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  1. #1
    Mid
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    Accountability Project

    Simply a heads up that the following exists .........................



    In 2010 the Thai Red Shirts organized the largest pro-democracy demonstration in the history of Thailand.

    The demonstrations were brutally put down by the Thai Army, firing live ammunition at the unarmed civilians, killing around 90 people and wounding thousands.

    This site is a memorial to those who were killed, those who were injured and those who have been imprisoned.

    The Accountability Project
    Last edited by Mid; 30-01-2011 at 12:13 PM.

  2. #2
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    Witness 20

    The Statement of Anonymous Witness No. 20 is an amalgamation of testimony provided by a number of law enforcement officials in Thailand. These witnesses spoke with us at length, and they provided their testimony anonymously because of the grave danger they would face if their identities were discovered. Consequently, we merged their various testimonies into a single statement to make it more difficult for the Thai authorities to identify them.

    Their testimony is a behind-the-scenes account of the strategy and efforts by the Thai government to suppress evidence and manipulate the outcome of the official Thai investigations into the killings during the Red Shirt demonstrations in April and May 2010.

    thaiaccountability.org


    Statement of Anonymous Witness No. 20

    1. I am a resident of Bangkok, Thailand. I am making this statement anonymously because I am afraid to give my real name for fear that the Thai government will retaliate against me. Consequently, some of the information contained in this statement is intentionally vague, but this is not because I lack knowledge of the facts, but because specificity regarding certain events would identify me, placing my life in grave danger.

    2. My first language is Thai. However, although this statement is prepared in English, it has been translated for me, and its contents are accurate.

    3. I am employed by an official government agency in Bangkok. My position allows me to acquire information concerning the investigations being carried out by the Royal Thai Police (“Police”) and the Department of Special Investigations (“DSI”) into the killings that occurred during the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in April and May 2010 (the “Civilian and Army Personnel Killings”).

    4. It has been the official policy of the government of Thailand to conceal and/or eliminate all evidence of criminal conduct by the government or the Army leaders in connection with the Civilian Killings. One example of that policy involved the decision to release the bodies of the civilian victims to their families with full knowledge that the remains would be cremated, leaving no possibility of challenging any of the conclusions made in the official medical reports.

    Another example involved a massive campaign by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (“BMA”) – under orders from CRES – to clean the streets of Bangkok immediately after the conclusion of the Red Shirt demonstrations on May 19. This campaign lasted several days and, in the process, the BMA destroyed most of the physical and crime scene evidence of the civilian deaths. This campaign violated Thai laws concerning preservation of evidence, but it was intentionally carried out in order to remove any evidence of criminal conduct by the Army leaders and/or the Thai government.

    5. After the violent events in Bangkok on April 10, 2010, during which some 25 people were killed, the CRES caused the investigation into those deaths to be assigned to the DSI. The case was not assigned to the Police because it was determined that the Police were too numerous and diverse, and it would be impossible to control the results of their investigations. The DSI, on the other hand, is much smaller, and its Director, Tarit Phengdit and Deputy PM Suthep Thuegsuban, are themselves members of the Centre for Resolution of Emergency Situation (“CRES”). This assignment to the DSI, however, represented a gross conflict of interest in that the CRES should itself be a target of criminal investigation in connection with the killings on April 10.

    6. Nevertheless, on April 16, 2010, DSI Director Tarit was formally vested with the authority to conduct the investigation into the April 10 killings. Director Tarit promptly assigned the investigation into all of the 25 deaths to DSI investigator Wirawat Dejboonpa, who is loyal to Tarit. Investigator Wirawat intentionally did nothing to investigate the cases. Later, after additional killings in May, a total of 89 deaths were assigned to investigator Wirawat. He has to this day failed to conduct any serious investigation into the killings of innocent civilians, but rather has tried to assign criminal responsibility to the Red Shirt leaders currently incarcerated, in order to provide ostensible support for the terrorism charges asserted against them by the Thai government.

    7. Quite to the contrary, Investigator Wirawat’s investigations have been quite improperly biased in favor of the government’s official position. His investigative conclusion, for example, is that the Red Shirts were responsible for the explosions on Dinso Road on the night of April 10 that killed Colonel Romklao Tuwatham and several other soldiers. However, he has conceded openly that he has no evidence to support that conclusion. This absence of evidence is further supported by the fact that nobody has been arrested in connection with physically causing those explosions.

    8. During the period between May 13 and May 19, 2010, more than 60 additional people were killed in connection with the Red Shirt demonstrations. DSI Director Tarit, however, did not assign any of these killings to his subordinates for investigation until August 30, 2010, when public outcry forced him take some action. This delay constitutes a violation of Thai law, which requires investigations into deaths caused by public officials to be concluded within a specific period of time.

