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Thread: Airline News

  1. #2576
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    Quote Originally Posted by Boon Mee View Post
    Boeing 737 Max: Battle Brews over Who Should Analyze Black Boxes from Ethiopian Air Crash

    Ethiopia’s aviation authority is unable to read the black box recorders from the Boeing 737 Max plane that crashed Sunday, but a row is brewing over just where the flight recorders will be sent for analysis.

    http://fortune.com/2019/03/13/ethiopian-air-crash-black-boxes/

    Worried about US corruption? That's pretty heavy, man...
    Little history lesson for you Booners:

    When TWA800 blew up outside New York, Boeing were asked to assist the NTSB in the investigation. Boeing had a report about the centre tank of 747's blowing up under certain circumstances, but they told the NTSB and FAA that they didn't.

    And you wonder why nobody trusts the c u n t s?

    The TWA800 Precursor Report that Boeing forgot to mention

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    Quote Originally Posted by harrybarracuda View Post
    Indonesia’s Lion Air plans to drop a $22 billion order for Boeing Co 737 Max jetliners and switch to aircraft from rivals Airbus SE as a rift between the companies widens following this week’s crash in Ethiopia, a person with knowledge of the proposal said.

    Lion Air was already looking at scrapping the Boeing deal after one of its own Max planes came down on October 29, killing 189 people, and the African tragedy has made co-founder Rusdi Kirana more determined to cancel the contract, according to the person.



    https://gulfnews.com/business/aviati...tch-1.62612433

    Well to be fair Harry, and while Boeing is not covering themselves in any glory here, Lion Air is in no way a bastion of flight safety. Since 2002, 10 out of 14 the aircraft they have mismanaged to crash/write off have been Boeing B737's. Not sure Airbus will be offering discounts either.

  4. #2579
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    Quote Originally Posted by bobfish View Post
    Well to be fair Harry, and while Boeing is not covering themselves in any glory here, Lion Air is in no way a bastion of flight safety. Since 2002, 10 out of 14 the aircraft they have mismanaged to crash/write off have been Boeing B737's. Not sure Airbus will be offering discounts either.
    You'd think Boeing would have been really happy at their aircraft churn rate.

    But a lot of this is face: Boeing's instant reaction was to point the finger at the pilots (as it usually is), and the CEO took umbrage.

    And the simple fact is that the A320-NEO is a better aircraft: It's a new plane without the design flaws of the 737MAX, which essentially is a 50 year old aircraft with new, bigger engines bolted onto it that make it unflyable.

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    Commentary: Boeing’s Tylenol moment and the need for radical transparency
    By Judson Rollins


    The 737 MAX has now been grounded or banned in nearly every jurisdiction in which it was operating just a few days ago.


    Sunday’s tragic accident in Ethiopia bears an uncanny resemblance to the circumstances of the October crash of Lion Air 610, a fact which Boeing has tried to downplay by arguing that both accidents are still under investigation. The earlier accident is widely believed to have been caused by repeated nose-down trim responses driven by the MAX’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which in turn may have been influenced by inputs from a faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor.


    Prior to Wednesday’s belated decision by the White House and FAA to ground the MAX, social media was inundated with passengers asking airlines to move them off flights scheduled to be operated by the model. A Dallas Morning News review of pilot filings to a NASA safety reporting system revealed that pilots have been complaining for months about MAX handling issues believed to have brought down the ill-fated Lion Air flight.


    One pilot wrote, “Now we know the systems employed are error-prone – even if the pilots aren’t sure what those systems are, what redundancies are in place and failure modes. I am left to wonder: what else don’t I know?”


    Reports of a phone call between Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenberg and US President Donald Trump reportedly imploring the latter not to allow the FAA to ground the MAX provides additional reason for doubt. To wit, why lobby the White House to override the FAA if the technical evidence is clearly on Boeing’s side? This flies in the face of any Boeing public statements about putting safety first.


    Boeing’s own announcements have also shown an appalling ignorance to the gravity of the situation. A Monday release touted a MAX software update that would “make a safe airplane even safer” – which is more than slightly uncomfortable when set alongside the fact that more than 150 people just died in an accident involving that same airplane.


