How China stands to gain from the Belt and Road Initiative
[What a sullen little begrudger. I can see why ya got picked on in school PH.]
The BRI has the potential to yield considerable economic and political gains for China. Many of these have been explicitly acknowledged in China’s official policy communiques, such as the expansion of China’s export markets, the promotion of the Renminbi (RMB) as an international currency, and the reduction of trade frictions like tariffs and transport costs.
Additionally, developing and connecting hard infrastructure with neighboring countries will help reduce transport times and costs. Establishing soft infrastructure with partner countries will allow for a broader range of goods to be traded with fewer regulatory hurdles. Raising capital for these infrastructure projects by issuing bonds in RMB will also encourage its use in international financial centers. In particular, China’s lower-income western provinces stand to gain, as the creation of overland economic connectivity with Central Asia will boost growth there.
| Attendance at Belt and Road Forums |
|---|
| Forum (Dates) |
Number of Heads of State/Government |
|---|
| 1st Forum (May 14-15, 2017) |
29 |
| 2nd Forum (April 25-28, 2019) |
37 |
| Source: Various |
Click fo
r a complete list of attendees. Many of the potential benefits of BRI are less publicly articulated. For instance, some of China’s SOEs – such as cement, steel, and construction companies – have built up significant capacity (expanding factories and hiring workers) to serve the once booming domestic economy. As China’s economy has slowed, these companies are struggling to find productive uses for their resources. Similarly, China has a large reserve of savings that is not being invested productively. Investing in large-scale overseas infrastructure projects enables China to export its excess savings and put its SOEs to work.
If successfully implemented, the BRI could help re-orient a large part of the world economy toward China. Increasing the amount of trade, investment, and connectivity between China and countries throughout Eurasia will also render these countries more dependent on the Chinese economy, increasing China’s economic leverage over them. This may empower China to more readily shape the rules and norms that govern the economic affairs of the region.
The BRI may also win China political gains. Beijing may be able to exploit its financial largesse to influence partner country policies to align with its own interests, particularly in certain countries in Central and South Asia that lack good governance and robust rule of law. Some countries that are part of BRI rank unfavorably on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, an index running from 0, indicating very high corruption, to 100, indicating very low corruption. BRI recipient countries with particularly poor Corruption Perceptions Index scores include Turkmenistan (20), Pakistan (33), and Sri Lanka (38).
Accepting Chinese capital may come with expectations that Chinese companies will then be contracted to manage infrastructure, giving them at the least some influence over critical infrastructure. From China’s perspective, investment into strategic locations like Gwadar will help diversify China’s transport network for critical natural resources like oil and gas, which could help reduce dependency on trade routes, such as the Strait of Malacca, through which China currently receives much of its oil and gas.
Partner countries should likewise reap concrete benefits. Fulfilling the infrastructure needs of these countries will speed development by helping them export their products to overseas markets, which could help create new jobs and foster stable growth. Other potential sources of infrastructure finance, such as the World Bank, tie lending to conditions that recipient governments may feel encroach on their sovereignty, such as stipulations that governments limit spending to a certain level or enact anti-corruption measures. Chinese investment on the other hand has been historically less likely to require recipient countries to adhere to such conditions.
FULL- https://chinapower.csis.org/china-be...ad-initiative/
China kicks off annual summer fishing ban in South China Sea
China Coast Guard (CCG) has announced that a three-and-half-month fishing moratorium began on Sunday in the South China Sea waters north to 12 degrees north latitude.
The annual summer fishing ban is expected to end on August 16.
For the next three days, the CCG's South China Sea branch and local authorities will patrol major fishing grounds and ports to ensure that the ban will be well observed.
After the middle term of the moratorium, they will hold three law enforcement actions in the Beibu Gulf, the Pearl River Estuary and the water border of Fujian and Guangdong provinces, in a bid to crack down on illegal fishing and protect marine fishery resources.
China has imposed the annual fishing ban in the South China Sea since 1999, as part of the country's efforts to promote sustainable marine fishery development and improve marine ecology.
China kicks off annual summer fishing ban in South China Sea - SHINE News