    9. Many of these remaining cases were assigned to investigators who are unwilling to ignore the truth, and will not whitewash the investigations out of loyalty to Tarit or the Abhisit government. Indeed, the majority of the DSI investigators are committed to proper conduct, and will not fabricate evidence or conceal the truth in order to reach a predetermined conclusion. At this time, investigations into more than half of the 89 deaths during the Red Shirt demonstrations – which are in various stages of progress – have concluded, at least preliminarily, that the killings were caused by certain soldiers of the Royal Thai Army under orders from the Thai government and the CRES.

    10. Some of the DSI investigators that have reached these conclusions have been instructed by their superiors to change their conclusions.

    11. Some of the killings from the period between May 13 and May 19, 2010 have been assigned to DSI investigators who are loyal to Director Tarit and are willing to ignore proper investigative procedures. These DSI investigators are doing nothing substantive to advance their investigations. They are also hoping for special promotions that DSI Director Tarit is seeking from the government on their behalf.

    12. At the moment, certain DSI investigators have completed their initial reports regarding at least four killings in May 2010, which conclude that that certain soldiers of the Royal Thai Army, under orders from the government, caused the deaths. At this stage, the DSI would ordinarily consult with the District Attorney’s Office and request the assignment of a District Attorney to interface with the DSI investigators to begin assessing whether the killings were carried out with intent, or whether they were in self-defense. However, DSI Director Tarit has taken no steps to begin any investigation into the issue of intent. This is contrary to normal DSI procedures and the requirements of Thai law, and is an attempt to delay the cases.

    13. DSI Director Tarit is engaged in a purposeful effort to delay the outcome of the DSI’s investigations. This is evident from his failure to assign the cases promptly for investigation, and from his failure to initiate any investigation into the issue of intent. His failure to advance the case is motivated, at least in part, by the fact that he is a member of CRES, which, under ordinary circumstances, would be the focus of an investigation.

    14. Additionally, consistent with other government efforts to suppress evidence, DSI Director Tarit has issued orders that the DSI investigators are prohibited from summoning any soldier of the Royal Thai Army for interrogation. This position is wholly inconsistent with ordinary practices of the DSI, which would have long ago interrogated anyone the DSI had concluded had been the cause of a killing.

    15. In November 2010, official DSI reports regarding some of the killings in May 2010 were leaked to the press, and Red Shirt leader Jatuporn Prompan made public comment about their conclusion that certain soldiers had caused the deaths. Shortly after this occurred, it was reported in the Thai media that Army Commander General Prayuth Chan O-Cha had called for the removal of DSI Director Tarit. Accordingly, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thuegsuban summoned DSI Director Tarit to meet with him.

    16. Immediately after that meeting, Prime Minister Abhisit held a press conference reaffirming his support for DSI Director Tarit. Director Tarit was kept in his position so that he could make a final decision not to prosecute Army leaders or members of the CRES.

    17. On his part, DSI Director Tarit told the press that Mr. Jatuporn’s statements about the leaked DSI reports did not coincide with the findings of the DSI investigators. These statements by Director Tarit were untrue.

    18. Shortly after his meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Suthep, DSI Director Tarit issued an internal DSI edict expressing his sole authority over the determination of whether there had been criminal intent in any of the killings. Without a finding of criminal intent, there can be no criminal liability under Thai law against Army leaders, CRES members or the Thai government.

    19. Additionally, following his meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Suthep, DSI Director Tarit informed all of his investigators that if they are unable to identify with specificity the names of the people who pulled the triggers that led to killings during the Red Shirt demonstrations, they must conclude that Red Shirts pulled the triggers. Additionally, where DSI investigators had concluded that at least five of the six victims from inside the Wapatumaran Temple had been killed by Army soldiers, DSI
    Director Tarit unilaterally reduced that number to three.

    20. It is abundantly clear from these events that DSI Director Tarit assured Prime Minister Abhisit, through Deputy Prime Minister Suthep, that he would conclude that there was no criminal intent on the part of any Army soldiers in connection with the civilian and soldiers deaths in April and May 2010, regardless of any finding by DSI investigators concerning the cause of death. In exchange for this concession, DSI Director Tarit was allowed to keep his job.

    21. There is absolutely no possibility that the DSI will voluntarily conduct a proper investigation into the killings of the civilians and soldiers during the Red Shirt demonstrations.
    _________________________________
    Anonymous Witness No. 20

    thaiaccountability.org

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    Witness 22

    The Statement of Anonymous Witness No. 22 is an amalgamation of testimony provided by a number of active-duty officers in the Royal Thai Army. These witnesses spoke with us at length, and they provided their testimony anonymously because of the grave danger they would face if their identities were discovered. Consequently, we merged their various testimonies into a single statement to make it more difficult for the Thai authorities to identify them.

