Thread: Cut undersea cables in Baltic Sea are a reminder of Asia Pacific’s vulnerability

In hybrid warfare, acts like the sabotage of internet cables can be devastating, but are hard to prove and prevent, says Ian Li from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Two undersea fibre-optic communications cables in the Baltic Sea were severed within 48 hours of each other in November. Europe is on alert, with suspicions surrounding Russia’s involvement.


For many, this was a clarion call over the threat of hybrid warfare and a reminder of the vulnerability of undersea cable networks – something the Asia Pacific knows all too well, as home to one of the world’s greatest concentrations of undersea cables.

But determining whether the Baltic Sea incidents are part of a wider Russian hybrid warfare campaign linked to the Ukraine war is less straightforward. This is not helped by the fact that there is much ambiguity about what hybrid warfare means.


Hybrid strategies seek to combine individual tools that can be potent on their own but achieve exponentially greater effects when employed together. Ultimately, hybrid warfare is an amorphous term, and like cuisine, each actor’s version has its own unique flavour – and recipe.


Western analysts often label Russia’s actions as hybrid warfare. However, it is not a term used by the Russians. Rather, it operates under the framework of New Generation Warfare, which blends various instruments, specifically of a non-military nature, to achieve objectives.

GUILTY BEYOND ALL REASONABLE DOUBT?


Regardless of what it is called, Russia has placed greater reliance on its unconventional toolkit to gain inroads in the Ukraine war. Despite recent territorial gains in east Ukraine, its military is far from achieving a decisive breakthrough, tying down a significant portion of its conventional fighting force.

Indeed, when one considers the wider spate of sabotage and disinformation activities against NATO countries, and Russian efforts to gain influence in the Global South through information operations, the shades of a broader hybrid strategy begin to emerge, designed to erode Western cohesion and support for Ukraine. The result is a two-pronged assault in both the political and military spheres that could potentially cripple Ukraine’s war effort.


Nonetheless, while it is clear that Russia is waging some form of hybrid warfare against Ukraine, and by extension its Western allies, it does not necessarily mean that the cable incidents were part of it.


Russia is not even the only possible culprit, given the likelihood that the damage was caused by a Chinese vessel, the Yi Peng 3, which tracking sites said had sailed over the cables around the time they were cut.

A similar incident occurred in October 2023, when two undersea cables and a gas pipeline were damaged by the trailing anchor of a Chinese vessel. Despite initial denials of responsibility, Chinese authorities acknowledged 10 months later that Hong Kong-flagged ship NewNew Polar Bear caused the damage by accident.

Unfortunately, without perpetual surveillance, it is difficult to establish intentionality, or even attribution, in such incidents. And given the stakes involved, states are unlikely to risk escalation unless guilt can be proven beyond all reasonable doubt.


AN EMERGING VECTOR OF THREAT


Given the vastness of the Earth’s oceans, and the sheer number of undersea cables, securing the global network in its entirety is impossible. Furthermore, many cables run through international waters, where there is no effective regime to hold potential culprits accountable.


Undersea cables are vital to the functioning of the internet, and while it cannot be conclusively proven that the cable incidents in the Baltic Sea were malicious, they provide a glimpse of how similar acts of sabotage could be employed as part of a hybrid strategy.


For example, in 2023, two undersea cables connecting Taiwan with its Matsu islands were cut by Chinese non-naval vessels, disconnecting 14,000 people from the internet for 50 days. While there was no evidence that this was a deliberate act on China’s part, it is not hard to see how such an incident might support military operations in the event of war.

The Asia Pacific and its many cables is a fertile hunting ground for would-be hybrid actors. For example, the Straits of Malacca is a critical chokepoint for the region’s undersea cables, responsible for providing data connection between Asia, India, the Middle East and Europe, and with its relatively shallow waters, run a high risk of incidents. Should an incident occur there, the impact on regional connectivity would be significant.

HOW TO FIGHT HYBRID WARFARE?


While there are no easy solutions, several measures can be adopted to mitigate the threat. The first is for the international community to establish a working regime that governs responses to undersea cable sabotage, and to strengthen multilateral monitoring and repair capabilities. The undersea cable ecosystem is after all a shared global resource.

The second is for states to build communications resilience, acquiring backup sources for internet services and essential communications networks, such as satellite-based and microwave systems, and local fibre-optic networks. While such options provide only a fraction of the connectivity afforded by undersea cables, they will help partially alleviate the impact of a communications blackout.


Finally, borrowing from the hybrid warfare playbook, countermeasures can be adopted in other areas to deter potential sabotage – by addressing key vulnerabilities to strengthen overall resilience, a potential target becomes less attractive for hybrid actors to act against. For example, building social cohesion would allow a country to weather the effects of an incident, while a strong military provides an essential backstop against opportunistic attacks.


