massive cash bonuses and lucrative oil-smuggling and drug-trafficking deals. The mafia's opponents are repressed, often brutally. In terms of the number of political prisoners, Maduro's Venezuela has joined the ranks of China, Cuba, and Turkey.


One might expect U.S. President Donald Trump's administration to minimize Maduro's repressive practices. But Trump was also quick to recognize the leader of the opposition, Juan Guaido, as interim head of state, after Guaido, with widespread support among Venezuelans, invoked a constitutional provision to challenge Maduro's legitimacy.


Practically all of Venezuela's democratic neighbors ― including socialists in these countries ― have spoken out against Maduro's tragic parody of a revolution. Gustavo Petro, a former guerrilla and Colombia's most emblematic far-left politician, has labeled Maduro "a dictator."


Brazil's Socialist Party denounced his regime as "crazy" and "a totalitarian state," while the country's former left-wing president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, distanced himself from his Workers' Party's endorsement of Maduro. Even the Venezuelan socialist group Marea Socialista denounced Maduro's "totalitarian tendencies."


But leftist politicians in the West resist taking a similar stand. America's rising socialist stars staunchly oppose this approach. Representative Ilhan Omar has warned of a "U.S.-backed coup" aimed at picking a leader "on behalf of multinational corporate interests," and ignorantly defined the opposition as "far right." (Guaido is a member of a social-democratic party.)


Likewise, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez agreed that the large-scale, human rights-violating crisis is an "internal polarized conflict," and argued that the United States should not recognize Guaido as head of state.


Senator Bernie Sanders, for his part, invokes America's dark history of interventions in Latin America when discussing Venezuela. In the United Kingdom, Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, who memorialized Maduro's mentor Hugo Chavez in 2013 for his "massive contributions to Venezuela and a very wide world," also opposes "outside interference in Venezuela."


These leaders subscribe to a Cold War worldview, in which virtually any domestic revolution stands in direct opposition to the ultimate enemy: Western imperialism. By not recognizing the nuances of the current crisis, they end up effectively advancing the interests of multiple dictatorships, including those in Iran, Nicaragua, Syria, and Turkey, as well as the real colonial powers in Venezuela right now: China, Cuba, and Russia.


In Venezuela, Russia is following its playbook from Syria, where it intervened not to save besieged people, but to prop up the tyrant they were trying to escape, Bashar al-Assad. Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping want to secure repayment of the massive loans they have issued to Venezuela's Chavista regime. And free oil from Venezuela has been vital to Cuba's economic survival.


These ties mean that Maduro's regime poses a legitimate national security risk to the U.S. Though Trump himself was probably motivated to recognize Guaido more by his desire to win support from Hispanic voters, the fact is that Russia's deepening military cooperation with Venezuela could conceivably result in a modern rendition of the Cuban Missile Crisis.


But there is a more fundamental issue at play. The world's dictatorships support Maduro because they want to undercut the principle, adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, that the international community has a responsibility to protect populations from atrocities carried out by their own governments.


By backing Maduro, they seek immunity for themselves. Defending the spirit of the so-called R2P principle, which the left should cherish, was a key motivation behind the decision by many other democracies ― including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and the U.K. ― to recognize Guaido.


Rather than stick to their old political dogma, leftist political figures should heed the voice of Toshiko Sakurai, a Venezuelan exile. "I am sick of you," she told the Spanish left. "We both believe in public universal education and health care financed with taxes" and "a safety net and wealth redistribution." But, she continued, "supporting socialist policies doesn't keep me from denouncing the brutal monstrosity being inflicted upon my country."


The 2008 economic crisis has fueled the rise of a new political class that revived the social-democratic call for a fairer society. These figures are right to reject any consideration of a potentially calamitous foreign military intervention in Venezuela. But ― for the sake of their own political credibility, as much as the principles of human rights and democracy ― they must abandon well-meaning but obsolete assumptions in foreign policy.


Instead, the left should support increased international pressure on the Maduro regime, including through the sanctioning and isolation of its core leadership. Efforts to boost the capabilities of Venezuela's suppressed democratic opposition would also help.


Western nonintervention killed Spanish democracy in the 1930s. More recently, it sustained Assad's appalling tyranny. Venezuela must not be next.


Nicolas Maduro's useful idiots

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on Sunday announced a 30-day plan to ration electricity after a series of blackouts paralyzed the nation, leaving millions without light, water, or internet access.


A power outage on Friday was the third to plunge the country into darkness in less than a month.

In response, protesters climbed on balconies, blocked roads, and burned trash to demonstrate against the government's inability to restore the electric grid, The Associated Press reported. Government supporters known as "colectivos" showed up on motorcycles to threaten some protesters.

Maduro said on national television that services around the system would return gradually with his new rationing plan.

On Twitter, he repeated his longstanding claim that "terrorist attacks" by the United States and the opposition are damaging the power system. The socialist leader has said that his rivals launched cyber attacks on the electric grid.

"I call on the Venezuelan people to preserve peace and remain in loving resistance to definitively to combat the electricity war," he said.

But Juan Guaidó, the opposition leader trying to oust Maduro, has said corruption, neglect, and brain-drain have left the country's once impressive electric grid in a state of disarray.