    Boeing has long been known for a secretive, buttoned-up culture that rarely admits bad news. After the 1994 crash of USAir 427, Boeing repeatedly and publicly insisted the accident was caused by a pilot’s poor response to wake turbulence. It relented only when the National Transportation Safety Board requested flight data directly from 737 and 747 operators proving that uncommanded rudder reversal was the likely cause.


    A more recent example was the 2007 rollout of a “fake” production 787 with plywood wing panels and doors, no cockpit, and no interior bulkheads. Boeing also repeatedly downplayed production and certification delays to the 787 program. The company’s apparent PR approach of “move along, nothing to see here” has become so de rigueur that its denials have come to feel more like implicit confessions.


    Following the Lion Air accident, Boeing essentially blamed the pilots – causing the CEO of the airline to threaten to cancel orders for more than 150 MAXes.


    For an example of how to manage a full-blown crisis of confidence, Boeing would do well to look at how US consumer giant Johnson & Johnson managed a 1982 scandal involving its market-leading Tylenol painkiller. Seven people in Chicago were reported dead after taking Tylenol capsules. Police eventually discovered that the victims died from cyanide poisoning. The suspect – who has never been identified – removed Tylenol bottles from store shelves, injected them with cyanide, and returned them to the shelves.


    In a concerted effort to reassure the public, Johnson & Johnson distributed warnings to hospitals and distributors and halted Tylenol production and advertising. In October 1982, it issued a nationwide recall of Tylenol products, costing the company more than US $100M ($273M in 2019 dollars). They also halted all advertisement for the product, and even issued national warnings urging the public not to take Tylenol.


    When Tylenol was brought back to market, each bottle came with triple-seal tamper-resistant packaging. Johnson & Johnson also began to promote the purchase of caplets, which are more resistant to tampering. The company tasked more than 2,000 sales representatives with delivering presentations to the medical community to restore confidence in Tylenol products.


    Before the cyanide scandal, Tylenol accounted for 37% of US painkiller sales. Within the first 12 months, that market share had fallen to just 7%. Marketers predicted that the Tylenol brand, which accounted for 17% of J&J’s net income in 1981, would never recover from the sabotage. However, by 1983 it had recovered to a 30% share.


    Although Johnson & Johnson management knew the company was not responsible for the tampering of the product, they assumed responsibility by putting public safety first and recalling all affected products from the market. Herein lies an essential lesson for Boeing: When your reputation depends on safety, it does not matter what has been proven or who is at fault. What matters is that you are seen taking the lead to protect the safety of the public – at all costs.


    Radical transparency is essential to restore the 737 MAX’s reputation
    Now that the decision of whether to ground the airplane has been taken out of Boeing’s hands, it is time for management to put a full-scale effort into restoring trust in the company’s products and approach to safety issues.


    The top priority should be full public disclosure of all known problems with MCAS and AOA sensors to regulators, operators, pilots … and yes, even the traveling public. Ninety-nine percent of travelers will not understand (or even care) how MCAS works, but just seeing Boeing offer full disclosure of what it knows and how it intends to implement potential fixes will go a long way. The goal must be to restore the public’s confidence that Boeing is solely focused on identifying and addressing any technical issues – not avoiding bad publicity or maintaining its stock price.


    Whether Boeing management likes it or not, perception is reality. Any public perception of a less-than-honest approach to safety will have implications on operators’ fleet selections for years to come. Even in a world where Boeing is one of only two choices for most commercial aircraft purchases, the buyers of those aircraft (airlines) know they must offer a product to their end customers (passengers) that the latter instinctively know to be safe and reliable.


    The public’s confidence in Boeing has already been severely shaken, and damage to the company’s brand will only grow every day it continues to deny the existence of a problem it cannot disprove.


    https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/13/commentary-boeings-tylenol-moment-and-the-need-for-radical-transparency/

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    The box info suggests a similar problem to the previous Max crash, not pilot error.



    https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-...-hundreds-feet
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    Quote Originally Posted by harrybarracuda View Post
    You'd think Boeing would have been really happy at their aircraft churn rate.