    Their testimony is a behind-the-scenes account of the military crackdown on the Red Shirt demonstrations in April and May 2010, told by insiders who were able to observe the decision-making process of the government and the military.

    thaiaccountability.org


    Statement of Anonymous Witness No. 22

    1. I am a resident of Bangkok, Thailand. I am making this statement anonymously because I am afraid to give my real name for fear that the Thai government will retaliate against me. Consequently, some of the information contained in this statement is intentionally vague, but this is not because I lack knowledge of the facts, but because if I were more specific about certain events it would identify me, placing my life in grave danger. I am disclosing as much information as I safely can.

    2. My first language is Thai. However, although this statement is prepared in English, it has been translated for me, and its contents are accurate.

    3. I am a well‐placed active duty officer in the Royal Thai Army. My position has allowed me to acquire extensive and detailed information about the official response to the Red Shirt movement, including the planning and execution of military operations against Red Shirt demonstrators.

    4. Almost immediately after the 2006 coup that deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the highest levels of leadership in the Royal Thai Army came to conclusion that the pro‐ democracy movement in Thailand would almost certainly stage mass protests in response to the military junta that had taken over control of the country following the coup. This thinking was consistent with the views of the military junta itself, the leadership of the Democrat Party, and the Elite ruling class within Thai government (referred to collectively here as the “Thai Government”).

    5. Consequently, the leadership of the Royal Thai Army, with the full knowledge and authorization of the Thai Government, began to develop a military response plan. The overarching policy behind the response plan was to react to any political demonstrations by the Red Shirts with decisive military force in order to suppress and ultimately destroy the Red Shirt movement in Thailand.

    6. In addition to military force, one of the central strategies of this suppression policy involved (and continues to involve) the element of deception. The strategy has been to manufacture the false public impression that neither the Army nor the Thai Government are responsible for illegal, wrongful or unreasonable conduct toward the Red Shirt movement but, rather, that the Red Shirts are solely responsible for the use of military force against them. This strategy is coordinated between the Army and the Thai Government, and has taken a variety of forms including, as described more fully below:

    (a) destruction and/or manipulation of evidence that incriminates the Army and the Thai Government;

    (b) planting of evidence designed to incriminate the Red Shirts; (c) the surreptitious use of weaponry, including snipers and explosive devices, in such a way as to create the false appearance that the Red Shirts are responsible for violence; and

    (d) media propaganda designed to create the false appearance that the Red Shirts are violent, dangerous and threat to the Monarchy.

    7. The military leadership responsible for this policy included General Prem Tinsulanonda, General Anupong Paochinda, General Prawit Wongsuwan, General Prayut Chan‐ocha, General Kittipong Ketkowit, General Songkitti Jaggabatara, Admiral Kamthon Phumhiran, Air Chief Marshal Ithiporn Supawong, Police General Patheep Tanprasert, General Piroon Paewpolsong, General Wit Thephadsadin Na Ayutthaya, General Teerawat Boonyapradap, and General Daopong Rattanasuwan.

    8. Because of its historic political significance, the area of Rachadamnoen Avenue was thought to be the likely focus of any Red Shirt demonstrations. Therefore, as of approximately February 2007, in furtherance of this Army/Thai Government policy, the Army’s 11th Regiment King Guard – located at Bangkhen, in the northern part of Bangkok – was designated as the training grounds for the anticipated suppression of Red Shirt demonstrations. The facilities of the 11th Regiment were selected because of they were large enough to accommodate a full‐scale mock‐up of Rachadamnoen Road, which was mapped out in detail on the ground, beginning at the area of the Rama V Monument, south to Pan Fa Bridge and curving west to Pinklao Bridge on the Chaopraya River.

    9. All of the roads in the vicinity of Rachadamnoen Avenue were recreated for training of Army troops in anticipation of suppression operations. Regular training took place at these mock‐up facilities continuously as of February 2007, at the insistence of General Prayuth, with various component parts of the Armed Forces rotating into the 11 Regiment compound for training.

    10. In addition to the training activities at the 11th Regiment facilities, Armed Forces snipers were trained for operations in the Rachadamnoen Avenue area. They became intimately familiar with building locations and elevations, along with strategic locations for posting snipers. Their marksmanship training incorporated hypothetical targets based upon these parameters. They established killing zones, determined trajectories, and assigned snipers to specific zones.

    11. Certain Army units were permitted to grow their hair and beard, and they were ordered to attempt to infiltrate the UDD. Several soldiers secured positions as drivers, guards and sound engineers for various Red Shirt leaders, which enabled them to acquire information about the Red Shirts, as well as to identify Red Shirt targets for the Army.

    12. The Army leadership began to examine and study the history of political conflict in other countries, with particular attention paid to the strategy and tactics of armed forces in other countries who have put down civilian demonstrations by force.

    13. During the first part of 2009, the Army learned through its intelligence assets that the Red Shirts were planning mass demonstrations in April 2009, involving thousands of participants. The first such demonstrations began on approximately March 26, 2009. As anticipated, the demonstrators assembled in the area around the Government House on Rachadamnoen Road, demanding the dissolution of the Parliament and fresh elections.