After all, if hybrid warfare represents a holistic form of attack, the defence must be just as expansive.


Ian Li is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).

Commentary: Cut undersea cables in Baltic Sea are a reminder of Asia Pacific’s vulnerability - CNA

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NATO launches new naval operation in Baltic Sea after severing of cables

NATO is launching a new patrol and surveillance operation to protect critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region bordering Russia, the alliance said Tuesday after several breaches of undersea cables have put European authorities on high alert.


The mission will boost the Western military alliance’s presence in a region on edge, including with frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, submarine satellites, remotely operated vehicles and a “small fleet of naval drones” to enhance surveillance, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told a news conference in Helsinki.


He declined to share figures and said the number of vessels “might differ from one week to another,” but said the operation dubbed “Baltic Sentry” would work “to deter future destabilizing acts” and “enhance our vigilance.” A NATO statement said the operation would “continue for an undisclosed amount of time.”


Alongside Rutte and other European officials, leaders of Baltic nations met in Helsinki on Tuesday to coordinate on securing the sea, after Finland seized an oil tanker that was suspected of severing a power cable connected to Estonia in late December. Damage was also reported to four telecoms cables.


The incidents contributed to mounting European fears of sabotage, as NATO officials accuse Russia of a growing “destabilization campaign” over their military support for Ukraine and sanctions against Moscow.


The Kremlin has denied involvement in any such plots, saying it is “absurd to continue to blame Russia for everything.”

Finland did not directly blame Moscow for the damage in last month’s incident, although European authorities have said they suspect that the Eagle S tanker is part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” — carrying Russian oil products that are under Western embargo — and that it caused the damage by dragging its anchor across the seabed.


Finnish authorities have said they believe the vessel would have caused more damage if police hadn’t boarded it when they did, and they have banned some of the crew from traveling as part of an ongoing investigation. “In that particular case, had it continued for another 12 minutes, the carnage would have been much worse,” Finnish President Alexander Stubb told reporters Tuesday.

A few weeks earlier, in November, an underwater communications cable between Finland and Germany was cut, in what Berlin described as suspected sabotage, and damage was reported to a separate internet cable linking Lithuania and Sweden. European authorities said there has been no major impact on the public or on energy supplies in the recent cases.


The leaders of Baltic allies described the Finnish approach of seizing the ship as a first — and as a way to ward off more sabotage attempts. Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal said Tuesday that it “should be a benchmark for future operations.”


About 2,000 ships cross the Baltic Sea every day, making it tricky to monitor them all, but a “bold signal” could improve deterrence, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics said. Officials in Baltic states bordering Russia, which have been some of the most vocal about backing Ukraine, have long pressed for greater action.


Well before Tuesday’s announcement, European countries had boosted their military presence in the region since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, increasing security around infrastructure including power and telecom cables and gas pipelines.


While NATO leaders have increasingly warned of a Russia-linked sabotage campaign in recent months as the bloc squares off with Moscow over Ukraine, some European leaders have been hesitant on what the response should be — in some cases because hard evidence can be elusive and because of a reluctance to further escalate tensions.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson told reporters ahead of the meeting that it was “totally unacceptable that these damages seem to have been increasing in numbers recently” but was careful about casting blame. “We don’t accuse anybody for anything so far. We don’t do that easily without very firm proof,” he said.


German prosecutors are also still investigating the bombing of the Nord Stream gas pipelines between Russia and Germany in September 2022. The Post reported in 2023 that a senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country’s intelligence services played a central role in the Nord Stream bombing.


Sweden, which joined NATO last year, would dispatch up to three warships under NATO command in the Baltic Sea for the first time. The Lithuanian navy is boosting surveillance there, and Estonian forces stepped up sea patrols.


A 10-nation European force led by Britain is also launching an AI-powered monitoring system called “Nordic Warden,” trialed during drills in Latvia. The British Defense Ministry said this month that the tool, backed by Silicon Valley-based Palantir, will “track potential threats to undersea infrastructure and monitor the Russian shadow fleet.”


While the secretive Big Data company doesn’t typically disclose military use of its tools, Palantir’s U.K. head, Louis Mosley, said Nordic Warden has been “in active use” since the Christmas Day cable incident in the Baltic that pushed Finland to seize the oil tanker.


Leaders meeting Tuesday warned that Europe should brace for more such attempts, work with private-sector providers and enhance the capacity to make swift repairs. “You cannot prevent all actions of sabotage, and that’s why it’s so important that you have varying sources of energy or data that you can convert to,” Stubb said.

MSN