    But a lot of this is face: Boeing's instant reaction was to point the finger at the pilots (as it usually is), and the CEO took umbrage.

    And the simple fact is that the A320-NEO is a better aircraft: It's a new plane without the design flaws of the 737MAX, which essentially is a 50 year old aircraft with new, bigger engines bolted onto it that make it unflyable.

    Fair point! Corporate greed and avarice.....

    Both the B737 Max and A320 NEO are re-engined derivatives of their original models. In the Boeing case, quite a few generations later. One of the reasons for this is that Boeing can claim the Max as a derivative of the original model [no more than 30% change by generation] and as such can certify the aircraft to some of the less restrictive performance standards that existed when the first -100 flew. [Eg rejected takeoff pilot reaction time]. This places newer clean sheet models at a disadvantage: [In the takeoff example, the newer aircraft requires more runway/less weight/bigger brakes/higher lift devices etc].

    Whether the NEO is a better aircraft than the MAX is a moot point, and outside my experience parameters.

    My opinion of the MCAS bandaid fix for the MAX: The input logic from the AOA probes does not provide for failsafe redundancy ie failure of an active probe does not preclude activation of the MCAS. Both probes should have been simultaneously monitored so that a fault[disagreement] in either would inhibit MCAS activation. This is fairly basic engineering stuff and responsibility lies directly with Boeing and the FAA.

    Is the MAX unflyable without MCAS? In the high angle of attack regime there presents some difficulty with handling the aircraft, so that MCAS was developed to provide positive stability. In most flight envelope regimes though, the Max is perfectly flyable without MCAS.

    Which brings me to a point clarified by Boeing after the Lion Air crash: If abnormal uncommanded trim functions - whether MCAS induced or not - the standard procedure should be followed. This includes inhibiting normal trim function via switches on the centre pedestal. This is the same for all 4 Boeing types I have flown, and fairly basic pilot stuff.

    Whether the Ethiopian episode mirrors the Lion Air fault and Pilot response remains to be seen. If so, a tragedy that should quite easily have been avoided.

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    “Pilots said in prior reports that soon after engaging the autopilot on Boeing 737 Max 8 planes, the nose tilted down sharply...” The new, heavier engines necessitate these electronic sensor overrides



    https://twitter.com/RealJamesWoods/s...38529417195520

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    Quote Originally Posted by bobfish View Post
    Both the B737 Max and A320 NEO are re-engined derivatives of their original models. In the Boeing case, quite a few generations later. One of the reasons for this is that Boeing can claim the Max as a derivative of the original model [no more than 30% change by generation] and as such can certify the aircraft to some of the less restrictive performance standards that existed when the first -100 flew. [Eg rejected takeoff pilot reaction time].
    The only reason Boeing made the max was in response to the success of the A32xNEO. To save time and money, they re-engineered the 737 which mean they could use "supplemental type certification" - a much quicker (and CHEAPER) process that "trusts" existing, certified designs.

    The problem is the 737 sits too low for bigger engines, so they had to move them up and out. This is what caused the plane to go nose up "under certain conditions". You can't have a plane acting randomly, so the invented MCAS to counteract the unexpected affects and fucked it up.

    The NEO on the other hand sits higher, so effectively all they had to was bolt bigger engines on.



    Whether the NEO is a better aircraft than the MAX is a moot point, and outside my experience parameters.
    Well it hasn't crashed, that's a lot fucking better in my book.

    My opinion of the MCAS bandaid fix for the MAX: The input logic from the AOA probes does not provide for failsafe redundancy ie failure of an active probe does not preclude activation of the MCAS. Both probes should have been simultaneously monitored so that a fault[disagreement] in either would inhibit MCAS activation. This is fairly basic engineering stuff and responsibility lies directly with Boeing and the FAA.

    Is the MAX unflyable without MCAS? In the high angle of attack regime there presents some difficulty with handling the aircraft, so that MCAS was developed to provide positive stability. In most flight envelope regimes though, the Max is perfectly flyable without MCAS.
    "The Boeing 737-MAX: Doesn't crash in most circumstances". Quite the selling point.