    14. In response to these demonstrations, the Royal Thai Army’s 2nd Infantry Division (also known as the Queen’s Guard or the Eastern Tigers), under the command of General Prayuth Chan o‐Cha and Maj. Gen. Walit Rojanapakdi, was charged with responsibility for suppressing the demonstrations. On April 9, 2009, the 2nd Infantry Division left their headquarters in Chonburi Province, Sakaew Province and Prachinburi Province and arrived for staging at the 11th Regiment compound in Bangkhen.

    15. At approximately midnight on April 12, The Army withdrew troops of the 1 and 9 Infantry Divisions who had been occupying the Ding Dang area east of the Government House, and replaced them with troops of the 2nd Infantry Division under direct control of Maj. General Walit Rojanapakdi, who was to carry out the suppression operation.

    16. General Walit was given four basic orders in connection with the operation:

    (a) to complete the suppression before daylight on April 13;

    (b) to leave no bodies or injured behind;

    (c) to leave no traces of blood or other incriminating evidence; and

    (d) to prevent any reporters from witnessing the operations.

    These orders came from General Prayut Chan O‐cha, with the approval of Prime Minister Abhisit. It was clear to me from these orders that the purpose and intent of the military operation was to kill civilians, and that General Prayuth, his superiors in the Royal Thai Army, and the decision‐makers within the Thai Government, including Prime Minister Abhisit, were aware that the operation would involve killing innocent civilians as a part of implementing their overarching policy to suppress and eliminate the Red
    Shirt movement.

    17. Additionally, General Prem Tinasulanond ordered General Prayuth to assassinate some of the Red Shirt leaders in retaliation for the fact that Red Shirt demonstrators had staged protests in front of General Prem’s home.

    18. General Prayuth assigned Colonel Romklao Thuwatham to lead the 2nd Infantry Division’s suppression operation on the ground.

    19. A unit from the Army’s 1st Infantry Division was assigned the task of retrieving any bodies and removing them from the area. They were also assigned the task of taking prisoners. These troops, with assistance from the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration used water trucks to hose down the area to remove any traces of blood. The 1st Infantry Division removed at least six bodies of Red Shirt demonstrators.

    20. Following the events of April 2009, officials within the Army and the Thai Government falsely reported to the media in Thailand that no Red shirt demonstrators had been killed by the Army. Similar statements were made by Colonel Romklao and others to official parliamentary investigative commissions held later in 2009. These statements, however, were false.The 2nd Infantry Division was responsible for killing at least six and wounding more than 100 people during the suppression operation in April 2009.

    21. The Royal Thai Army and the Thai Government repeated this pattern of unprovoked killing and public deception on a much larger scale in response to the Red Shirt demonstrations in 2010. Indeed, the fact that the international press had failed to question the use of military weaponry in 2009 encouraged the Army Leadership to use them even more liberally in 2010.

    22. In early 2010, the Army learned from its intelligence assets that the Red Shirts would hold mass demonstrations in Bangkok, as of March 12, along Rachadamnoen Avenue and in the area of the Ratchaprasong intersection. Key leaders in the Thai Government and the Army immediately began to confer on a regular basis at the Army’s 11 Regiment facilities in Bangkhen to plan suppression operations. Regular participants from the Thai Government included Prime Minster Abhisit, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thuegsuban and DSI Director Tarit Phengdit (collectively referred to as the “Government Leadership”). Regular participants from the Armed Forces included General Anupong Paochinda, General Prawit Wongsuwan, General Prayut Chan‐ocha, General Kittipong Ketkowit, General Songkitti Jaggabatara, Admiral Kamthon Phumhiran, Air Chief Marshal Ithiporn, Police General Patheep Tanprasert, General Piroon Paewpolsong, General Wit Thephadsadin Na Ayutthaya, General Teerawat Boonyapradap, and General Daopong Rattanasuwan (collectively referred to as the “Army Leadership”). Just as in 2009, the objective of these meetings was to develop and implement a plan to suppress the Red Shirt demonstrations, consistent with the overarching policy to eliminate the Red Shirt movement in its entirety.

    23. An Army Task Force was established – under the command of Lt. General Daophong Ratanasuwan, General Anupong Paochinda and General Prayuth Chan o‐cha – to implement the military aspects of the suppression operations.

    24. Part of the plan involved conditioning the public to accept the notion that the Red Shirts were violent and dangerous. Consequently, beginning in early February 2010, provocateur groups working in coordination with the Army Task Force and the Abhisit administration set out to terrorize the public and lay the blame on the Red Shirts. They carried out their work principally in Bangkok, and their primary method was to plant and detonate a variety of explosive devices. Although this activity abated after the Red Shirt demonstrations were finally put down on May 19, they were allowed to continue at a reduced rate thereafter in order to provide ostensible justification for the Thai Government to maintain in effect the Emergency Decree in Bangkok.

