Thread: Power in Asia

Yes, you have a point. But like I mentioned, seeing as it is largely served concurrently, yada.
Imagine if the UK was so paranoid about, y'know, Separatists!! Or, shudder, Anti-Monarchists!!

Nae bother, hen.

China and Asia are OK with each other.

It appears that many global entities embrace relationships with China, not only in Asia.

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on December 8, 2021

"CCTV:

We noticed that the Global Development Initiative put forward by China has been well received and supported by many parties. At the recent Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, African countries also said they welcome and support the initiative. Do you have any comment?
Wang Wenbin:

Since President Xi Jinping put forward the Global Development Initiative at the general debate of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, it has received wide support from the international community, especially developing countries. So far, dozens of countries and many international organizations expressed their support.

The Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations acknowledged the initiative.

The Joint Statement of China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting stated that Pacific Island Countries welcomed the initiative and  expressed readiness to support and join this important initiative to ensure  alignment with the Pacific Roadmap for Sustainable Development and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

The Declaration of the Third Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum welcomed the initiative, which will bring new opportunities for developing countries, Latin American countries included, to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The initiative also received widespread support from 53 African countries and the African Union.

The recently-held Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) released the Dakar Declaration and the FOCAC Dakar Action Plan. Both documents stated that African countries welcome and support the Global Development Initiative proposed by China. They believe that global partnership is imperative to accelerate implementation of Agenda 2063 of the AU and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the UN, and commit to promote stronger, greener and healthier global development and build a global community of development with a shared future.

These facts fully show that the Global Development Initiative meets the development trend of the world, serves the needs of developing counties, and demonstrates strong vitality and appeal, thus highly recognized by the international community. 

At a time when the world faces once-in-a-century changes and pandemic, solidarity and cooperation remain an unchanging theme and irreversible trend. China welcomes the participation of all like-minded partners in the Global Development Initiative. Together, let us garner strong impetus for the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and jointly advance the global sustainable development cause."

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on December 8, 2021

It appears some believe it's not just Asia.

The Great Rivalry: China vs. the U.S. in the 21st Century

Author: Graham Allison Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Dec. 07, 2021

"In the past two decades, China has risen further and faster on more dimensions than any nation in history. As it has done so, it has become a serious rival of what had been the world’s sole superpower. To paraphrase former Czech president Vaclav Havel, all this has happened so quickly that we have not yet had time to be astonished.To document what has actually happened in the competition between China and the U.S. in the past twenty years, Professor Graham Allison has directed a major study titled “The Great Rivalry: China vs. the U.S. in the 21st Century.” Originally prepared as part of a package of transition memos for the new administration after the November 2020 election, these reports were provided to those leading the Biden and Trump administrations’ strategic reviews. They are now being published as public Belfer Center Discussion Papers.

The major finding will not surprise those who have been following this issue: namely, a nation that in most races the U.S. had difficulty finding in our rearview mirror 20 years ago is now on our tail, or to our side, or in some cases a bit ahead of us. The big takeaway for the policy community is that the time has come for us to retire the concept of China as a “near peer competitor” as the Director of National Intelligence’s March 2021 Global Threat Assessment still insists on calling it. We must recognize that China is now a “full-spectrum peer competitor.” Indeed, it is the most formidable rising rival a ruling power has ever confronted.

In Washington, the first question officials ask about an issue is: What to do? “Don’t just stand there, do something,” however, is a political reflex, not strategic guidance. Strategy insists that diagnosis precedes prescription. The specific assignment to which the Papers on the “Great Rivalry” respond is “to document what has actually happened in the past two decades in the array of races between China and the US.” The goal was to provide an objective database that could serve as a foundation for policy makers who would undertake a fundamental strategic reassessment of the China challenge. Five Papers drill down on the rivalry in five core arenas of power: technological, military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological.

News about China overtaking us and even surpassing us in some races is unsettling. Indeed, as students of international security, we recognize that the international order the United States has led for the seven decades since World War II provided a rare “long peace” without war between great powers, and larger increases in health and prosperity worldwide than in any equivalent period in history. The impact of China’s meteoric rise on that order is thus a matter of deep concern. But as John Adams repeatedly reminded his compatriots as they fought for freedom against the most powerful nation in the eighteenth-century world: “facts are stubborn things.”

Contrary to those for whom these findings lead to defeatism, the authors of the Papers do not believe that this means “game over” for the United States. Recognizing the magnitude of the challenge posed by what Singapore’s founding leader Lee Kuan Yew predicted would be “the biggest player in the history of the world” is the starting point for crafting an effective and sustainable China policy. We believe it should—and will—lead the United States to mobilize a response proportionate to the challenge."

