Originally Posted by
SteveCM
^ Prem's radical idea of amnesty (you could almost call it "Amnesty Plus") for the communist insurgents has been brought up before as at least an example of what can (arguably
should) be done to break conflict log-jams - but it was in the context of dealing with what was very much an
armed CPT insurgency. That's much closer to the ongoing situation in the South than to even the most lurid and fanciful versions of armed/violent elements said to lurk in the background of UDD/Redshirt activity. To put it plainly, UDD/Redshirts aren't FARC.
For some background on dealing with the CPT insurgency, see
Thailand: anatomy of a counterinsurgency victory | Military Review | Find Articles - particularly p8 about "PM Order No. 66/23" and "PM Order No. 65/25".
Its actually a really good paper on what happened to CPT and how a number of circumstances brought about its downfall as opposed to the victories in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
But, in addition to the comparison with today's Southern Insurgency, replacing CPT with UDD and you have amazingly accurate picture of what is going on today under the guise of a democracy movement. The founders of the UDD really show their Maoist roots, wouldnt you say?
Its strategy was to negate the state's greater military power by mobilizing the people against it through the creation of a counterstate. Direct mobilization of a popular base and indirect mobilization through front organizations were to be the party's main lines of operation. Violence would be but one tool among many in an armed political campaign designed to march steadily towards seizure of the capital, Bangkok.
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Tactically, the Communist Party used local guerrilla units (main forces were never formed) to challenge government control of certain areas. Operationally, the link between the party and the guerrillas was the clandestine infrastructure, the counterstate, rooted in CPT control of local areas that functioned as its bases for further expansion.
Simultaneously, to attract and unify popular support, CPT political themes and propaganda concentrated on promoting the perception that the party was the Thai people's sole champion, its only effective means to address grievances. Hence the CPT concentrated its activity mainly in rural areas beset by poverty and politically estranged from the central government.
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To focus the resulting outburst, the CPT constructed its counterstate along standard Leninist lines. At the apex was a 7-man Politburo, below it a 25-man Central Committee. Central Committee members performed various staff functions, one of the most important being supervision of the military apparatus and creation of a united front (as called for by Maoist doctrine). Committee members frequently served as heads of Communist Party provincial (changwat) committees, which oversaw CPT district (amphoe) committees that, in turn, guided "township" (tambol) and village (muban or ban) party structures.