    Whether the Ethiopian episode mirrors the Lion Air fault and Pilot response remains to be seen. If so, a tragedy that should quite easily have been avoided.
    I don't think "remains to be seen" are the correct words. It's more "when it's confirmed".
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    Well Harry,
    I feel time may prove you correct, but I'll wait for the definitive report. I don't buy into the whole Boeing vs Airbus bullshit. With 10+ years personally on the A330/A340 as well, all types have their foibles which require a work-around....

    Boon Mee,
    That's an interesting but very simplistic graphic. The weight of the engines is not the issue, rather their aerodynamic placement. It does however get the basic message across for non-aviators.

    Would I fly a MAX? With knowledge of the MCAS problem and an easy workaround; sure. As a passenger? yes, but I'd choose my airline wisely.....
    Last edited by bobfish; 15-03-2019 at 02:37 PM. Reason: punctuation

  11. #2586
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    Quote Originally Posted by bobfish View Post
    Well Harry,
    I feel time may prove you correct, but I'll wait for the definitive report. I don't buy into the whole Boeing vs Airbus bullshit.
    I'm not quite sure what you mean. I clearly explained the difference between the two aircraft and why Boeing had to relocate the engines on their plane to bring a product to market that could compete with the NEO. That is not "bullshit" it's market forces, and it's why they did it.


    With 10+ years personally on the A330/A340 as well, all types have their foibles which require a work-around....
    I'm all ears. Which ones crashed because of these "foibles"? AF447?

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    (Bloomberg)—A screw-like device found in the wreckage of the Boeing 737 Max 8 that crashed Sunday in Ethiopia has provided investigators with an early clue into what happened, as work begins in France to decode the black boxes recovered from the scene.


    The so-called jackscrew, used to set the trim that raises and lowers the plane’s nose, indicates the jet was configured to dive, based on a preliminary review, according to a person familiar with the investigation. The evidence helped persuade U.S. regulators to ground the model, said the person, who requested anonymity to discuss the inquiry.

    https://www.chicagobusiness.com/manu.../manufacturing

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    This is what happens when corporations run the government
    by Dana Milbank (WaPo)

    This is what happens when corporations run the government.

    As the world was grounding 737 Max airliners this week, following the second crash involving the new jet in five months, the Trump administration, serving as a wholly owned subsidiary of Boeing, declared “no basis to order grounding.”

    This from an administration and president that claim climate change is a hoax, radiation and pesticides are healthy, and that “raking” prevents forest fires.
    When President Trump finally buckled to pressure and grounded the 737 Maxon Wednesday, he said he “maybe didn’t have to” but thought it important “psychologically.”
    And why shouldn’t everybody trust the judgment of a guy who didn’t know the difference between HIV and HPV, proposed that exercise is bad for you and claimed that vaccines cause autism? Trump says he has a “natural instinct for science” because an uncle taught at MIT.

    But Trump’s late uncle didn’t tell him to protect Boeing. That was Boeing’s chief executive, a frequent visitor to Trump properties, phoning Trump with a plea not to ground both the 737 Max 8 and Max 9.
    That corporations make safety decisions for Trump (himself a failed airlineowner) isn’t surprising. The acting head of the Federal Aviation Administrationis formerly of American Airlines and of the Aerospace Industries Association, of which Boeing is a prominent member. Trump is expected to nominate a former Delta Air Lines executive for the top FAA job. His acting defense secretary is a former Boeing executive.

    In Trump’s broader corporatocracy, a former oil-industry lobbyist acts as interior secretary, a former pharmaceutical executive is health and human services secretary, and a former coal lobbyist runs the Environmental Protection Agency. Fully 350 former lobbyists work, have worked or have been tapped to work in the administration, The Post’s Philip Bump reported , using data from the liberal group American Bridge 21st Century. The 24 at the Transportation Department lag behind only the 31 at HHS and 47 in the executive office of the president.