    25. Another example of this high‐stakes form of negative public relations strategy involved the evacuation of Chulalongkorn Hospital in Bangkok on April 30, 2010. It was widely reported that the evacuation was prompted by an invasion of Red Shirt demonstrators searching for snipers. In fact, the incident was planned in advance by the Government Leadership and the Army Leadership, in collusion with certain members of the Thai media and certain members of the board of Chulalongkorn Hospital.

    After members of the press challenged Red Shirt leaders to back up their claims that Army snipers had fired shots from atop the hospital, hospital management immediately ordered the evacuation. There was never any genuine belief that the Red Shirt leaders presented a threat, and the orders to evacuate were given in order to heighten tensions and reinforce the false impression that the Red Shirts were violent and a threat to the Monarchy.

    26. The Government Leadership’s postponement of the beginning of the school year in May 2010 was also part of this anti‐Red Shirt public relations strategy. The decision was not based on any actual or perceived threat from the Red Shirts, but was designed to create the illusion that they were dangerous.

    27. On about March 8, 2010, Prime Minister Abhisit moved his personal residence to a building at the 11th Regiment facilities in Bangkhen so that he could be physically removed from the Red Shirt demonstrations while remaining directly involved, together with the rest of the Government Leadership and the Army Leadership, in the management of the response to the demonstrations. Prime Minister Abhisit was personally present at every meeting involving the Government Leadership, the Military Leadership and, later, the Centre for Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) concerning the Red Shirt demonstrations, and he expressly approved each and every order given to the Army through the Army Leadership.

    28. The Army Leadership and the Government Leadership determined to carry out an initial military suppression operation on April 10 in the area of Rachadamnoen Road. The operation was patterned largely upon the Chinese Army’s putdown of student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and there was never any question that it would involve killing numerous civilians. The Army estimated that the operation would result in approximately 500 civilian deaths, and based on those parameters, the operation was approved by all members of the Government Leadership, including Prime Minister Abhisit, and the Army Leadership.

    29. The specific objectives of the operation were to terrorize the demonstrators, assassinate the Red Shirt leaders, and suppress the Red Shirt movement. Contrary to common perception, the strategy was not to disperse the demonstrators. Rather, the operational strategy was to concentrate the demonstrators in a confined area, provoke the crowd to violence in order to create a perceived need for self‐defense, and open fire.

    30. As early as March 12, the Army task force had assembled a group of professional snipers, drawn from the various branches of the Thai military (every division in Operation Area). The Royal Thai Army sent its 3 Special Forces Regiment (Red Beret); the Royal Thai Air Force contributed a unit from its Special Force. The Thai Navy provided a Seal unit, and the Royal Thai Police sent a unit from their elite Arintharaj, Border Patrol Airborne and commandos. Roughly 40‐50 troops were sent from each division. These snipers were trained to operate in hiding, using special weapons. Following initial training for the suppression operation, they were assigned their weapons and instructed to zero their sights to a range of 300 meters.

    31. On April 7, 2010, as part of the suppression plans, Prime Minister Abhisit issued an Emergency Decree, limiting the movement and criminalizing the assembly of the Red Shirts. He also issued a decree establishing the CRES, and assigned Deputy Prime Minister Suthep as its Chairman. The CRES headquarters were set up at the Army’s 11th Regiment facilities.

    32. During the morning of April 10, the professional snipers previously assembled from the various branches of the Thai Armed Forces, and others, were deployed to strategic locations. In the Pan Fa Bridge area, they were posted on the Bangkok Bank building and atop the Pokklao Museum, with line of sight to the stage used by the Red Shirt leaders to give speeches. In the area of Democracy Monument, they were posted on the roof of the Streewit School on Dinso Road. Near the Khok Wua intersection, they were deployed on the roofs of the connected buildings in that area. They also stationed observers atop these buildings assigned the task, among other things, of identifying potential targets.

    33. At approximately 13:00 hours on April 10, the visible part of the suppression operation began. At this time, the Red Shirt crowds filled Outer Rachadamnoen Avenue southward for approximately two kilometers to Pan Fa Bridge, where the street turns west and becomes CentralRachadamnoen Avenue, leading to Democracy Monument, then further west to the Khok Wua intersection with Tanao Road, stopping just short of where Central Rachadamnoen Avenue crosses the Chaopraya River at Pinklao
    Bridge.

    34. Troops from the 1st Infantry Division – under the command of General Prayuth – were deployed from the First Region Army Headquarters on Outer Rachadamnoen Avenue at the Makkawan Bridge. The orders for the 1st Infantry Division were to drive the demonstrators south on Outer Rachadamnoen Avenue. Later, troops from the 9th Infantry Division would be deployed at the Pinklao Bridge and drive the demonstrators east along Central Rachadamnoen Avenue. In this manner, the demonstrators would be pinched into the middle area around Pan Fa Bridge. This concentration and density of people would enable armed soldiers disguised as Red Shirts, who had infiltrated the crowd, to create chaos and assassinate the Red Shirt leaders on the stage in a manner that could subsequently be blamed on something other than the Army. The objective was to complete the entire suppression operation by 18:00 hours, during daylight hours. By approximately 14:30 hours, the Army had exhausted its supply of rubber bullets and had begun to use live ammunition.