"We all know the 30-day ration system is a farce," he said about the government plan. "No one believes them. That's why they need to go."


The continuous blackouts have brought most of the country to a standstill. Reports from the country say that food is rotting in warm refrigerators, many hospitals are struggling to keep patients alive as their backup generators fail, and spotty internet connections are making communication difficult.

"Caracas is in chaos without public services," Marcel Madera, an 18-year-old student told INSIDER. "We don't even have subways, so everyone has to walk."

Roxanna Vitali, a 22-year-old sociology student living in Caracas, told INSIDER that the blackouts are the last straw of what is already a crippling humanitarian crisis.

Like many Venezuelans, Vitali often skips meals and avoids buying meat as shortages caused food prices to skyrocket. Her underpaid professors regularly cancel classes. She says she does not even think of buying clothes: a month's minimum wage does not even cover a t-shirt.

"The truth is we all have a limit. Now it's not only food, clothes or banal things. Now we don't even have basic services," she said.
The constant anxiety has taken a toll on her physical and mental health, she said: "Worry is the master, and us Venezuelans are its slaves."

https://www.thisisinsider.com/venezu...tioning-2019-4

Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro announced 30 days of electricity rationing Sunday, after his government said it was shortening the working day and keeping schools closed due to blackouts.


Angry Venezuelans meanwhile took to the streets of Caracas to protest the power cuts and water shortages.


The measures are a stark admission by the government — which blamed repeated power outages in March on sabotage — that there is not enough electricity to go around, and that the power crisis is here to stay.


The blackouts have worsened already dire economic and living conditions in the country, which sits on the world’s largest proven oil reserves.


Power failures come alongside a political showdown between Maduro and opposition leader Juan Guaido, who is recognized as interim president by the United States and more than 50 other countries.


Speaking on state television, Maduro said he had approved “a 30-day plan” to ration power.


He did not detail how it would work but said there would be “an emphasis on guaranteeing water service”.


Maduro also acknowledged that many Venezuelans could not watch his broadcast because they had no electricity.


Crippled infrastructure, little investment in the power grid and poor maintenance have all contributed to electricity problems.


A “brain drain” of qualified personnel has also hit the industry, with about 25,000 people in the electricity sector among the 2.7-million Venezuelans who have emigrated since 2015.


Add to that the country’s deep economic crisis, which includes a soaring inflation rate.


Earlier on Sunday, authorities announced other measures as a result of the electricity shortage.


“To achieve consistency in the provision of electricity, the Bolivarian government decided to maintain the suspension of school activities and establish a workday until 2:00 pm in public and private institutions,” Communications Minister Jorge Rodriguez said on state television.


With no electricity, pumping stations can’t work, so water service is limited. Street lights and traffic lights go dark, pumps at fuel stations stand idle, and cell phone and internet service is non-existent.


Children don’t have “a drop of water” to drink, complained Maria Rodriguez, a Caracas resident.


But people try to find it wherever they can: from springs, leaky pipes, gutters, government-provided tankers, and the little that flows through the Guiare River in Caracas.


“We fill up from a well near here but we don’t know if its drinkable. But we’re using it,” said Erimar Vale, a resident of the capital.


Angel Velazquez said he bathed at work because they did not have water at home.


Opposition leader Guaido asked people to protest each time there was a blackout.


The situation is very serious, there will be more blackouts and rationing,” said Winton Cabas, president of the Venezuelan Association of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering.


“The whole power grid is barely generating between 5,500 and 6,000 megawatts, when it has the capacity to generate 34,000 megawatts,” he told AFP.


The Maduro government has blamed “terrorists” for alleged attacks that have damaged the Guri hydroelectric power plant, which generates 80 percent of Venezuela’s electricity.


The Guri plant, however, was already showing signs of trouble: back in 2010, then-president Hugo Chavez said electricity would be rationed in some Venezuelan states because water was low at the Guri dam due to a drought.


Jose Aguilar, a Venezuelan consultant living in the United States, said the problems with the power grid run deep.


“Over the past 20 years, the infrastructure has been abused due to a lack of maintenance and the postponing of upgrade plans,” he told AFP.


Another problem was the “de-professionalization” of the sector, when Chavez nationalized the privately-run power company in 2007, in which pro-government loyalists took positions as managers and engineers.


Demonstrations by Venezuelans angry about the blackouts broke out Sunday in Caracas.


With cooking pots, whistles and flags, dozens of residents spontaneously took to the streets in scattered protests.


Protesters and human rights groups said some demonstrators were attacked by “colectivos”, pro-government enforcers that the opposition describes as paramilitary thugs.


Maduro has given the “colectivos” permission to contain protests that he describes as violent mobs aiming to oust him from power.


Joaquin Rodriguez, a 54-year-old lawyer, was among those protesting in Los Palos Grandes, a once-prosperous neighborhood that has endured blackouts for more than a decade.


“Once again a nationwide blackout is affecting our quality of life,” he told AFP.


“We don’t have water. We don’t have any light. We don’t have internet access, our phones don’t work… we are even worse off than we could have imagined.”



https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-01-maduro-announces-30-days-of-electricity-rationing-in-venezuela