    The swamp has overflowed, with lobbyists employed by Trump quintupling over two years. Boeing, American Airlines and 31 other corporate entities landed at least five former lobbyists apiece. Public Citizen reported that, five months into the administration, nearly 70 percent of top nominees had corporate ties.

    The corporate hold over the government hurts U.S. credibility overseas. After the crash of one of its Max 8 airliners, Ethiopian Airlines opted to send the doomed plane’s black boxes not to the United States but to Europe. U.S. resistance to grounding the 737 Max raised worldwide concern about a “defiant” United States (Bangladesh), its credibility “eroded” because government is “too cozy” with business (Hong Kong) and is swayed by “corporate interests . . . to ignore reality” (Australia).

    Nobody yet knows whether the Ethiopian Airlines crash had the same cause as October’s similar Lion Air crash in the Java Sea near Indonesia. But, clearly, the procedural fix circulated by the FAA in November was inadequate, and a Boeing software update, which government officials planned for January, never came. The Wall Street Journal reported that the delay was caused, in part, by the government shutdown. The corporate FAA chief denies this, but the pilots’ union had warned that the shutdown suspended safety oversight.

    Trump facilitates the corporate takeover by running his administration on autopilot. A disproportionate number of “acting” officials — they hold the FAA’s top three positions, run the Pentagon and Interior Department, and serve as Trump’s chief of staff and budget director — reduces congressional oversight and weakens enforcement.

    In addition, the billions of dollars that corporate executives invest in lobbying and campaign contributions have generated healthy returns: a corporate tax cut, an assault on regulations and unrelenting efforts to shrink enforcement. The president, who previously attempted to privatize 30,000 FAA jobs, again proposed slashing the FAA in his budget this week.
    Corporate victories keep coming. The Los Angeles Times just obtained emails showing that EPA officials moved to block NASA from monitoring pollution levels. Politico recently obtained data that showed that the Interior Department gave oil drillers nearly 1,700 waivers of safety rules implemented after BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.

    The Union of Concerned Scientists has documented more than 70 “attacks on science,” many benefiting corporations: censoring scientific language, suppressing studies, weakening advisory panels and such. The group suspects “inappropriate corporate influence” in rolling back fuel efficiency, chemical and methane standards, repealing the Clean Power Plan, suppressing known health risks, expanding oil and gas leasing and bailing out the coal industry, among others.

    The American consumer pays the cost. Three days before the crash in Ethiopia, I took a Southwest 737 Max 8 flight to Denver. I knew it was the same model that had crashed in October, but I trusted federal officials’ claims to have addressed the problem with new pilot instructions (which were insufficient) and the promised software fix (which never came).
    Like millions of Americans, I long trusted that the federal government tried to protect food, air, water and safety. Trump’s corporatocracy broke that trust.
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    Federal Aviation Administration's reputation at risk over handling of Boeing 737 MAX 8 grounding


    The FAA's priorities are being questioned after the second Boeing 737 MAX 8 crash in four months

    As investigators in France begin examining the black box flight recorder from Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, questions are being asked about aviation regulators on the other side of the Atlantic.

    Key points:

    • The US was the last major country to ground its Boeing 737 MAX 8s
    • Experts say the Federal Aviation Administration's reputation has been seriously damaged as a result
    • Boeing shares are down in the wake of the Ethiopian Airlines crash, with the manufacturer's future revenue under threat



    In particular, why was the US so slow to ground its fleet of Boeing 737 MAX 8s after two crashes in four months, which between them claimed more than 300 lives?

    And why was it US President Donald Trump who made the announcement and not the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)?
    Long-time airline industry watcher Peter Harbison, from the Centre for Asia-Pacific Aviation, believes the FAA's reputation has been seriously damaged.

    Mr Harbison told the ABC the fact that the US was the last major country in the world to ground its 737 MAX 8s — and that it was the President who announced it — implied it was a business, as well as a safety, decision.

    "The commercial impact on the US airlines was much greater than any other country," he said.

    For the balance of the article search ABC federal-aviation-administration-safety-ethiopian-airlines-boeing/10908252
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    ^Just another example of ameristani "values".