The Great Rivalry: China vs. the U.S. in the 21st Century | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

China Is Slamming Shut Its Window of Opportunity

Leaders in Beijing have lost the tactical flexibility and risk controls that helped them nurture the country’s rise, and it’s not clear they are capable of changing course.

By Minxin Pei (Bloomberg)
December 9, 2021


China’s aggressive actions have rallied opposition around the world. Photographer: Guang Niu/Getty Images
Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College.

Chinese leaders like to intone that “great changes unseen in a century” are sweeping the world today. What they really mean is that, after long years of humiliation and decline, China is seeing the global balance of power tilt in its favor. In trying to seize this supposed window of opportunity, however, the Chinese regime is in danger of slamming it shut.

For four decades after the death of Mao Zedong, a benign external environment helped China vault from an impoverished and isolated backwater to an economic superpower. Now China’s hard-won ties with the developed economies in the West are fraying, jeopardizing the country’s economic growth and access to investment and critical technology.

The security picture is even grimmer. While the Chinese armed forces have made great technological strides in recent years, the U.S. has begun effectively rallying allies to increase its leverage. A deal to provide nuclear submarines to Australia and the growing closeness between the U.S. and fellow “Quad” nations Japan, India and Australia have widened the array of foes China may have to face in any conflict.

Chinese leaders might persuade themselves they are blameless in these developments. China’s run of geopolitical fortune ended with U.S. President Donald Trump’s surprise victory in 2016. His protectionist trade policy and the dominance of China hawks in his administration speeded the onset of a U.S.-China confrontation.
The eruption of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 then exacerbated tensions. Trump believed that China’s poor handling of the pandemic was part of a plot to make him lose his re-election bid. The severe disruptions caused by the pandemic encouraged the West to shorten supply chains and reduce reliance on China.

Bad luck isn’t the issue, however. China’s geopolitical aggressiveness — highlighted by its brazen construction of artificial islands in disputed areas of the South China Sea, economic coercion against trading partners such as Australia and hyper-nationalist “wolf warrior” diplomacy — has played a far more important role in turning the West against Beijing.

And behind the adoption of these counter-productive policies lies a flawed decision-making process that lacks traditional mechanisms for risk control. During most of the post-Mao era, beginning with his successor Deng Xiaoping, collective leadership ensured that China followed Deng’s foreign policy of “keeping a low profile.” Major policy initiatives could be undertaken only with the consensus of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the top decision-making body of the Chinese Communist Party.

This process was never ideal. Indeed, it was blamed for the stagnation in economic reform in the late 2000s. At the same time, the system helped the party avoid potentially calamitous foreign policy mistakes. Today, in a centralized decision-making process with few brakes, high-risk policies are far more likely to be adopted and less likely to be reversed.

China’s loss of balance and tactical flexibility in its foreign policy has compounded the problem. Nowhere is this more evident than with respect to human rights. While post-Tiananmen Chinese leaders had little concern for Western standards of human rights, they at least understood that excessively hardline measures could backfire. So, while abuses were routine, few were egregious enough to incense the entire Western alliance.

That is no longer the case. The mass internment of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang province and the end of the “one country, two systems” governance model in Hong Kong have fundamentally altered the West’s view of China.

Tactically, China used to mix toughness and concessions masterfully to de-escalate tensions and divide the West. But Beijing’s toolbox now appears to include hammers only. Its uncompromising stance on human rights, as demonstrated by its retaliation against the European Union after Brussels imposed sanctions on Chinese officials involved in the crackdown in Xinjiang, harms China more than it helps. There’s now little chance China’s investment treaty with the EU will be approved anytime soon.
Chinese leaders have a decision to make. If they feel that they are strong enough to get their way, they might well double down on risky adventures. The report that China is seeking its first military base on Africa’s Atlantic coast, if true, may be an indication of such a fateful choice.

Alternatively, China could try to improve its international standing with strategic retrenchment. A dramatic curtailment of its controversial activities in the South China Sea, including harassment of Vietnamese and Philippine fishermen, might help repair its tarnished image. Replacing “wolf warrior” rhetoric with a diplomatic charm offensive might also send a positive signal to the rest of the world.

Whether Chinese leaders retain enough flexibility to change course — especially in the face of rising nationalism at home — is an open question. But the stakes are so high that they would be wise to try.