    35. Using methods designed to intimidate rather than disperse – including beating on shields with batons, shooting rubber bullets directly at demonstrators, and firing live rounds into the air – the troops of the 1st Infantry Division succeeded in driving the demonstrators south to where Outer Rachadamnoen Avenue intersects Wisut Kasat Road, at an area called Jorporror.

    36. At approximately 16:00 hours, the 1st Infantry was ordered to hold its ground at Jorporror because the 9th Infantry Division had encountered problems and was unable to advance beyond the Pinklao Bridge. These circumstances arose because Red Shirt demonstrators had rushed to meet the 9 Infantry Division at the Pinklao Bridge, and the soldiers leading the advance in armored personnel carriers (APCs) had been unwilling to drive over the civilians with their vehicles. When support trucks failed to advance, demonstrators removed their wheels, completely blocking Pinklao Bridge and stalling the advance of the 9th Infantry Division.

    37. At approximately 16:00 hours, as it became apparent that the Army would be unable to complete its operation before sundown, a meeting of the Army Task Force ensued at the temporary command center inside the First Region Army Headquarters during this period. There, General Prayuth argued that the operation should be completed immediately, regardless of daylight. He was opposed by the other generals on the Army Task Force but, on direct instructions from Prime Minister Abhisit, Prayuth prevailed and he was left in charge of the operation. There were no written orders for this nighttime operation.

    38. At approximately 17:00 hours, the professional snipers posted on the buildings in the area of the Khok Wua intersection began to fire live .22 caliber rounds at the demonstrators assembled in that area in an unsuccessful attempt to provoke them into attacking the troops.

    39. Prayuth added to the troops that had taken up positions at the top of Dinso Road and Tanao Road by deploying his own loyal troops on the front lines. He deployed troops from the 2nd Infantry Division at both locations, with the troops on Dinso Road supported by six APCs, led by Colonel Romklao.These troops advanced down Dinso Road and Tanao Road until their front lines were directly in front of the demonstrators.

    40. At 18:00 hours, the professional snipers posted atop the Streewit School began to fire live .22 caliber rounds into the legs of some of the protesters in the Democracy Monument area in an attempt to provoke them to make some form of threatening move against the Army troops on the ground. Additionally, soldiers began shooting rubber bullets directly into the crowd, and firing live ammunition over their heads. Soldiers of the 2ndDivision fired live .50 caliber rounds into the Democracy Monument structure from a machine gun fixed atop one of the APCs. Some of the soldiers began to fire live rounds directly into the crowd. One of these live rounds hit Japanese journalist Hiroyuki Muramoto, killing him.

    41. All of this activity was designed to provoke the crowd to violence so that the troops would have an excuse to open fire. The crowd, however, did not take any threatening action, and only lit firecrackers and threw plastic water bottles at the Army troops. This continued for more than an hour.

    42. At approximately 19:15, two separate grenades exploded behind the front lines of the 2nd Infantry Division on Dinso Road, killing several soldiers, including Colonel Romklao. I do not know who threw these grenades, although I suspect that they came from someone in the 1st Infantry Division (the King’s Guard), which has been involved for some time in a bitter rivalry with the 2nd Infantry Division (the Queen’s Guard) over which division would be considered the preferred path for advancement to the position of Army Commander, which has historically belonged to the King’ Guard but has in recent years moved to the Queens’ Guard. Neither would it surprise me if I were to learn that elements under General Prayuth’s command had thrown the grenades to provide an excuse for the troops to open fire on the crowds.

    43. Regardless of who threw these grenades, the 2nd Infantry Division took advantage and, in fact, opened fire on the crowd. Hundreds of civilians were wounded and many were killed. A gunner atop one of the 2nd Infantry Division’s APC, armed with a .50 caliber machine gun, was ordered to open fire on the civilians, but fortunately he refused.

    44. Earlier, the troops from the 2nd Infantry Division deployed on Tanao Road at the Khok Wua intersection had also opened fire, shooting thousands of rounds of live ammunition into the unarmed civilian crowd, although there had been no explosion on Tanao Road.

    45. As a consequence of how the suppression operation developed, the Army was not able to assassinate the Red Shirt leaders on the stage at Pan Fa Bridge because the troops could not compress the demonstrators into the area with sufficient density to create the required chaos. Further, the Army Leadership and the Government Leadership fully expected that assassinating the Red Shirt leaders at Pan Fa Bridge would lead to a collapse of the Red Shirt demonstrations at Ratchaprasong. Instead, most of the demonstrators who had assembled along Rachadamnoen Avenue moved to the Ratchaprasong area, adding to its strength.