    I'm sure goldilocks let his "friends" know of his decision prior to announcing it to the world, there's a profit to be made don't you know.

  16. #2591
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    Quote Originally Posted by OhOh View Post
    ^Just another example of ameristani "values".

    I'm sure goldilocks let his "friends" know of his decision prior to announcing it to the world, there's a profit to be made don't you know.
    Don't be silly. It would stick out like a sore thumb if anyone shorted Boeing stock just before an announcement of that magnitude.

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    Interestingly, one of the links on PPRUNE discusses an unexplained B767 cargo plane crash recently that has hardly got a mention despite many of that Boeing model also being in service as a passenger aircraft.

    The plane was descending to land and then suddenly accelerated before pitching 49 degrees nose down and flying into a bay, killing all three on board.

    It was briefly captured on a security camera (apologies, the tit that posted it added some ridiculous dramatic music often seen on car crash videos from Russian posters).



    The NTSB issued an investigation update on the February 23, 2019, crash of Atlas Air flight 3591, a Boeing 767-375BCF that killed all three on board. The aircraft entered a rapid descent from 6,000 ft and impacted a marshy bay area about 40 miles southeast of George Bush Intercontinental Airport (KIAH), Houston, Texas.


    Air traffic control communications and radar data indicated the flight was normal from Miami to the Houston terminal area. About 12:30 pm the pilots contacted the Houston terminal radar approach control (TRACON) arrival controller and reported descending for runway 26L; the airplane was at 17,800 ft with a ground speed 320 knots. At 12:34, the airplane was descending through 13,800 ft, and the controller advised of an area of light to heavy precipitation along the flight route and that they could expect vectors around the weather.

    About 12:35, the flight was transferred to the Houston TRACON final controller, and the pilot reported they had received the Houston Automatic Terminal Information System weather broadcast. The controller told the pilots to expect vectors to runway 26L and asked if they wanted to go to the west or north of the weather.


    Radar data indicated the airplane continued the descent through 12,000 ft with a ground speed of 290 knots, consistent with the arrival procedure. The pilots responded that they wanted to go to the west of the area of precipitation. The controller advised that to do so, they would need to descend to 3,000 ft expeditiously.


    About 12:37, the controller instructed the pilots to turn to a heading of 270°. Radar data indicated the airplane turned, and the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated a selected heading of 270°. The airplane was descending through 8,500 ft at this time.


    About 12:38, the controller informed the pilots that they would be past the area of weather in about 18 miles, that they could expect a turn to the north for a base leg to the approach to runway 26L, and that weather was clear west of the precipitation area. The pilots responded, “sounds good” and “ok.” At this time, radar and ADS-B returns indicated the airplane levelled briefly at 6,200 ft and then began a slight climb to 6,300 ft.


    Also, about this time, the FDR data indicated that some small vertical accelerations consistent with the airplane entering turbulence. Shortly after, when the airplane’s indicated airspeed was steady about 230 knots, the engines increased to maximum thrust, and the airplane pitch increased to about 4° nose up and then rapidly pitched nose down to about 49° in response to nose-down elevator deflection. The stall warning (stick shaker) did not activate.


    FDR, radar, and ADS-B data indicated that the airplane entered a rapid descent on a heading of 270°, reaching an airspeed of about 430 knots. A security camera video captured the airplane in a steep, generally wings-level attitude until impact with the swamp. FDR data indicated that the airplane gradually pitched up to about 20 degrees nose down during the descent.


    https://news.aviation-safety.net/201...-column-input/


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    Quote Originally Posted by harrybarracuda View Post
    I'm not quite sure what you mean. I clearly explained the difference between the two aircraft and why Boeing had to relocate the engines on their plane to bring a product to market that could compete with the NEO. That is not "bullshit" it's market forces, and it's why they did it.
    Perhaps you were reading too much into this and reacted personally Harry. Not my gunfight.
    The Boeing vs Airbus bullshit has been a constant stream of excrement [IMHO] since the advent of the A300... on many more platforms, flightdecks, bars and crewrooms than this forum. I've flown both, been a Captain for more than a quarter century [combined] on both, and a Type Rating Examiner. On both. I stand by my comment.



    Quote Originally Posted by harrybarracuda View Post
    I'm all ears. Which ones crashed because of these "foibles"? AF447?
    AF447?. Well that's an interesting example out of a number of Airbus crashes I could use to elucidate/educate. In the case of AF447, the 'ADR Disagree' fault which they experienced was a matter of record on a considerable number of occasions with other airlines prior. In my own company, at least two occasions. They and others did not lose control because they fortunately employed a 'workaround' : It is drummed into pilots, Power + Attitude = Performance. Basic Student Pilot technique and 100% valid in this scenario. Subsequent to these events, the 'Recommendation' [ note: not a Directive ] among others was to replace the Pitot heads with modified units. AF and some other companies elected not do this. The ADR Disagree foible remained for those operators. Unfortunately, after encountering the 'foible' the basic 'workaround' was not implemented in AF447's case. That is a matter of record and opens a whole other can of worms.

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    Quote Originally Posted by bobfish View Post
    Perhaps you were reading too much into this and reacted personally Harry. Not my gunfight.
    The Boeing vs Airbus bullshit has been a constant stream of excrement [IMHO] since the advent of the A300... on many more platforms, flightdecks, bars and crewrooms than this forum. I've flown both, been a Captain for more than a quarter century [combined] on both, and a Type Rating Examiner. On both. I stand by my comment.


    You're welcome to stand by it, I was simply asking you to elucidate. If you simply mean Boeing don't like competition, that would sum it up neatly.




    AF447?. Well that's an interesting example out of a number of Airbus crashes I could use to elucidate/educate. In the case of AF447, the 'ADR Disagree' fault which they experienced was a matter of record on a considerable number of occasions with other airlines prior. In my own company, at least two occasions. They and others did not lose control because they fortunately employed a 'workaround' : It is drummed into pilots, Power + Attitude = Performance. Basic Student Pilot technique and 100% valid in this scenario. Subsequent to these events, the 'Recommendation' [ note: not a Directive ] among others was to replace the Pitot heads with modified units. AF and some other companies elected not do this. The ADR Disagree foible remained for those operators. Unfortunately, after encountering the 'foible' the basic 'workaround' was not implemented in AF447's case. That is a matter of record and opens a whole other can of worms.
    I picked that one because it was an almost identical scenario: Shitty equipment (Pitot tubes); irrational computer behaviour (turning off stall protection which confused the flight crew) and the pilots' inability to respond to the crisis.

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    Yeah, my point is there are plenty more examples from either side of the A vs B cutting table.

    I guess it doesn't give the families of the departed any solace, nor us any real answers.

    On a separate, more aviation oriented, forum, the idea has been put forward that it would be more correct to ground the inadequately trained pilots rather than an aircraft with known [ but easily overcome] faults. That of course is utter BS. The root cause is as you have suggested Harry: Corporate avarice from manufacturers and operators, combined with massive reductions in experience and training, along with a general greedy expectation that fares should be cheap, cheap, cheap...... have led us to where we are.

    Maybe one day there will be that one big button that when pressed makes it all happen.


    Edit..... added later:

    But just to be pedantic: "Shitty equipment (Pitot tubes); irrational computer behaviour (turning off stall protection which confused the flight crew) and the pilots' inability to respond to the crisis."
    The computer behaviour was entirely rational given the failure. The pilot[s] did not understand the system and was left in command of an aircraft with the same stall protection as a previous generation aircraft eg Boeing 747/DC10/L1011. It should have been a non-event.....
    Last edited by bobfish; 16-03-2019 at 09:25 PM.

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    ^^ The 767 accident is of interest to me. I worked with Air Atlas nearly 20 years ago, on 747-200 freighters. This was an ex Pax plane converted to freighter. First thoughts were an empennage failure of some sort.