    46. During the weeks immediately following April 10, the Government Leadership and Army Leadership turned their attention to suppressing the Red Shirt demonstrations at Ratchaprasong. Their plan called forestablishing a perimeter around the Ratchaprasong area and sealing off all ingress and egress. The Army would then breach the Red Shirt barricades and assassinate the leaders.

    47. In early May, the 2nd Cavalry Division, under the command of Maj. General Surasak Boonsiri, was ordered to secure Rama IV Road, from its intersection with Payathai Road (in the Samyan area) to its intersection with Wireless Road (Bonkai area). Maj. General Surasak’s immediate superior was Army Commander Anupong Paochinda.

    48. Officially, Maj. General Surasak’s orders were to shoot threatening targets only. However, his actual orders, which were unwritten, was to shoot any moving target in the Bonkai area, regardless of whether it represented a threat.

    49. Additionally, Maj. General Surasak was ordered to prevent anyone from taking photographs of the Army killing unarmed civilians, which effectively required the 2nd Cavalry Division to target any member of the media that entered the area. This order was prompted by the fact that there was abundant incriminating video and photographic evidence of the Army’s suppression operation on April 10, and the Army Leadership considered the April 10 operation a failure in part because of the public outcry that followed.

    50. Maj. General Surasak was also ordered to prevent anybody from removing the bodies of civilians killed in the Bonkai area by his troops. This order effectively required soldiers of the 2nd Cavalry Division to shoot at anyone trying to remove a body, including medical personnel.

    51. Most of the operations of the 2nd Cavalry Division in the Bonkai area were carried out by The 5th Cavalry Tank Battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. Phetpanom Pochai, a preferred of General Prem and General Pijit Kulvanich, both Privy Council members. Lt. Col. Phetpanon was continually in contact with General Prem and Gen. Pijit during this period, taking orders directly from them. Lt. Col. Phetpanom’s mobile phone number is +66‐081‐827‐6499, and his phone records during the period May 13 through May 19 would reveal numerous direct contacts with General Prem or his aids.

    52. Also in early May, the 1st Infantry Division, under the command of Maj. Gen Kampanat Rujdit, was ordered to secure the Ding Dang and Rajaprarop areas north of Ratchaprasong. The 1st Infantry Division was given the same basic orders in the north as the 2nd Cavalry Division had been given in the south:

    (a) shoot all moving targets, regardless of threat level;

    (b) prevent any photographic or video evidence; and

    (c) prevent the removal of any bodies.

    53. During the period between May 13 and May 19, the 1st Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division used the King Power Duty Free Shop in the Ratchaprarop area as a command post. The same professional snipers used on April 10 were also deployed in strategic areas, and they were responsible for the death of Maj. General Khataya Sawasdipol (known as Seh Dang), who was fatally shot in the head on May 13 while giving an interview to the press.

    54. The orders to the 1st Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division to shoot anyone attempting to remove a body from their respective areas of assignment was given in order to assist the implementation of an Army “intelligence” operation to destroy the evidence of any Army killings.

    55. Specifically, the Army Leadership implemented a policy of evidence destruction, in collusion with the certain state hospitals in Bangkok. Discreet units of the 1st Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division posed as ambulance drivers, and they would appear at shooting scenes in order to retrieve the bodies, ostensibly to take them to the hospital for proper treatment. In reality, however, these ambulances took numerous bodies to the Ding Dang’s Veteran’s Hospital and Chulalongkorn University Hospital for concealment and subsequent cremation. The objective was to destroy any evidence of criminal conduct by the Army.

    56. On May 19, the Army breached the Red Shirt barricades around Ratchaprasong. The troops involved where from the On May 19, the troops involved were the 2 Infantry Battalion of the 31 Infantry Regiment (King’s Guard), led by Lt. Col. Puengpak Yodarwut, deployed on the ground and on the BTS rails. These were joined on the BTS rails by troops from the 3rd Special Forces Regiment.

    57. Their orders were to shoot any person suspected of having weapons, and they were not required to determine whether anyone actually had weapons. Their pre‐deployment orders expressly stated that any individual carrying a slingshot was to be considered armed and dangerous. The troops were also ordered to shoot any Red Shirt guard on sight, whether armed or not. Thus, the troops were, in effect, permitted to shoot anyone they wished. It was this set of orders that led to the shootings at the Watpatumwanaram Temple in the late afternoon of May 19.

    58. The troops deployed on the BTS railing had specific orders to identify and shoot the Red Shirt leaders. However, the Red Shirt leaders were tipped off about these orders, and they quickly surrendered to the Police before the soldiers were able to kill them.