    My 737 knowledge is limited to 3/4/500 series but I can't see why a stab cutout wouldn't have made the problems non events. Trim wheel has a green band and is obvious when in motion.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Dana Milbank
    The American consumer pays the cost
    er , Dana , stop your navel gazing - it is the world that is paying the cost
    Last edited by baldrick; 17-03-2019 at 06:27 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by baldrick View Post
    it is the world that is paying the cost
    ...that notion has less impact on Milbank's target audience than his original statement and the import of the article: tRump's personnel decisions and the possible consequences...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Troy View Post
    ^^ The 767 accident is of interest to me. I worked with Air Atlas nearly 20 years ago, on 747-200 freighters. This was an ex Pax plane converted to freighter. First thoughts were an empennage failure of some sort.

    My 737 knowledge is limited to 3/4/500 series but I can't see why a stab cutout wouldn't have made the problems non events. Trim wheel has a green band and is obvious when in motion.
    There is some interesting discussion on this subject in the PPRUNE thread starting at about page 84.

    And I think I already posted that they found a jackscrew that indicated the plane was basically pointed nose down when it crashed, which is why they grounded the aircraft.

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    FAA allowed Boeing to carry out its own flawed safety analysis of the 737 MAX - report



    A troublesome autopilot feature believed to be behind two crashes of Boeing’s 737 MAX 8 airplane met all FAA requirements, the manufacturer claims. However, Boeing’s own safety analysis was riddled with flaws, engineers say.

    Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 nosedived into a field shortly after takeoff last Sunday, killing all 157 people on board. Last October, a similar fate befell Indonesian Lion Air Flight 610, which plunged into the sea, killing all 189 passengers and crew. In both cases, the 737 Max 8’s MCAS monitoring system is believed to have pushed the plane’s nose down automatically, throwing the aircraft into a dive.

    There are “clear similarities” between the two accidents, Ethiopia’s transport minister told reporters on Sunday.

    With the 737 Max 8 grounded worldwide, the MCAS system is now under scrutiny. A Boeing spokesman said on Sunday that the system met all of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) certification requirements, but a group of anonymous Boeing and FAA engineers told the Seattle Times that the FAA delegated much of the safety analysis to the company itself, which cut corners to deliver the plane on time.

    Due to the plane’s relatively forward engine placement, its nose was liable to drift upwards during flight, a characteristic that could lead to engine stalls. The MCAS system was designed to make micro-adjustments to the tail’s angle to push the nose back down and counteract this.

    Boeing’s analysis, the engineers said, understated the power of this system. By the time the planes entered service, the MCAS system was able to move the tail more than four times further than the initial analysis stated. Furthermore, the analysis failed to account for how the system would reset itself every time a pilot responded, allowing it to repeatedly push the plane’s nose down.

    The MCAS system relies on only one sensor to read the nose angle. Had Boeing accurately assessed the impact of that system’s failure, such a setup would never have been allowed, the engineers said.

    The FAA allowed Boeing to conduct its own safety analysis, and trusted the firm’s conclusions. Other air safety regulators around the world then certified the MAX 8 based on the FAA’s thumbs up.

    Boeing did not refute the engineers’ claims, but said that “there are some significant mischaracterizations” with them.

    Development of the 737 MAX was rushed, the engineers said, as Boeing was competing to bring the plane to market before Airbus’ A320neo. In this environment, the company allegedly cut corners. The MCAS system was not mentioned in any training manuals, and was expected to only kick in in extreme circumstances. Boeing’s insistence on its safety allowed 737 pilots to switch to flying the MAX 8 with minimal extra training, an attractive prospect to cost-conscious airlines.

    One pilot said his training involved little more than a one-hour session with an iPad, with no simulator hours.

    Moving forward, Boeing has promised to update the 737 MAX’s software, limiting the strength of the MCAS system and allowing it to take readings from multiple sensors. However, the Seattle company’s troubles are far from over. As the planes stay grounded, Boeing’s stock is falling and airlines are beginning to demand compensation.

    The FAA, meanwhile, has said that it may take “months” for Boeing to apply the necessary software updates."

    https://www.rt.com/news/454076-boein...fety-analysis/

    https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
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