    59. After the 2nd Infantry Battalion breached the Red Shirt barricades, they secured the entire Ratchaprasong area. By 17:00 hours, the Army had fully secured all of the Central World buildings. All civilians were removed from the buildings, including numerous security guards who worked at Central World. After the civilians were removed, soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Battalion were posted outside Central World to prevent anyone from approaching or entering. The purpose of this exercise was to permit a team of arsonists contracted by the Army to plant incendiary devices inside Central World. These devices were intentionally ignited at approximately 17:45 hours, destroying the Zen store building. The operation was planned by the Army Leadership, with the consent and approval of the Government Leadership, several weeks in advance of May 19. The purpose of the operation was to cement in the public mind the concept that the Red Shirt movement was violent and dangerous, which the Government Leadership and the Army Leadership believed would create the impression that the Army’s actions in suppressing the Red Shirts were justified. In fact, the Red Shirts had nothing to do with the fires that destroyed part of the Central World complex.

    60. During the afternoon of May 19, Lt. Sanya Thairatanakul was responsible for searching Ratchaprasong and Lumpini Park for weapons held by the Red Shirt. He was unable to locate any. After he informed his superiors, a meeting was held at 09:00 hours at CRES headquarters the next day to discuss the issue. In attendance were Maj Gen. Aksra Kerdpol, Lt. Col. Monrat Ratavanich and four other people. They developed a plan to plant incriminating evidence against the Red Shirts. Pursuant to that plan, Lt. Sanya assembled a large cache of weapons, including AK‐47 automatic rifles and a variety of explosive devices, and planted them inside the Watpatumwanaram Temple and in Lumpini Park. The next day, Army spokesman Col. Sansern Keawkamnerd held a press conference during which he displayed the weapons and falsely announced that they had been found in Lumpini Park and in the Temple.

    _________________________________
    Anonymous Witness No. 22

    thaiaccountability.org

  4. #4
    Mid
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    Master Sergeant (Ret.) Joe Ray Witty

    Joe Ray Witty is a Green Beret and Master Sergeant (Retired) of the United States Army, Special Forces. He is a military-trained sniper and an explosives specialist, serving two tours of duty in military combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is currently employed by Los Angeles Police Department SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) team, where he is a member of SWAT’s sniper and breaching cadres. He is also an instructor for the Los Angeles Police Department in crowd control and crowd management, where his responsibilities include the planning and execution of law enforcement response to public demonstrations throughout the greater Los Angeles area.

    Master Sergeant (Ret.) Witty has reviewed and evaluated the Royal Thai Army’s response to the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in April and May 2010. He has studied many hours of video and photographic evidence from the demonstrations. He traveled to Bangkok in 2010, where he personally examined the physical sites of the Royal Thai Army’s crackdown and interviewed numerous witnesses. His Expert Report represents a scathing indictment of the methods employed by the Thai Royal Army and the Thai Government.

    Read Master Sergeant (Ret.) Witty’s Expert Report here
    (Warning: Highly Graphic Material)

    thaiaccountability.org

  5. #5
    Mid
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    UDD commemorates '2010 heroes'
    10/04/2014

    The United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) on Thursday morning took part in a religious rite to commemorate the red-shirts who lost their lives in the government crackdown on anti-government protesters at the Khok Wua intersection on Ratchadamnoen Avenue on April 10, 2010.


    The ceremony, at the Imperial World department store at Lat Phrao, was attended by UDD leaders led by Jatuporn Prompan.

    Activities - including shows of video clips featuring past struggles of the red shirts, music, and speeches by UDD core members - are scheduled to be continue until 6pm.

    bangkokpost.com

  6. #6
    Lord of Swine
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    Quote Originally Posted by Mid View Post
    Master Sergeant (Ret.) Joe Ray Witty

    Joe Ray Witty is a Green Beret and Master Sergeant (Retired) of the United States Army, Special Forces. He is a military-trained sniper and an explosives specialist, serving two tours of duty in military combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is currently employed by Los Angeles Police Department SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) team, where he is a member of SWAT’s sniper and breaching cadres. He is also an instructor for the Los Angeles Police Department in crowd control and crowd management, where his responsibilities include the planning and execution of law enforcement response to public demonstrations throughout the greater Los Angeles area.

    Master Sergeant (Ret.) Witty has reviewed and evaluated the Royal Thai Army’s response to the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in April and May 2010. He has studied many hours of video and photographic evidence from the demonstrations. He traveled to Bangkok in 2010, where he personally examined the physical sites of the Royal Thai Army’s crackdown and interviewed numerous witnesses. His Expert Report represents a scathing indictment of the methods employed by the Thai Royal Army and the Thai Government.

    Read Master Sergeant (Ret.) Witty’s Expert Report here
    (Warning: Highly Graphic Material)

    thaiaccountability.org


    I would strongly suspect that if you had an actual expert in the field produce a report on anything the Thais did, from fumigating a hotel to waste management and through to building an airport or highway, the report would be "scathing".

  7. #7
    Mid
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    why settle for suspect , link to the report is there .

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